PATTERNS OF POWER

The Parvenu and the Palimpsest

Italy in Libya, 1911–1943

A CASE STUDY

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic)

held as tested, not revealed

A note on the collaboration

This study was built the way the others in the collection were built: one module at a time, by a human author working with Claude, an AI system made by Anthropic, each doing the part it does best. The framework is the author's — the twelve-module method, the two dials and the seam and the gradient from an order held by force to one that runs on the governed's own conviction, the whole apparatus set out in the *Patterns of Power* papers that stand behind every case. The judgment about what the framework was showing, and where a case pushed back on it, was made in the conversation between us. What Claude brought was the reading and the drafting under a fixed discipline: verify every load-bearing quote, date, and figure against a source before writing it; quote the primary record exactly and paraphrase only the modern scholarship; set the public words beside the on-the-ground words and let the gap speak rather than preaching the sum; and hold the suffering with gravity, refusing both the flattery that would excuse the order and the demonisation that would flatten it. "Legibility is not pardon" was the rule at every step — to explain an order's logic is not to forgive it, and the study explains in order to see clearly, not to absolve.

The method has a particular value on a case like this one, which was suppressed for most of a century — the archives shut, the film banned, the crimes folded under a national myth of essential decency. A study that must verify its every figure against the record, and that treats the exact wording of a law or a general's order as the evidence rather than as decoration, is one way of forcing a sealed seam open and keeping it open. Where a figure could not be confirmed it was given as a range or left out; where a source's wording could not be checked it was flagged as reported rather than asserted. The discipline is the argument.

Every module also carries something back to the framework — a refinement the case forced, stated plainly in each module's closing section — because a case study that only illustrated a method would not be worth the writing. Those contributions are gathered in the final module and listed there; several were substantial enough to be written back into the field manual itself.

The study in brief

The subject is Italy's conquest and colonisation of Libya, from the invasion of 1911 to the loss of the colony in 1943 — and, past that, to the return of the order Italy had tried to destroy. It is read, as every colonial case must be, from two societies at once, reconstructed in the opening landscape. To the north stood Italy: a nation barely fifty years old when the fleet sailed, its own formation still thin — most of its people unable to read, most not speaking its language, its Church for two generations pointed against its state — and, after 1922, a nation led by a parvenu, a charismatic ruler with no dynastic legitimacy whose authority ran on the triumphs he could deliver. To the south stood Libya: a palimpsest of naturalised conquests a thousand years deep, its Islam the seventh-century Arab conquest driven so far into the ground that it had long since become simply the way the world was, held and renewed through the Sanusi lodge until the faith and the tribe were one seam. The study is the record

of what happened when an expensive-pole conquest, whose belief never took with the conquered, was laid over a cheap-pole order whose belief had taken so completely that it needed almost no force at all.

The twelve modules follow the order from its floor to its fall. The coast was taken in three weeks by naval gun; the interior took twenty years, sixteen concentration camps, and a genocide, because a mobile pastoral people offered the conqueror no natural pen and the pen had to be built by hand — the wire and the camp that manufactured the capturability the desert refused. The wealth taken was not a surplus, for Libya was a box of sand; it was the land itself, cleared of its people for Italian settlers, so that the killing and the settling were one act and the roads Italy built cannot be netted against the dead, because they were built for the caste that replaced them. The legitimating stories were cut for every audience except the conquered — Rome reborn for the metropole, a forged Sword of Islam for the wider Muslim world, and toward the Libyans nothing but the floor. The formation that might have made the order real was withheld, so the field stayed held by the native order, which reproduced itself for free and produced the twenty-year resistance. The information that would have let the metropole see what was done was managed by the oldest valve of all, distance — and, when the regime fell, resealed by the nation itself under the myth of the *italiani brava gente,* the good people, which is why the camps stayed unknown for eighty years. The elite was coordinated by a charismatic apex who exported his most dangerous lieutenant to the colony and was undone, in the end, by the king whose borrowed legitimacy he had never been able to do without. A genuine plural opening under a weak liberal Italy — the first republic in the Arab world, elective parliaments, a recognised native emir — was foreclosed the moment a regime arrived willing to pay the price of domination. And the order fell not because the conquered beat it but because the parvenu's delivery-engine consumed itself, staking the empire he held on the sea he coveted and losing both to a foreign army and to his own deposition — after which the Sanusi order the camps had been built to erase rose from where it had waited and took the crown of an independent Libya.

The through-line, drawn tight in the final module, is the recursion of Rome. Italy claimed to return to Libya as the heir of the Rome that had ruled the coast before Islam — and inverted Rome's method exactly. The Rome whose heir Italy claimed to be had, in the person of a dynasty born on that very Libyan coast, opened the widest door to inclusion the ancient world ever cut, extending its citizenship to a whole empire while letting each people keep its own law. The Italy that claimed to inherit that Rome took the identical instrument, the retention of the conquered's law, and used it to lock the Libyans out of citizenship rather than into it. The door Rome opened, its heir closed — and an order that refuses to take the governed in can hold the floor by force but never becomes their world, which is why Rome lasted centuries on that coast and Italy thirty years. That is the measurement the whole study is arithmetic toward, and it is left, as the method requires, for the reader to weigh.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

Contents

Landscape	*The Parvenu and the Palimpsest*
Module 1	*The Paper and the Wire*
Module 2	*The Diploma and the Podere*
Module 3	*The Arch and the Sword*
Module 4	*The Kuttab and the Balilla*
Module 5	*One Doctor for Thirty-three Thousand*
Module 6	*Space for the Great Proletarian*
Module 7	*Damaging to the Honour of the Army*
Module 8	*Benito in Balboland*
Module 9	*The Republic and the Reconquista*
Module 10	*The Sea He Claimed*
Module 11	*The Land the Dead Bought*
Module 12	*The Door the Heir Closed*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — OPENING LANDSCAPE

THE PARVENU AND THE PALIMPSEST

The ground before the landing — a thousand-year palimpsest of naturalised conquest on the southern shore and a nation fifty years old on the northern one, and the colonial bend doubled: a robe cut not for the conquered but for a metropole still making itself, under an apex who had no robe but the one he could deliver

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Why a colonial case is read from two landscapes — and why this one is read from more than two

Every study in this collection begins by reconstructing the ground a conquest fell on: who held the floor of force, how the wealth was settled, and what story the population had been formed to believe was rightful, so that the conquest can be read as an act performed *against* a real prior order rather than upon empty scenery. A colonial conquest doubles that requirement, because a colonial conqueror answers to an audience the conquered will never see, and two landscapes have to be reconstructed rather than one — the land invaded and the land that invaded it.

The bend the colonial case puts in the framework was stated once, for French Algeria, and holds here without alteration, so it can be stated briefly and then complicated. In an ordinary order the floor and the robe sit over the same population: force holds the ground, and a believed story is laid over that same ground to make the holding cheap. In a colony they come apart by distance. The floor operates in the colony; the robe is cut for the metropole. The colonial governor does not need the conquered to believe he is rightful — their belief buys him nothing his rifles do not already secure, and *force never pays for what it does not need*. What he needs is the belief of the people back home: the taxpayer who funds the expedition, the deputy who votes its credits, and above all the formed citizen who fills the army and obeys the order to embark. That citizen's conviction that the conquest is lawful, glorious, or civilising is the foundation the whole enterprise rests on, and it is a foundation laid at home, not on the conquered coast. The conquered are handled on the cost side of the ledger, by the floor, as the ruled-who-are-contained; the metropole is the ruled-who-must-believe.

This case takes that bend and turns it further than any yet in the corpus, in two ways that organise everything downstream and are the reason the file is opened here rather than at the first landing.

The first is that the metropole whose belief funds this conquest is itself barely made. When the fleet sails in 1911, the Kingdom of Italy is fifty years old. Its people do not, in any thick sense, yet believe in *it* — most cannot read, most do not speak its language, the Church that formed them has forbidden them to take part in its politics, and its poorest by the million are leaving it altogether for the Americas. A colony's robe is normally cut to fund a conquest; here the robe is cut partly to *manufacture the nation doing the conquering*. The Libyan war was sold at home not only as glory but as the act

that would finally make Italians of the Italians — which means the belief the floor was really building was the metropole's belief in its own existence. The reversed robe, in this case, is a nation-making engine pointed inward, and that is a refinement the framework has to absorb: where the metropole's own formation is thin, the colony becomes a formation-machine for the metropole, and the conquest exists in part to make the conqueror.

The second is that after 1922 the man at the apex of that metropole has no inherited robe at all. Benito Mussolini is not a king. He descends from no anointed line, holds no currency of tradition, rules formally beneath a Savoy monarch who could dismiss him and finally did. His authority is the third of Max Weber's types — the charismatic, the personal gift or mission that must be demonstrated, and demonstrated again, by what it delivers, because a charisma that stops delivering stops being believed. To borrow a plain word for it, Mussolini is a *parvenu:* a man whose legitimacy is exactly and only what he can produce in the moment. A parvenu apex needs victories the way an anointed one needs a coronation, and a poor, half-pacified box of desert that could be reconquered and dressed as Rome reborn was precisely the coin such a man could still strike. So the colony's robe here does double and triple duty: it funds a conquest, it helps make a nation, and it feeds the personal charisma of an apex who has nothing else to run on. Three audiences, three robes, one floor — and, at the far end, a fourth robe cut toward the wider Muslim world in the shape of a sword forged in Florence.

Against all of that stands the southern shore, and here the framework's second discipline governs the reading — the one that says a conqueror never meets an aboriginal or timeless baseline, because the order he finds is itself a naturalised *former* conquest that already reached the self-running pole. The Islam that had become simply the way the world was in Libya was the seventh-century Arab conquest driven so deep across a thousand years that no living person experienced it as a thing that had once been imposed; the coast beneath it was a palimpsest of earlier conquests, each scraped down and written over by the next. The whole of the study's central measurement is the contrast between the two shores read in these terms: an expensive-pole conquest, whose belief never took with the conquered and which therefore ran on force and surveillance, laid over a cheap-pole order whose belief had taken so completely that it needed almost no force at all. Naming the southern order's origin as conquest is not to debunk it — the opposite. A built thing that became real is more genuine and more durable than a lie could ever be, and the Islamic-Sanusi order was authentically the conquered's world, as the Fascist order was authentically the settler's. That a thing was built does not make the belief a performance; it makes it a thing that was built and then became real. Hold that, and the two shores can be stood on in turn.

Landscape I — Libya: the palimpsest

The substrate: a coast written and overwritten

There is no first innocent order anywhere on this coast, only earlier builds that took and were buried under later ones. The oldest layer the record reaches is Berber; over it the Phoenicians of Tyre planted trading cities on the western shore before 500 BC — Oea, Sabratha, and the Lepcis that the Romans would call Leptis Magna, the three towns whose Greek name, Tripol-

is, still names the whole region. On the eastern shore Greek colonists from Thera founded Cyrene about 631 BC and, around it, the five cities of the Pentapolis that gave Cyrenaica its name. Rome absorbed both, and the depth of that absorption is worth one concrete emblem, because it is the recursion in a single life: the Roman emperor Septimius Severus, who ruled from 193 to 211, was born at Leptis Magna of Libyan-Punic descent, the first emperor sprung from a provincial family rather than an Italian one — a man from this coast who was not a Roman ruling Libyans but a Libyan who was entirely, unremarkably Roman, and who poured such wealth on his birthplace that it rivalled Carthage and Alexandria. "Roman" had been a conquest identity once; by his day it had been naturalised so thoroughly that a Libyan could wear it to the summit of the world and no one thought it strange. Over Rome came Christianity, of which this coast was an early centre — the heresiarch Arius came from Ptolemais in Cyrenaica — and then the Vandals in 439, and then the Eastern Empire again in 533, each layer a conquest that for a time was simply the world and then was scraped away.

The point of rehearsing the palimpsest is not antiquarian. It is that the conqueror who came in 1911 calling himself the heir of Rome, and who set his archaeologists to digging the Arch of Septimius Severus out of the sand at Leptis Magna in the very years he was building the concentration camps, was invoking one former conquest of this coast to justify displacing another — reaching past the layer that had actually taken to claim kinship with a layer a millennium dead. The recursion is not a subtlety the study imposes on the case; the case performs it with shovels.

The conquest that became the world

The layer that took — that reached the cheap, self-running pole and stayed there — was the Arab and Islamic one. Under Amr ibn al-As, the armies of the new faith crossed from Egypt into Cyrenaica in September 642, renaming the Pentapolis Barqa; Tripoli fell in 643 or 644, and the Fezzan was reached under Uqba ibn Nafi in the following decades. The conquest was military, and its consolidation was slow and contested — Berber resistance ran for generations, and full Arabisation waited on the great migration of the Banu Hilal Bedouin from the eleventh century, which carried the language and the tribal form into the deep interior. But given the time formation needs, the belief drove all the way down. By the nineteenth century a Bedouin of the Cyrenaican plateau lived a life that had changed little in the centuries since his ancestors first accepted the Prophet's teaching, and the shape of his world — the Qur'an as the ground of the law, the calendar of the fasts and the pilgrimage, the five daily prayers, the descent of the holy families from the Prophet's line — was not to him a doctrine that someone had once brought and installed. It was simply the way things were, the furniture of reality, defended as the edge of the world is defended, without any thought that it had an author or a beginning. This is the self-running machine at full function: an order held up by the conviction of the governed themselves, needing almost no force to maintain, because the many enforced it on themselves for free and felt righteous doing so. That its origin, twelve hundred years earlier, was a conquest by an army does not make it less real. It makes it exactly the thing the framework calls a former conquest naturalised to the cheap pole — and it is the standard against which the expensive thing Italy was about to attempt will be measured.

The class above: the Ottoman order and the Karamanli interlude

Onto that deep Islamic formation a further, shallower conquest had been laid, and its character is the second half of the southern landscape, because it was the state Italy actually had to defeat and it was governed on a logic Italy could not reproduce. The Ottomans took Tripoli in 1551 and ruled the three regions, in law, until 1912. But they ruled them the way a durable empire rules a distant Muslim province: with a class of Turkish and Turkish-descended administrators and soldiers sitting above a population left substantially in possession of its own formation. The everyday texture of belief — the Maliki law the population followed, the Sufi lodges, the veneration of saints, the authority of the local shaykh — the Ottoman state did not try to replace, because it did not need to. Its own legitimacy toward its Muslim subjects ran through the very formation they already held: the Sultan was the Caliph, the commander of the faithful, the sword of Islam against the Christian sea, and to obey him was to stand on the right side of the only division that mattered. The overlay and the substrate shared a robe. That sharing is the whole difference between the Ottoman conquest and the Italian one to come —

the Turk was a foreigner whose religion was the population's religion, and the Italian would be a foreigner whose religion the population was formed to see as the enemy.

Even this overlay had bent toward local hands and back again in a rhythm the corpus will recognise. Through the eighteenth century Istanbul's grip slackened; in 1711 a cavalry officer of mixed Turkish and local descent, Ahmed Karamanli — a ***kouloughli,*** son of a Turkish soldier and a Libyan woman — seized Tripoli and founded a hereditary dynasty that ruled for a hundred and twenty-four years under nominal Ottoman suzerainty, living on corsairing, tribute, and the trans-Saharan trade, and independent enough to sign its own treaties and to fight a war with the young United States over the Barbary ransom. When the dynasty tore itself apart in civil war, and with the French newly in Algiers in 1830 and Muhammad Ali stirring in Egypt, the Ottomans came back in force in 1835, deposed the last Karamanli, and imposed direct rule for the first time in centuries. This second Ottoman period, which lasted to 1911, was administration held on a short leash from the centre — some thirty-three governors rotated through in seventy-five years, precisely so that none could put down local roots — reaching firmly along the coast and the tax-roads and thinning to almost nothing in the interior. The extraction was real but not crushing; the reach was a fiction in the deep desert. It was a tributary overlordship with a hard floor along the corridors and a light hand in the mountains, and it had functioned in its own register for centuries when the men who came to bring it order arrived.

The seam that took: the Sanusiyya

Where the Ottoman state's reach thinned, another authority had grown into the vacancy, and it is the single most important feature of this landscape for everything that follows, because it was the true holder of the trusted-information leg among the tribes and it was the thing that would still be standing when the Turkish floor had cracked. In 1837 an Algerian-born scholar, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi — remembered as the Grand Sanusi — founded a reformist Sufi order in Mecca; expelled from the Hejaz, he moved it to Cyrenaica about 1843 and built its mother lodge, the Zawiya al-Bayda, on the Jabal al-Akhdar. In 1856 he moved his headquarters deliberately eastward to the remote oasis of Jaghbub, out of reach of Ottoman surveillance, and built there a mosque and a university reckoned second in Africa only to al-Azhar. From that seat the order spread by planting zawiyas — lodges that were at once school, court, hostel, storehouse, and chapterhouse — along the caravan routes and among the tribes. There were some fifty-two by the founder's death in 1859 and around a hundred and forty-six by 1902.

What made the Sanusiyya decisive was not its size but the way it fused with the tribal structure until it *was* the structure's nervous system. The lodge sat at the seam between the Bedouin and everything the Bedouin could not check for himself — the law, the letters, the settlement of blood-feuds, the safe conduct of trade, the meaning of the faith — and it earned, over three generations, the trust that a state can only covet. In the desert the order was, in plain fact, more powerful than the Ottoman state, and in much of Tripoli and Benghazi the word of the shaykh carried further than the decree of the governor. This is the durable native counter-formation that the framework predicts, and it is durable for exactly the stated reason: it was a former conquest's robe — Islam — that had fully taken, renewed and organised by an order that had grown into the population's own seam. When the alien floor above it cracked, this formation would not crack with it, because it had never lived in that floor. It lived in the lodges, and it is why the resistance that met Italy in Cyrenaica was not a defence of the Ottoman state at all but a religious mobilisation under a Qur'an teacher from a Sanusi lodge — Omar al-Mukhtar — whose authority flowed from the zawiya and the faith, not from any dey or pasha. The

order would outlast the whole colonial episode: its leader Idris al-Sanusi, recognised Emir of Cyrenaica in 1920, would become the king of independent Libya in 1951.

What the floor found, on the eve of 1911

Set the layers together and the southern landscape is a state that was easy to defeat and a society that was nearly impossible to convert. A small Ottoman garrison — on the order of five thousand regulars — held the coast for a Sultan whose sovereignty the population honoured because he was the Caliph, over perhaps a million to a million and a half people (the figure is contested and undercounted, the nomads never properly numbered), the great majority of them Arab and Berber Muslims whose formation ran not through the state but through the mosque, the lodge, and the tribe. Cracking the floor would take the Italian fleet a few weeks. Reaching the belief beneath it would prove, across the next twenty years, to be a thing no quantity of shells could do — because the belief was not held by the thing being shelled.

Landscape II — Italy: the nation fifty years old

A fiction lately made real

Cross the sea to the power that sent the fleet, and the first fact to fix is that "Italy" in 1911 was a very recent achievement laid thinly over formations far older and deeper than itself — which is the mirror of the southern shore and the engine of the whole colonial bend as this case bends it. Rome had fallen in the fifth century; for the fourteen centuries since, the peninsula had been a patchwork of kingdoms, duchies, republics, and papal domains, conquered and reconquered by Normans, Spaniards, Austrians, and French, with no political "Italy" at all. The idea of one was a nineteenth-century project, stirred by the revolutions of 1848 and driven to completion by the Kingdom of Sardinia under the House of Savoy: the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed on 17 March 1861, took Venice from Austria in 1866, and completed itself only in 1870, when Italian troops breached the wall at Porta Pia and took Rome from the Pope. It was, historians of the process say bluntly, "Piedmontisation all around" — the annexation of the peninsula by one north-western state, which imposed its own constitution, its taxes, and its officials on everyone else.

And the formation was thin, by every measure the framework asks for. At unification something close to four in five Italians could not read; the illiteracy rate would take half a century to halve. Only a small minority spoke the Tuscan literary language that was now the national one; the rest spoke tongues a Piedmontese could not follow. The deepest formative institution in the land, the Catholic Church, stood against the new state outright: robbed of Rome, the Pope forbade the faithful to vote or stand in its elections, a boycott — the *Non Expedit* — not fully lifted until 1929, so that the most Italian thing about most Italians, their Catholicism, was for two generations pointed away from the nation. The South, conquered as much as joined, answered unification with years of insurrection the state suppressed as "brigandage." The famous line that names the whole condition is itself a fitting artefact of it — the maxim "we have made Italy, now we must make Italians," universally attributed to the statesman Massimo d'Azeglio, turns out on scholarly inspection to be a later crystallisation whose exact wording and even authorship are contested, the memoirs actually carrying a gloomier and differently worded lament that Italy had been made but the Italians were not being made. A nation whose most quoted sentence about its own unfinished formation is a phrase half-invented after the fact is a nation whose formation was, precisely, unfinished. The robe was thin, and everyone serious knew it.

The great proletarian: emigration and the search for a nation

Onto that thinness pressed a demographic wound that would supply the conquest its deepest public justification. Poor Italians were leaving by the million — to the United States, to Argentina, to Brazil — and the nationalist intellectuals of the new century read that haemorrhage as a national humiliation and a national argument. Enrico Corradini gave it a slogan by casting Italy as a proletarian nation, poor and exploited among the plutocratic empires as a worker is among the rich, entitled to seize its place by the same logic that justified the worker's struggle. The remedy the nationalists proposed was a colony that could hold the emigrants Italy was losing — a demographic colony, land for the landless, so that a peasant who would otherwise become a labourer in Pennsylvania might instead become a farmer on Italian soil across the water. Libya was cast for the part and given a name that stated the fantasy directly: the Quarta Sponda, the Fourth Shore, an extension of Italy itself across the Mediterranean, and, by the further claim that Italy was the heir of Rome, a mere recovery of what had once been Roman ground. The sceptics saw through it — the radical Gaetano Salvemini dismissed Libya as uno scatolone di sabbia, a big box of sand, poor and worthless and no solution to anything — but the box of sand was never really the point. The point was at home.

Pascoli's hinge: the conquest as a way to make Italians

The clearest statement of what the conquest was actually for came not from a general but from a gentle poet, and it is the hinge on which the two landscapes lock together. On 26 November 1911, weeks into the war, Giovanni Pascoli rose in the theatre at Barga and delivered the oration published the next day in La Tribuna, opening with a line that has been quoted ever since: "La grande proletaria si è mossa" — the great proletarian has stirred. The great proletarian was Italy: the poorest of the European nations, whose sons had been sent abroad to be treated, he said, almost as the Black man was treated, doing the hardest and most despised work in other men's countries, and who were now to have fertile land of their own across the sea. And Pascoli closed the argument by tying it back to the wound of thin formation directly, declaring that in this fiftieth-anniversary year of unification the martyrs of the war had at last fulfilled the founders' vow and shown that the Italians, too, had finally been made. There is the reversed robe in a single speech: the conquest justified to the metropole as the act that would forge, out of a still-unmade people, the nation the Risorgimento had failed to finish. The belief the floor in Libya was really building was the belief of Italians in Italy.

The parvenu: an apex with no robe but delivery

That conquest was begun by Liberal Italy, under the veteran prime minister Giovanni Giolitti, for reasons that were already three-quarters domestic — prestige, the emigration argument, the pressure of the nationalists, an election in view. But the man who would complete it, eleven years later, ruled on a wholly different and more naked basis, and he is the second reason this landscape must be read past the first landing.

Benito Mussolini was born in 1883, the son of a village blacksmith, and made himself first as a socialist agitator and journalist — and, in a detail the study will not let go of, he was jailed in 1911 for violently *opposing* the very invasion of Libya he would one day complete and crown himself for. He broke with the socialists over the First World War, built a movement of blackshirted veterans, and in October 1922, at the head of a threatened March on Rome, was handed the premiership by King Victor Emmanuel III — who refused to sign the martial law that would have stopped him and preferred to install the "strong man" who would spare him the recurring crises of parliamentary government. Mussolini took office at thirty-nine, with no prior office and thirty-two deputies, formally the King's appointee and formally beneath him: a *diarchy,* in which the crown retained, unused until 1943, the power to dismiss the Duce it had raised. His title, *Il Duce,* the Leader, he had borrowed from the poet-adventurer D'Annunzio; his authority was neither the throne's traditional currency nor the settled legal-rational kind, but the charismatic — the personal mission that is believed only so long as it

produces. He was, in the plainest sense, a parvenu: a man with no inherited legitimacy whatever, whose robe was whatever he could deliver, and who therefore *needed* to deliver — victories, order, empire, prestige — the way an anointed king needs only to be crowned.

This is why a poor box of desert mattered to him out of all proportion to its worth. Mussolini, eager for domestic triumphs, set his eye on *reconquering* Libya, where Italian control had shrivelled during the World War to little more than the coastal towns, and he dressed the campaign as the *Riconquista* — Rome reborn, the *mare nostrum* made Italian again. The reconquest was the delivered result on which the charisma fed, and its instrument in Cyrenaica, General Rodolfo Graziani, would produce the delivery by methods the metropole was never shown whole. And when the killing was largely done, Mussolini reached for a last robe, cut toward the one audience the sword still impressed: on 18 March 1937, on the outskirts of Tripoli, a pro-Italian Berber notable presented him with a "Sword of Islam" and he had himself proclaimed *Protector of Islam,* heir — he reasoned — to the caliphal authority Italy had taken from the Ottomans. The sword was a forgery in the most literal sense, commissioned by Mussolini himself from a goldsmith's firm in Florence, with no tradition behind it; the acclamation was choreographed, the crowd taught to sing the Fascist anthem in Arabic; the famous photograph of the Duce on horseback raising the blade was retouched to remove the groom holding his horse still. It is the framework's *forge* provenance at its purest — a trusted authority manufactured from nothing, the cues a mind is built to trust deliberately counterfeited — and, like Timur's separate claim of the Sword of Islam toward his Persian subjects, it was a robe cut for an audience that would never compare notes with the one at home. That the man raising it had been imprisoned for opposing this very conquest a quarter-century before is not hypocrisy to be scored; it is the plainest possible reading of the engine. Position, not sincerity, chooses the robe. The socialist who went to jail against the war and the Duce who crowned himself its Protector were the same man reading two different positions, and each choice was the local logic of the chair he sat in.

The seam the study will pry at

Set the two shores side by side and the shape of the whole study stands up. On the southern shore, a society formed to the bone by a former conquest that had become the world — Islam held at the cheap, self-running pole, renewed through the Sanusi seam, so deeply the population's own that defeating the Ottoman state that sat above it did nothing to touch it. On the northern shore, a nation half-made, its formation thin and contested and its people leaving by the million, reaching across the sea for a conquest that might at last make Italians of them — and, after 1922, an apex with no robe of his own but the one he could deliver, for whom the reconquest was the coin his charisma had to keep minting.

Between them runs the asymmetry these studies exist to expose, and here it is sharpened by the parvenu's need and by the metropole's thinness into something close to a pure specimen. What was done on the Cyrenaican plateau after 1929 — the forced march of the Jebel population to camps on the coast, the wire, the hunger, the aircraft over the tribes, the border fenced to the Egyptian frontier

to seal the fighters off from help — was one thing. What was shown to Italy — the Fourth Shore blooming, the Roman arch rising from the sand, the Duce as pacifier and Protector of Islam — was another, and the distance between them was not an accident of the record but the working principle of the enterprise. The private words the study will set against the public ones are already in the archive: the order, given in June 1930 for the separation of the population from the resistance, that the course must be carried through to the end *even if the entire population of Cyrenaica must perish* — set that beside the equestrian bronze in Tripoli that named the man on the horse the redeemer of the land of Libya, and the seam is exposed without a word of commentary. The gallows on which Omar al-Mukhtar was hanged on 16 September 1931, before some twenty thousand of his own people interned at the camp of Soluch, stood on one shore; the news that reached the other shore was that Cyrenaica had been pacified. Keeping those two ends from meeting was the order's core task, and it is what the modules that follow are built to measure.

Those modules will build each of these out in turn — the floor of the two conquests, Liberal and Fascist, and the founding legends that cover them; the settlement of confiscated land and the native apparatus Italy tried and failed to turn; the several robes, cut for the metropole, for the army, for the wider Muslim world, and never for the conquered; the thin formation Italy withheld from a people it would not admit; the cost column, the extraction, the suppression, the camps; and, with the sharpest attention the study has to give, the open problem inside a Fascist elite organised around one parvenu, and the plurality briefly opened under Liberal Italy and foreclosed under Fascism. What the landscape has established is the ground they stand on: a palimpsest and a parvenu, a thousand-year-old belief that had gone cheap and a fifty-year-old one that had not yet gone at all, and a conquest whose real theatre was never only the coast it fell on but the unfinished country that sent it and the unfinished man who finished it.

Reading the Italian and Libyan landscapes against the framework

The landscape confirms the colonial bend as stated for Algeria — the reversed robe cut for the metropole, the seam split in two by distance, the floor operating raw where the home conscience could not see it — and it drives one refinement back into the framework that Algeria did not force, because Restoration France, for all its instability, was an old nation with a deep formation, and Bourbon Algeria's conqueror was a settled state. Here neither is true, and the doubling matters.

The refinement is this: where the metropole's own robe is thin and its apex is a parvenu, the colony's reversed robe is not only a conquest-funding device but a formation-engine pointed inward — it is put to work manufacturing the nation and the ruler at home. The framework already held that the colonial robe is cut for the metropole rather than the conquered; this case adds that the robe can be cut to make the metropole exist. Pascoli's speech is the evidence in its cleanest form — the war justified not as the civilising of Libyans but as the finishing of Italians — and Mussolini's whole use of the reconquest is the evidence in its second form, a charismatic apex spending a colony's blood to mint the personal legitimacy he had no other way to hold. The reversed robe, in other words, has a further

reversal in it: at its thinnest-metropole extreme it turns entirely away from the conquered and does its real work on the conqueror's own belief in himself, national and personal at once. The tell of this configuration is the *forged* robe — the Sword of Islam, a counterfeit authority commissioned from a Florentine goldsmith — because a robe manufactured from nothing, toward an audience the floor does not actually need, is what an apex reaches for when he has no borrowed currency left and must fabricate one. Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took; the forged relic is the tell of an apex who has none of his own.

And the case sets, more starkly than any yet in the corpus, the two poles of the machine against each other on the same ground: a cheap-pole order and an expensive-pole one, laid one over the other, measured side by side. The Islamic-Sanusi order the Italians displaced ran on the conviction of the governed, needing almost no force, because a former conquest had been driven so deep it had become the furniture of reality — the machine at the self-running pole. The Fascist order that displaced it ran on force, wire, aircraft, and a forged sword, because its belief never took with the conquered for a single day — the machine at the expensive pole, held down the dear way. That contrast is much of what the study is for, and it carries the framework's hardest discipline with it: to name the southern order's origin as a conquest is not to debunk it but to credit it, because the thing that had become real over a thousand years was more genuine and more durable than the thing Italy tried to install in twenty. The collapse this study will trace, when it comes, will not come from the conquered beating the floor. It will come, as the framework predicts of these expensive orders, from the metropole's will emptying — and the reader is left to weigh, module by module, what the emptying cost the people on the shore the will was never spent believing in.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is limited to what the public record verifies: Giovanni Pascoli's oration *"La grande proletaria si è mossa,"* delivered at the Teatro dei Differenti in Barga on 26 November 1911 and published in *La Tribuna* the following day, including its closing claim that the Italians had at last been made; Gaetano Salvemini's dismissal of Libya as *"uno scatolone di sabbia,"* a phrase attributed to him in the period debate; and the naming of the *Quarta Sponda,* the *Riconquista,* the *Non Expedit,* and Mussolini's title *Protector of Islam.* The maxim "we have made Italy, now we must make Italians" is given as what it is — a phrase popularly and, on recent scholarly examination (the work on the origins of the saying in *Italian Culture,* 2013), erroneously fixed on Massimo d'Azeglio, whose memoir *I miei ricordi* carries a differently worded and more pessimistic lament; the contested status is the point, not a footnote to it. The order of June 1930 that the separation be carried through "even if the entire population of Cyrenaica must perish" is given in the standard English translation of Pietro Badoglio's directive to Rodolfo Graziani and will be set against its Italian original in the modules; Omar al-Mukhtar's reported last words are a Qur'anic formula (Q. 2:156) as related by his biographers. The reconstruction of the Libyan landscape draws on the standard scholarship on Roman and Islamic North Africa; on the Arab conquest under Amr ibn al-As (Cyrenaica 642, Tripoli 643–644) and the later Banu Hilal Arabisation; on Ottoman Tripolitania, the Karamanli dynasty (1711–1835) and the second Ottoman period (1835–1911); and, for the Sanusiyya, on

Evans-Pritchard's classic study and the subsequent literature (Ahmida, Baldinetti, Vandewalle and others), with the lodge counts (about fifty-two by 1859, about one hundred and forty-six by 1902) and the order's ascendancy over the Ottoman state in the interior taken from that body of work. The reconstruction of Italy draws on the standard scholarship on the Risorgimento and "Piedmontisation," on the literacy and language figures at unification, on Corradini's "proletarian nation" and the demographic-colony argument (Choate), on Giolitti's 1911 war, and on Fascist Libya, the reconquest, the concentration camps, and the settlement under Balbo (Del Boca, Rochat, Labanca, Ben-Ghiat, and Wright on the Sword of Islam). Contested or approximate figures — the Libyan population in 1911 (most often put between about 0.8 and 1.5 million, with higher figures for all three provinces together); the Cyrenaican population at the start of the pacification (around 225,000) and its decline (to roughly 142,000, a fall of about a third); the numbers interned (on the order of 100,000, about half of Cyrenaica); the death toll of the pacification (camp deaths often put near 40,000, total pacification deaths at 60,000–70,000) and of Italian rule overall (a United Nations estimate of 250,000–300,000 for 1912–1942, Ahmida's higher figure toward 500,000, and Gaddafi's later and unevidenced claim of 750,000); and the settler numbers (about 64,000 by 1936, 110,000 by 1940, with Balbo's 20,000 of 1938) — are given as ranges, to be tightened in the modules with dated, sourced specifics. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 1

THE PAPER AND THE WIRE

Module 1 · The Floor of Force — how the coast fell in three weeks and the interior took twenty years; the royal decree that proclaimed a sovereignty the treaty never granted and the interior never yielded, and the barbed wire and the camps that had, by hand, to manufacture the capturability the desert refused to supply

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The two floors, and why the doubling is the finding

Every study in this collection opens on the floor of force, because force is the founding fact and the belief is laid over it afterward to make the holding cheap. This case opens on the floor twice, and the gap between the two openings is the whole of what Module 1 has to teach. The coast of Libya fell to Italy in three weeks in the autumn of 1911, to naval gunnery and a landing party, against a garrison that barely fought. The interior of Libya took Italy twenty years, two wars, sixteen concentration camps, a border strung with two hundred and seventy kilometres of barbed wire, and a death toll that a growing body of scholarship weighs against the word genocide. One conquest was almost bloodless and took a fortnight; the other consumed a generation and a quarter of a province. The question that spread between them is the question the module exists to answer: why was the same floor so cheap to lay on the coast and so ruinously expensive to lay on the plateau behind it — and the answer, worked out below, forces a refinement on the framework's account of what makes a population capturable in the first place.

Floor one: three weeks of naval gun

The floor Italy laid in 1911 was, in its first act, a demonstration of pure material monopoly. Italy presented an ultimatum to the Ottoman government on the night of 26–27 September, declared war on 29 September, and on 3 October the fleet under Vice-Admiral Luigi Faravelli opened fire on the forts of Tripoli from beyond the range at which the forts' obsolete guns could answer — a squadron of battleships and armoured cruisers firing at nine and a half kilometres against fixed emplacements that could not reach them. The forts were silenced in an afternoon. On 5 October a naval landing party of some fifteen hundred sailors took the city against no resistance, the Ottoman garrison having withdrawn inland; within a fortnight the expeditionary corps of about thirty-four thousand men and seventy-two guns under General Carlo Caneva had disembarked and taken possession of Tripoli and Homs in Tripolitania and of Benghazi, Derna, and Tobruk in Cyrenaica. The whole Ottoman regular force in the three provinces amounted to somewhere between four and five thousand men, stiffened by a few hundred officers; the defence of Libya, from the first days, fell not on the state but on the

population and on the Turkish officers — among them Enver Bey and a young Mustafa Kemal — who would organise it.

What made the coast capturable in a fortnight was that the coast was *fixed*. Cities, ports, and stone forts cannot disperse; they stand still to be shelled and occupied, and against them the Italian monopoly of long-range naval artillery, and soon of wholly new weapons, was decisive. This war was the debut of several of them. On 23 October the pilot Carlo Piazza flew the first aerial reconnaissance in the history of war; on 1 November the pilot Giulio Gavotti leaned from an Etrich Taube and dropped four small bombs on the oasis of Ain Zara, pulling the pins with his teeth — the first aerial bombardment ever delivered. Guglielmo Marconi came to Libya to string the first military wireless network; armoured cars and machine guns saw early field use. Against a fixed target held by an obsolete garrison, a floor built of these things is cheap and quick. The trouble, which the next twenty years would make plain, was that the thing Italy actually needed to hold was not fixed at all.

The paper: a sovereignty declared, not held

Before the floor was anywhere near secure, Italy laid its founding legal fiction over it, and the fiction is worth quoting exactly because its precise wording is the point. By royal decree number 1247 of 5 November 1911, the Kingdom of Italy unilaterally proclaimed *"la sovranità piena ed intera del Regno d'Italia"* — the full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy — over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and the Italian parliament converted the decree into law the following February. The words claimed everything; the floor beneath them held a handful of coastal enclaves and could not send a column ten miles inland without a fight. And the claim was a fiction in a second and sharper sense, because the treaty that supposedly ratified it did no such thing: the Treaty of Ouchy of October 1912 granted Italy only the civil and military administration of the territory, a kind of protectorate, while the Sultan retained his religious sovereignty and the provinces remained, in law, part of the Ottoman Empire. The "full and entire sovereignty" the decree announced was never conferred by the treaty and would not be made real on the ground for twenty more years. Name the legal instrument as fiction, as the method requires: the decree of 5 November 1911 was a statement of intent dressed as a statement of fact, a floor claimed on paper decades before it could be built in the desert.

The founding legend laid over the paper was cut, as the colonial bend predicts, entirely for the audience at home. The conquest was presented in Italy not as an annexation but as a *return* — the recovery of a lost Roman homeland by the heir of Rome — and as the liberation of the Arab from a decayed Turkish yoke. The prime minister, Giovanni Giolitti, told an audience at the Teatro Regio in Turin on 7 October 1911 that the enterprise answered *"una fatalità storica alla quale nessun popolo può sottrarsi"* — a historical fatality no people can escape without irreparably compromising its future — the language of destiny laid over a decision that was, in its actual motives, about prestige, emigration, and the votes of an electorate Giolitti was preparing to enlarge. The Italian consul at Tripoli, Carlo Galli, had assured Giolitti that the Arabs, weary of Ottoman rule, would greet the Italians as liberators; the nationalist press had promised a *passeggiata militare,* a military stroll. Every one of

these claims was addressed to Rome, not to Tripoli, because the belief the floor needed was never the belief of the conquered.

Sciara Sciat: the legend meets the floor

The legend of the liberating stroll survived exactly three weeks. On 23 October 1911, at the oasis village the Italians called Sciara Sciat — Shar al-Shatt — in the densely inhabited Menscia belt east of Tripoli, a battalion of the 11th Bersaglieri, poorly sited among the gardens where artillery could not support it, was overrun by a combined Ottoman and Arab attack. Something over five hundred Italians were killed, of whom roughly two hundred and ninety were taken prisoner and then killed after they had surrendered. Italian propaganda circulated lurid accounts and photographs of the mutilation of the captured Bersaglieri, and those images did enormous work — they converted the war, for the home audience, from a stroll into a martyrdom, and they furnished the justification for what the floor did next.

What the floor did next was the reprisal the metropole was not shown. Over the three days following the ambush, Italian troops moved house by house through the Menscia oasis and killed the inhabitants — men, women, and children — in a toll the sources put at anywhere between one thousand and four thousand; a mosque in which perhaps a hundred people had taken refuge was burned. A gallows was raised in the Piazza del Pane, the Bread Square of Tripoli, and men were hanged from it and left to hang. And the reprisal did not end with the killing on the spot. On the day after Sciara Sciat, Giolitti telegraphed General Caneva to confirm that detention camps stood ready for the Arabs judged complicit and to order their prompt embarkation; between 25 and 30 October more than four thousand Libyans were shipped in inhuman conditions to penal islands off the Italian coast — Ustica, Ponza, Favignana, Gaeta, and the Tremiti. In the Tremiti camp alone, by the following June, something on the order of a third of the deportees had died of privation, among them children and old men. The first Italian floor in Libya thus produced, within its first month, the two instruments that the second floor would industrialise twenty years later: the reprisal massacre and the concentration camp.

Here, at the very founding, the seam that this whole study exists to pry at is already split by the sea. Italy publicised, at home and abroad, the photographs of its own massacred soldiers; it worked to keep the news of the oasis massacre from getting out. The two ends did not quite stay apart — the reprisal became internationally known and stirred real anti-Italian feeling, particularly in Britain — but the *effort* to keep them apart, the deliberate management of what the metropole was permitted to see, was present from the first weeks and was, from the first weeks, the floor's core interpretive task. What Italy did on the Libyan shore and what Italy said about it in Italy were two different things, and holding them apart was not incidental to the enterprise; it was the enterprise.

The stall, and the war that waited

After the reprisal the floor stalled, and the stall is the proof of the coming argument. Italy held the fixed coast and could extend along it — by the summer of 1912 its naval supremacy let it control almost the whole two thousand kilometres of shoreline — but it could not penetrate the interior, where the Ottoman officers and, decisively, the Sanusi order raised the mobile Bedouin against it and simply would not stand and be shelled. The Treaty of Ouchy in October 1912 ended the war with the Turks on paper; it did not end the war on the ground, which guttered on until the World War pulled Italy's attention to Europe and forced its troops back into the coastal enclaves. For a decade Italy held little more than the ports. It even experimented, in the exhaustion after the World War, with a genuinely plural settlement — the *Legge Fondamentale* statutes granted to Tripolitania in 1919 and Cyrenaica in 1919, which offered Libyans a joint citizenship and each province its own parliament — an opening this study will return to at Module 9, and one that Fascism would close. The whole interior conquest, in short, was deferred; and it was deferred until a regime arrived in Rome that needed it. The parvenu who took power in 1922 — the man who, as a young socialist, had gone to prison in 1911 for opposing this very war — now required its completion as the delivered triumph his charisma ran on, and he authorised the reconquest that the Liberal floor had never managed to build.

Floor two: manufacturing the pen

The second floor began under the governor Giuseppe Volpi in 1923 and reached its terrible efficiency under General Rodolfo Graziani after 1930, and its whole character follows from the single fact the first floor had exposed: the population Italy needed to hold could not be shelled into submission because it would not hold still. The Cyrenaican Bedouin were pastoralists; they and their herds moved; the desert was not a wall that penned them but a door that let them out; and across that door lay Egypt, nominally independent and effectively British, where the fighters could rest and resupply and where an Italian column could not follow. Geography, which in most conquests hands the floor its capturability for free, here handed the floor nothing — it handed the *conquered* their mobility. Volpi understood from the start that the old technique of ruling through co-opted native intermediaries would not serve a floor that meant to hold the ground itself, and he summarised his policy in a phrase that is the negation of indirect rule: neither with the chiefs, nor against the chiefs, but *without* the chiefs. The floor would govern by its own force, and would therefore have to manufacture, by engineering, the capturability that geography refused.

It manufactured it with two instruments. The first was the camp. Having failed to catch Omar al-Mukhtar's mobile bands in the field, Graziani — in full accord with the governor Pietro Badoglio, the colonial minister Emilio De Bono, and Mussolini — resolved to take the population away from the resistance by taking the population away from the land: the roughly one hundred thousand people of the Jebel Akhdar, close to half of all Cyrenaica, were driven from the plateau in 1930 and 1931 and penned in some fifteen or sixteen concentration camps on the coast and the edge of the Sirte, behind wire and machine guns. The private words in which this was ordered survive, and they belong in this module as the plainest specimen of the floor speaking to itself rather than to the metropole: Badoglio

wrote to Graziani in June 1930 that the separation of population from rebels must be carried through to the end *"even if the entire population of Cyrenaica has to perish."* The second instrument was the wire. In the winter of 1930–1931 the army strung a barrier along the Egyptian frontier — four parallel lines of stakes a metre and a half high in concrete bases, laced with barbed wire, running some two hundred and seventy kilometres from El Ramleh on the Gulf of Sollum south to the oasis of Jaghbub, watched by a line of forts and patrolled by armoured cars and aircraft over a free-fire zone — for the sole purpose of closing the door to Egypt and cutting the fighters off from refuge and supply. The camp penned the population that geography would not pen; the wire walled the frontier that geography left open. Between them they built, at enormous cost, the trap the desert had declined to provide.

The trap worked. Cut from the population that fed and hid them and from the Egypt that resupplied them, the fighters were run down; al-Mukhtar, a Qur'an teacher of the Sanusi lodge who had led the resistance for twenty years, was wounded and captured near Slonta on 11 September 1931 and hanged five days later before some twenty thousand of his own people interned at the camp of Soluch, the Italians hoping the resistance would die on the rope with him. In January 1932 Badoglio proclaimed the campaign over and Cyrenaica pacified. That same year Graziani published his account of it under the title *Cirenaica pacificata* — Cyrenaica Pacified — and among its photographs was an image of one of the concentration camps captioned, in the floor's own voice, "a step towards civilisation." The gallows at Soluch and the caption in the book are the two ends of the seam this study tracks, printed a few pages apart in the conqueror's own volume: the pen presented as progress, the killing presented as peace.

Reading the floor against the framework

The framework holds that a floor becomes durable where the governed cannot leave, and it inherits from Carneiro and Scott a particular account of *why* they cannot leave: geography pens them where they cannot disperse, and grain makes them legible and taxable because it ripens above ground to be counted. Both mechanisms assume a settled agrarian population held in place by the land it works. This case breaks that assumption and, in breaking it, sharpens the framework. The Cyrenaican Bedouin were the opposite of a penned peasantry — mobile, pastoral, dispersible, with an open desert frontier at their backs — and so the floor could not inherit their capturability from geography at all. It had to build it. The refinement the case contributes is therefore this: where the conquered society is mobile and the terrain offers exit rather than enclosure, capturability is not a gift of geography but a thing the floor must manufacture — and the manufacturing is both extravagantly expensive and intrinsically lethal, because you cannot pen a pastoral people and their herds without destroying the metabolic base that keeps them alive. The camp and the wire are Carneiro's circumscription built by hand where nature withheld it, and the mass death of the reconquest — the tens of thousands who died in the camps of hunger and disease, the herds that starved, the third of Cyrenaica that vanished — was not an excess laid on top of the capturability project. It *was* the capturability project. Penning nomads kills them; that is what penning nomads is. This is why Module II's metabolic-death test will

find the reconquest so much bloodier than the coastal conquest: the coast was taken by disabling a fixed garrison, which kills soldiers, while the interior was taken by immobilising a pastoral population, which starves a people.

The doubling confirms the rest of the colonial bend cleanly. The founding legend — the return to Rome, the liberation of the Arab, the full and entire sovereignty — was cut for the metropole and was false to the floor beneath it, which held a few ports and a decree. The floor operated raw in the colony, in the oasis massacre and the island camps of 1911 and the concentration camps and the wire of 1931, while the interpretive labour ran the other way, publicising the martyred Bersaglieri and captioning the camp as civilisation. And the arithmetic of three weeks against twenty years is the landscape's central claim made quantitative. The Ottoman floor — the alien garrison, the thing Italy actually defeated in 1911 — cracked in a fortnight and almost nobody died defending it, because almost nobody's belief lived in it. The twenty-year war, the war that cost Italy over a billion lire more than Giolitti had promised and cost Cyrenaica a quarter of its people, was not fought for the Ottoman floor at all; it was fought against the native formation that the floor's fall never touched — the faith and the lodge, the cheap-pole order that had become the world. An expensive-pole conquest was laid over a cheap-pole order, and the bill for the difference is written in the gap between the three weeks and the twenty years.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is drawn from public-domain instruments and from period speeches and directives reproduced in the scholarship: the royal decree of 5 November 1911 proclaiming *"la sovranità piena ed intera del Regno d'Italia"* (Regio decreto n. 1247, converted into law in February 1912), given here in the original Italian with translation; Giolitti's speech at the Teatro Regio, Turin, 7 October 1911, and its phrase *"una fatalità storica alla quale nessun popolo può sottrarsi"*; Giuseppe Volpi's summary of his governing policy, given in the standard English rendering ("neither with the chiefs, nor against the chiefs, but without the chiefs"); Pietro Badoglio's directive to Graziani of June 1930 and its clause about the population of Cyrenaica having to perish, given in the standard English translation and to be set against its Italian original in Modules 10 and 11; and the caption "a step towards civilisation" from a photograph in Rodolfo Graziani's *Cirenaica pacificata* (Mondadori, Milan, 1932), likewise given in translation. The lurid contemporary accounts of the killing of the surrendered Bersaglieri at Sciara Sciat are paraphrased rather than reproduced. The reconstruction of the military events draws on the standard scholarship on the Italo-Turkish War and the pacification of Libya (Del Boca, *Gli italiani in Libia*; Rochat; Labanca; Vandervort; Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya* and *Genocide in Libya*; and Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, for the resistance). Contested or approximate figures are given as ranges: the 1911 expeditionary corps (about 34,000, rising toward 100,000 by 1912) against an Ottoman garrison of some 4,000–5,000 regulars; the dead in the Menscia/Sciara Sciat reprisal (variously put between about 1,000 and 4,000); the Libyans deported to the penal islands in 1911 (upward of 4,000, of whom perhaps a third died); the population interned in the Cyrenaican camps after 1930 (on the order of 100,000, about half of Cyrenaica); the frontier wire (most often given as about 271 km, with the full run of stakes sometimes

stated as up to 320 km); and the death toll of the pacification (camp deaths frequently put near 40,000, total reconquest deaths in the range 56,000–70,000, and total deaths under Italian rule from 1912 to 1943 estimated by the United Nations at 250,000–300,000, with Ahmida arguing for a higher figure). Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 2

THE DIPLOMA AND THE PODERE

Module 2 · The Settlement — who got what: the confiscated land handed as farms to twenty thousand Italian settlers on a plateau the camps had emptied, and the special citizenship granted to the conquered by the very decree that abolished their path to the full one — the settlement's primary robe a law that included in order to exclude

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The settlement as the balance sheet of the floor

The settlement is the wealth-side of the floor, and in a colony built on confiscation the two sides are the same act seen twice. Module 1 emptied the Jebel Akhdar of its people, driving roughly a hundred thousand Cyrenaican pastoralists into the coastal camps, where something like a third of them died. Module 2 is what was done with the ground they were driven off. The plateau that the camps emptied of Bedouin was, within a few years, planted with Italian villages; the land that changed hands at the point of the deportation order changed hands again, on paper, as a farm assigned to a settler brought from the Italian south. And the same coalition performed both operations — the colonial state, the army that confiscated, the Fascist party, the parastatal colonisation agencies that redistributed, and the governor who presided over all of it. The wealth monopoly and the violence monopoly were not two hands that might check one another; they were one hand doing two things, and this module and the last describe the two things. What marks the settlement's boundary — who is inside it, who out, and by what sign — is set down in a series of legal instruments that this module reads as the settlement's primary robe, the floor's fiction in its plainest form, before Module 3 hunts the doctrine built on top of it.

The land: confiscation, the *Ente*, and the *podere*

The mechanism by which the conquered wealth passed to the conqueror was the conversion of the native order's land into Italian state domain, the *demanio*. The land the Ottoman state had held passed to the Italian state at the conquest; but the great reservoir was the land the native order held under its own tenure — tribal collective land, the grazing commons of the pastoral tribes, and the religious endowments of the Sanusi order, the *waqf* land whose revenues had fed the lodges. This the colonial state declared, by turns, "uncultivated," "unowned," "state," or "rebel" land, and so available for assignment; Graziani's reconquest had already expropriated on the order of seventy thousand hectares of Sanusi land, with hundreds of houses, in Cyrenaica alone. The legal frame for turning the seized land into settlement was built up across a decade — the so-called De Bono laws of 1928 made the demographic purpose explicit, and the basic colonisation legislation of 17 May 1938 systematised it — and the instrument that actually planted the settlers was the parastatal colonisation body, the *Ente per*

la Colonizzazione, run in Cyrenaica and then across Libya, working alongside the Fascist social-security institute, the INFPS. These agencies took the state-domain land, built the farmhouse, cleared and planted the ground, and installed a settler family on a *podere,* a smallholding transferred to the colonist on a long contract of gradual purchase. By 1940 the colonisation companies held something on the order of two hundred and twenty-five thousand hectares, up from about a hundred and thirty-five thousand in private concessions a few years earlier. The transmission rule for the settler was land title, ripening from tenancy into ownership and passing by inheritance; the point of the whole apparatus was to manufacture, out of confiscated ground, a permanent Italian yeomanry rooted in the soil.

The founding policy behind this was stated without euphemism in the colonial administration's own planning: the native population was to be driven onto the marginal land of the interior, and the Italian population resettled on the most fertile land of Libya. The settlement, in its first conception, was a transfer of the best ground from the conquered to the conqueror, and the confiscation was not a by-product of the war but its purpose realised.

The settlers: the *ventimila* and the twenty-six villages

The settlement's demographic ambition was the landscape's emigration fantasy made concrete. Italy had been losing its poor by the million to the Americas; the demographic colony was to catch that outflow and settle it on Italian soil across the sea, and under the governor Italo Balbo the fantasy became a mass movement staged as spectacle. In October 1938 Balbo brought the *ventimila* — the twenty thousand — some twenty thousand colonists carried to Libya in a single convoy, and settled them in twenty-six newly built agricultural villages, most of them in Cyrenaica, on the plateau the reconquest had cleared. A second wave followed in 1939. The villages were named for the martyrs and heroes of the national and Fascist pantheon — Olivetti, Bianchi, Marconi, Crispi, Corradini, Garibaldi, Battisti, Filzi, Oberdan — so that the map of the seized plateau was overwritten, village by village, with the names of the metropole's own story. By the census of 1939 the Italians in Libya numbered some hundred and eight thousand, about an eighth of the whole population, concentrated on the coast, where they made up better than a third of Tripoli and near a third of Benghazi. Libya was being sold at home, in these years, as the new America — the destination that would keep the emigrant Italian and his loyalty inside the nation, farming Italian ground, instead of losing him to Pennsylvania or the Plate.

That was the settlement as the metropole saw it: not a confiscation but a redemption, the desert made to bloom, the landless peasant given a farm, the ancient Roman ground recovered and replanted. The Italian press counted the olives and the vines — by the late 1930s the colonisation villages of Cyrenaica had put in the ground, on the official figures, close to two hundred thousand olive trees, over two hundred thousand almonds, and better than three million vines — and the classical archaeologists dug the Roman cities of Leptis Magna and Sabratha out of the sand to prove the recovery was a homecoming. The blooming plateau, the counted trees, the Roman arch rising beside the new village: this was the settlement's picture, and it was a picture composed for Italy.

The emptied plateau: the settlement as the balance sheet of the camps

What the picture omitted is the seam this study exists to pry at, and in the settlement the omission is starkest because the two ends lie so close together. The fertile plateau that the settlers were given was available to be given because it had been emptied — because the pastoralists whose collective land it was had been marched to the coastal camps and were dead or interned there while the surveyors laid out the *poderi*. The redeemed empty land was empty because it had been emptied, and the same regime that captioned a photograph of a concentration camp "a step towards civilisation" captioned the settlement of the ground beyond the wire the reclamation of a wilderness. The camps and the villages are the two halves of one operation: the deportation cleared the plateau, the colonisation filled it, and the interval between them was measured in the third of Cyrenaica that did not come back. To read Module 1 and Module 2 apart is to miss that the settlement was the balance sheet of the genocide — the wealth column of the same ledger whose cost column was the camps.

Balbo, from 1938, added a second layer that dressed the whole operation in generosity and completed a different piece of the floor's work at the same time. Having settled the Italians, he built ten "Muslim villages" for Libyan families, this time with Arabic names — El Fager, the Dawn; Nahima, the Delightful; Azizia, the Fragrant — and distributed *poderi* to Libyans as to Italians, presenting the whole as an assimilation, the Libyans now "Italian Muslims of the Fourth Shore" farming their own smallholdings beside the settlers. The gesture was real in its way, and it was also the completion of Module 1's project by other means: to settle the mobile Bedouin into fixed, mapped, named villages was to finish sedentarising the population whose mobility the camps and the wire had been built to defeat, converting a pastoral people that could disperse into a farming one that could be counted and held. The Muslim villages were roughly a tenth the scale of the Italian settlement, and they came with a status attached that the next section reads as the settlement's true marker — because generosity that fixes a caste is still the fixing of a caste.

The boundary: a special citizenship that included in order to exclude

The sign that marked the inside of the settlement from its outside was, as in French Algeria, drawn through the law of personal status and the graded orders of citizenship — and the Italian jurists knew the resemblance, one of them writing a treatise expressly on "the statute of the natives of Algeria and of Libya," because the two colonial powers had reached, without coordinating, the identical instrument. Its wording is the evidence, so it must be quoted exactly.

The liberal post-war governments had opened, in 1919, a genuinely graded but genuinely real citizenship: the statutes of that year — the *Legge Fondamentale* — made the inhabitants *"cittadini italiani di Tripolitania e di Cirenaica,"* Italian citizens of the two provinces, retaining their Muslim personal and successoral law, and gave each province an elective assembly. That was the opening this study will return to at Module 9. Fascism closed the political content first and reshaped the status after. By the law of 1927 the elective machinery was abolished, and the colonial jurist Gaspare Ambrosini recorded the change in the regime's own terms: *"È soppresso il sistema rappresentativo elezionista ed*

autonomista degli statuti del 1919, ed è restaurato in pieno il principio della sovranità dello Stato" — the elective and autonomist representative system of the 1919 statutes is suppressed, and the principle of the sovereignty of the State is fully restored. The inhabitants became simply *"cittadini italiani libici,"* Italian Libyan citizens, a status held within the colony.

The decisive instrument came in 1939, and it is the settlement's primary robe in its plainest form — a legal fiction whose precise wording is the whole of the point. The royal decree-law of 9 January 1939, number 70, was titled, in part, the *"aggregazione delle quattro provincie libiche al territorio del Regno d'Italia e concessione ai libici musulmani di una cittadinanza italiana speciale"* — the aggregation of the four Libyan provinces to the territory of the Kingdom of Italy, and the grant to Libyan Muslims of a special Italian citizenship. The four coastal provinces — Tripoli, Misurata, Benghazi, Derna — became integral metropolitan territory, exactly as the Italian commentators noted Algeria was integral to France; and to the Muslim of those provinces the decree offered, on application and on conditions, a *cittadinanza italiana speciale,* a special Italian citizenship. What that citizenship contained, and what it did not, is where the fiction does its work. It was granted *"mantenendosi lo statuto personale e successorio musulmano"* — the Muslim personal and successoral law retained — which is the coin in which the robe's respect for religion was paid and, in the same stroke, the marker that fixed the bearer as non-assimilable, subject to his own law and therefore not to the citizen's. Its rights, listed in the decree's sixth article, were real and were capped: the special citizen might bear arms under conscription, enrol in the Muslim Association of the Lictor under the Fascist party, pursue a military career but only *"nei reparti libici"* — in the Libyan units — hold the office of *podestà* but only *"nei municipi composti di popolazione libica,"* in municipalities of Libyan population, and take directive functions in the syndical bodies. Every clause admits and every clause encloses: the Libyan could command, but only Libyans; could govern, but only Libyans; could rise, but only within the compartment marked for him.

And then the hinge, the clause that turns an ordinary graded citizenship into a foreclosure: the same 1939 decree *abolished the pre-existing provisions governing the acquisition of full metropolitan Italian citizenship.* The very act that granted the special citizenship shut the door to the full one. It did not exclude the Libyan Muslim from the nation; it included him — as a special citizen, with a diploma the governor himself handed over in ceremony — and in the same article removed the path by which he might have become a full one. The Muslim Association of the Lictor was chartered, in the regime's words, *"a curare l'elevazione morale e civile dei nativi musulmani"* — to attend to the moral and civil elevation of the Muslim natives — so that even the machinery of uplift was an enclosure, elevating the native within his compartment and never out of it. Beneath the Muslim sat a third tier: the Libyan Jews, some twenty to thirty thousand, held as *sudditi* and then subjected, from 1938, to the metropolitan racial laws that barred foreign Jews from the Kingdom, Libya, and the Aegean alike. The settlement thus sorted the population into three castes — metropolitan Italian, special Libyan Muslim, Libyan Jew — and the diploma of special citizenship, handed to the Muslim on the plateau his people had been cleared from and the settlers planted on, was the paper that named his place in the order and closed it.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The framework holds that a settlement is transmitted through a marker of inside and outside — a bloodline, a manumission, a name in a book, a credential — and that where the transmission runs through a legal instrument, that instrument is to be named as the primary robe before any further doctrine is sought. Both hold here, and the marker is the same one French Algeria used: religion-as-personal-law, the retention of Muslim personal status functioning at once as the robe's respect for the conquered's faith and as the mechanism of their exclusion from full citizenship. That two colonial powers, uncoordinated, reached the identical caste-instrument — and that the Italian jurists wrote it up beside the French one, in a single treatise on the natives of Algeria and of Libya — is itself a finding, the convergence of position logic at scale rather than the borrowing of a trick: two conquerors facing the identical problem of a Muslim majority they would not admit and could not expel drew the same short answer from the same short menu.

But the Libya case sharpens the framework's account of the boundary marker, and the sharpening is this module's contribution. The settlement's boundary need not be drawn by excluding the conquered from citizenship; it can be drawn by including them into a lesser citizenship whose very grant abolishes the path to the full one — inclusion as the mechanism of foreclosure, which is more durable than exclusion because it wears the face of a gift. A bare exclusion advertises the caste and invites the excluded to turn the order's own language against it, demanding the citizenship withheld. The 1939 decree foreclosed that move by conceding its premise: it did not withhold citizenship, it granted one — special, capped, valid only in the colony, tied to a retained personal law — and in the same article removed the route to the full status, so that the Libyan who received his diploma had been given exactly enough to have nothing left to demand and no ladder left to climb. The metropole read this as elevation, the "Muslims of the Fourth Shore" raised toward Italy; the conquered received a real if lesser standing; and the caste boundary was fixed more securely by being dressed as generosity than any exclusion could have fixed it. The retained personal-status law is the hinge on which the whole device turns, paying the robe's respect and setting the caste's limit in one clause — which is why the settlement's primary robe here is precisely a citizenship law, and why naming that law as the robe, and reading its inclusion as foreclosure, is the move that keeps the study from mistaking a generous-sounding decree for the widening it pretended to be.

The rest of the colonial bend the settlement confirms without strain. The wealth was sorted by caste, the best land to the settler and a capped citizenship to the native. The wealth monopoly was fused with the violence monopoly in a single coalition, the confiscating army and the redistributing *Ente* being organs of one state. And the recursion runs visibly through the *demanio:* the land converted to Italian state domain and handed out as *poderi* was, in large part, the former conquest's own property order — the tribal grazing commons and the Sanusi *waqf,* the material base of the cheap-pole Islamic order that had held Cyrenaica for centuries — legally erased and overwritten, name by name, with the villages of the new one. The settlement did to the old order's land what the floor did to its bodies: cleared it to make room. What the settlement could not do, and what the next module takes up, is make the conquered believe that the clearing was just — because a diploma is not a robe that the man

who receives it can be made to revere, and the belief the order actually needed was, as always in a colony, being manufactured somewhere else.

A note on sources. The legal instruments are quoted from Italian juridical and archival sources that reproduce their texts: the statutes of 1919 (D.L. 931 of 1 June 1919 for Tripolitania and R.D.L. 2401 of 31 October 1919 for Cyrenaica) creating the *"cittadini italiani di Tripolitania e di Cirenaica"* with retained Muslim personal and successoral status; the law of 1927 (L. 1013 of 26 June 1927) and Gaspare Ambrosini's characterisation of the suppression of the 1919 elective system (*Lo statuto dei nativi dell'Algeria e della Libia,* 1939–40), quoted here in the original with translation; the unification decree of 1934 (R.D. 2012 of 3 December 1934); and the royal decree-law of 9 January 1939, number 70, aggregating the four provinces to the metropole and granting the *cittadinanza italiana speciale,* whose title, sixth-article rights, retention of Muslim personal law, charter of the Muslim Association of the Lictor, and abolition of the prior route to full metropolitan citizenship are given in the original Italian with translation. The reconstruction of the land and settler apparatus draws on the standard scholarship — Claudio Segré on Balbo and the colonisation, the Istituto Agricolo Coloniale volumes on the colonisation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and Del Boca, Ahmida, and Labanca on the confiscations and the demographic project. Contested or approximate figures are given as ranges: the Sanusi land expropriated in Cyrenaica (on the order of 70,000 hectares); the colonisation companies' holdings (about 135,000 hectares in the mid-1930s rising to roughly 225,000 by 1940); the settlers (the *ventimila* of some 20,000 in October 1938, a further wave in 1939, an Italian population of about 108,000, near 12.4 per cent of the whole, at the 1939 census); the new villages (twenty-six for Italians, about ten for Libyans); and the Libyan Jewish population (some 20,000–30,000). The tree-planting and agricultural-output figures are the colonial administration's own and are treated as such. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 3

THE ARCH AND THE SWORD

Module 3 · The Robe — not one legitimating story but a stack of them, each cut for a different audience and mutually contradictory: Rome reborn for the metropole and the world, the Protector of Islam forged for the Muslim world, and, toward the conquered themselves, no robe at all but the floor — the reversed robe pushed to its limit

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

A robe for everyone but the ruled

The colonial bend predicts a reversed robe — a legitimating story cut not for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not need, but for the metropole, whose belief funds and mans it. This case takes the prediction and pushes it to its limit, because the Fascist order in Libya ran not one reversed robe but a whole stack of them, each cut to a different audience, several of them flatly contradicting one another, and held all at once by the same apex in the same season without embarrassment. Toward the metropole and the watching world, the robe was Rome reborn — the heir of the Caesars recovering a lost Roman shore. Toward the wider Muslim world beyond the floor, the robe was the Protector of Islam, defender of the faith, sword of the Prophet. Toward the international gallery and the home liberal conscience, it was the civilising redemption of a wilderness. Toward the Fascist elite and the army, it was the charismatic triumph of the Duce, delivered as promised. And toward the one population actually under the floor — the Libyans themselves — there was, in any serious sense, no robe at all. They were handled on the cost side, by force; the belief the order manufactured so lavishly was manufactured for everyone except them. The whole module can be organised around a single week in March 1937, when Mussolini toured the colony and, days apart, inaugurated a Roman triumphal arch and had himself proclaimed the Protector of Islam — the arch and the sword, two robes for two audiences, each incompatible with the other, each meant for eyes that would never quite meet.

The *romanità* robe: Rome reborn, for the metropole and the world

The primary robe, the one that funded and manned the enterprise, was the cult of Rome. Fascism had made *romanità* — Roman-ness, the claim to be the living heir of the Roman Empire — the core of its self-understanding, and Libya was the perfect ground on which to prove it, because Libya had genuinely been Roman: the coast was strewn with the ruins of Leptis Magna and Sabratha and Cyrene, and Rome's own African emperor, Septimius Severus, had been born on it. So the conquest could be dressed not as a seizure but as a *return — l'epica del ritorno,* the epic of the return, as the colonial archaeology called itself — the recovery of ground that had always been Rome's and was Italy's by inheritance. The Mediterranean itself was reclaimed in the same word Rome had used: *mare nostrum,*

our sea, the sea of which, in D'Annunzio's overseas song written to celebrate the 1911 invasion, only Italy was worthy. Italy did not invade, ran the slogan; Italy returned.

The state built the robe in stone and in Latin. Its archaeologists dug the Roman cities out of the sand — the Arch of Septimius Severus at Leptis Magna uncovered in the mid-1920s, the excavations at Sabratha and Cyrene funded and publicised as proof of the homecoming — so that the tourist and the newsreel could see Rome rising again beside the new Italian villages. And in March 1937 Mussolini inaugurated, at the midpoint of the new coastal highway, a monumental triumphal arch faced with three hundred and fifty tonnes of travertine and more than thirty metres high: the Arco dei Fileni, named for a legend of boundary-fixing brothers out of Sallust, inscribed in Latin, one of its inscriptions presenting the arch, in the scholarship's summary, as a monument to the renewal of the Roman Empire under the aegis of the fasces. The governor Balbo said plainly what it was for: the arch did not merely record an ancient sacrifice but, in his words, exalted the construction of the highway and the imperial conquest. This is the recursion weaponised, exactly as the framework describes — a conqueror invoking one former conquest of this coast, Rome, to justify displacing a later one, Islam, and digging up the archaeology of the first to prove his right against the second. The provenance of this robe, in the framework's terms, was *redirect:* Fascism did not invent the cult of Rome, which centuries of Italian classical formation had already built; it got behind that earned reverence and pointed it at the Libyan conquest, which is the cheap way to acquire a robe, because someone else has already done the work of making the symbol trusted.

Senussia delenda: what the Roman robe covered

What the Roman robe was laid over is written, with unusual candour, in the floor's own founding text. Rodolfo Graziani, the general who ran the reconquest and built the camps, published his account of it in 1932 under a Latin title, *Cirenaica pacificata* — Cyrenaica Pacified — the very phrasing of Roman imperial peace, the *pax romana* that names conquest as tranquillity. And he closed the book with a chapter whose title states, in two Latin words, precisely what the pacification was: *"Senussia delenda"* — the Senussi must be destroyed. He explained the choice himself, saying it was fitting to paraphrase the words of Cato — *Carthago delenda est,* Carthage must be destroyed, the sentence with which the Roman senator ended every speech until Rome razed its rival to the ground and sowed the site. The romanità robe, followed to its root, is a genocide-justification: as Rome destroyed Carthage, so the new Rome must destroy the Sanusi order, the native seam that held Cyrenaica's faith. The same book that dresses the conquest in the peace of Rome ends by demanding, in Cato's Latin, the destruction of a people — and the two are one page apart. Set the robe beside the floor and the gap is the whole method: *pace romana* and *Senussia delenda,* Roman peace and a people to be destroyed, in a single volume by a single hand; the redemption of a land in the monument, and in the archive Badoglio's order that the work go on even if the whole population of Cyrenaica must perish. The robe was for the reader in Rome; the Latin verb of destruction was for the officers on the plateau.

The Sword from Florence: Protector of Islam, for the Muslim world

Then, in the same March 1937 in which he inaugurated the Roman arch, Mussolini put on a second and utterly incompatible robe. On the outskirts of Tripoli, at the head of two and a half thousand horsemen, he received from a pro-Italian Berber notable a "Sword of Islam" and had himself proclaimed *Hami al-Islam,* the Protector of Islam, and reassured the assembled Muslims, in words that survive, that he guaranteed them *"pace, giustizia, benessere e rispetto delle leggi del Profeta"* — peace, justice, well-being, and respect for the laws of the Prophet. He reasoned the title his by right: Italy having taken the place of the Ottoman government in Libya, and the Ottoman Sultan having been the Caliph whose religious sovereignty the treaty of 1912 had reserved, the authority of that Caliph — a Caliphate the Turkish Republic had abolished in 1924, leaving the position vacant — had descended, he claimed, to him. Around the claim he built the apparatus of a patron of Islam: mosques restored and built, Quranic schools, a School of Islamic Culture opened in Tripoli, facilities readied for the pilgrims bound for Mecca.

Every part of the performance was manufactured, which makes it the framework's *forge* provenance in its purest documented form. The sword itself was a fabrication — a straight double-edged blade with a solid gold hilt, decorated with arabesques, made to order for the occasion by a goldsmith's firm in Florence, Picchiani e Barlacchi, with no tradition behind it whatever. The acclamation was choreographed, the crowd of chieftains assembled and taught to sing the Fascist anthem in Arabic. The famous photograph of the Duce on horseback raising the blade was retouched for the propaganda, the groom who was holding the horse still painted out. This is exactly what the framework means by forging a robe: manufacturing a trusted authority where none exists, counterfeiting the cues a mind is built to revere — and it is precisely the structure the framework names in Timur, who ran a separate Sword-of-Islam claim toward his Muslim subjects while ruling by a wholly different currency toward his own steppe cavalry. The audience for the Sword was never the metropole and never, seriously, the conquered Libyans; it was the wider Muslim and Arab world — Egypt, the Arab East, the Muslims of the empires Italy meant to rival — for whom a European power posing as the protector of the faith was a piece of prestige-diplomacy aimed over the heads of Britain and France. The robe was cut for an audience that would see the newsreel and never read the Cyrenaican death registers.

The two audiences, and the hole between them

Hold the two robes of that single week together and the audience-indexing is undeniable: a Roman triumphal arch proclaiming the renewal of a Christian-Roman empire, and a Sword of Islam proclaiming its bearer the defender of the Prophet's law, inaugurated and received days apart by the same man on the same coast. They contradict at every point, and they survived the contradiction because they were addressed to audiences kept, mostly, from reading each other's robe. Where the second robe did leak to the first audience, the record shows the mechanism plainly: the Sword-of-Islam ceremony, filmed and circulated, provoked not scandal but hilarity among Italians at home — because the metropolitan audience filed the Protector-of-Islam claim not under *belief* but under *theatre,* a costume the Duce wore for foreign consumption, evidence of his cunning rather than of any

conversion. The same act reached two audiences in two registers: to the Muslim world, prestige; to the metropole, a clever piece of stagecraft. So the contradiction did not detonate even when the robes met, because neither audience took the other's robe as sincere — the Roman robe was meant, the Islamic robe was understood at home to be a move.

And here the revealed-preference test does its sharpest work anywhere in this study. Force never pays for what it does not need. Mussolini paid real, avoidable cost toward the metropole (the arch, the archaeology, the monuments) and real, avoidable cost toward the Muslim world (the forged sword, the ceremony, the mosques, the pilgrim facilities, the School of Islamic Culture, and the genuine awkwardness of a Lateran-Treaty Catholic dictator styling himself protector of Islam). Toward the conquered Libyans themselves he paid, for their belief, essentially nothing — he withheld full citizenship from them by the same 1939 decree that offered the special one, and withheld formation from them, as the next module shows, almost entirely. The expenditures are the evidence, and they point one way: the audiences whose recognition the order actually needed were the metropole, the Fascist elite, and the wider Muslim world, and the audience whose recognition it did not need was the one under the floor. That absence is itself a finding, the revealed-preference mirror: a population over which force is total requires no robe, and receives none.

There is a further reason the robe toward the conquered was not merely withheld but impossible, and it turns on what the floor had done to the seam. In French Algeria the conqueror *redirected* the native religious authority — got behind the marabouts and the brotherhoods and tried to point their earned trust at itself. Italy in Cyrenaica did the opposite: it *razed* the native seam, closing the Sanusi lodges, deporting the Quran-teachers to island prisons, expropriating the endowments, and hanging the order's imam before twenty thousand of his own interned people. Having destroyed the genuine Islamic authority, Italy had foreclosed its own ability to redirect it; a redirect requires a living channel of trust to capture, and Italy had killed the channel. What was left, when it wanted an Islamic robe toward the wider Muslim world, was the only remaining provenance — to *forge* one, a sword from Florence and a borrowed title. And the forgery was transparent to the one audience that had watched the razing: no Cyrenaican who had buried his dead in the camps mistook the Protector of Islam for anything but the man who had razed the lodges. The forge toward the Muslim world was made necessary, and made incredible, by the destruction of the seam toward the conquered.

Sincerity: tested or revealed

The framework's instrument for sincerity is the deviation test, applied only at the apex and held as probabilistic, and here it reads clearly enough. Mussolini's own trajectory is the datum: the man who as a young socialist went to prison in 1911 for opposing the conquest of Libya became, as Duce, its completer, and crowned himself the Protector of the Islam whose imam he had hanged. A break of that magnitude, made toward the personal advantage the parvenu's charisma required — the delivered triumph, the empire, the prestige — reads as instrumental rather than sincere; there is no costly break toward a value held above both doctrine and self to weigh on the other side. The Sword of Islam was, on its face, a manufactured tool, believed by no one at the top. The romanità robe is the harder case,

and here the discipline of origin-versus-function applies: many Fascists genuinely revered Rome, because the cult had been installed in them by formation from childhood, so the Roman robe could be at once a calculated legitimating instrument and a sincere conviction in those formed to it — a built thing that had become real. But the charismatic robe on which the whole rested was of the *revealed* rather than the tested kind: failure was read not as evidence against the doctrine but as a want of will, and a robe that runs on continual delivery is brittle by construction, needing a fresh triumph to renew it — which is exactly why, when the deliveries stopped, the whole structure fell, as Module 10 will trace.

Reading the robe against the framework

The framework already holds that one apex may run several robes for several audiences, and gives the forge/redirect/inherit menu of provenance. This case confirms both and sharpens each in two ways worth stating.

First, the reversed robe has a hole where the conquered should be, and the hole is the finding. In the framework's clean case, Timur, both robes were cut for audiences whose compliance he needed — his own cavalry and his Persian subjects. Here the entire stack — Rome for the metropole, the Sword for the Muslim world, redemption for the international gallery, charisma for the Fascist elite — is cut for every audience *except* the population being ruled, which receives no robe at all but the floor. The reversed robe of the colonial bend is not, at its extreme, a robe cut for a different audience than the ruled; it is a robe cut for every audience but the ruled, and the revealed-preference test — lavish expenditure toward all the others, nothing toward the conquered's belief — is what exposes it. A study of a colonial robe should therefore count not only the robes present but the robe *absent,* because the absence, measured against the spending elsewhere, tells you which audience the floor could rule without persuading.

Second, what the floor does to the seam toward one audience constrains the provenance it can use toward another. The framework treats forge, redirect, and inherit as three options an apex chooses among. This case shows the choice is not always free: having *razed* the Sanusi seam to hold the ground — because the mobile, faith-bound population could be held no other way, as Module 1 established — Italy foreclosed the cheap option of *redirecting* Islamic authority and was left, when it wanted an Islamic robe for the wider Muslim world, only with the expensive and fragile option of *forging* one. And the forgery was caught precisely by the audience that had witnessed the razing. So the menu of provenance is constrained backward by the floor's own violence: destroy a seam to solve the problem of holding the ground, and you have destroyed the channel you would later need to legitimate the holding. Razing forecloses redirect; the forge that remains is incredible to whoever watched the razing.

The rest the case confirms. The colonial bend holds — the robe is reversed, cut away from the conquered. The recursion holds and is unusually explicit — Rome invoked against Islam, the arch dug from the sand to prove the return, the Sanusi marked for destruction in Cato's own Latin. And the

cheap-versus-expensive contrast that runs through the whole study is nowhere clearer than in the robe: the order Italy displaced held its people's belief cheaply, on a faith that had become the furniture of reality through a seam the Bedouin trusted for free; the order Italy installed held nothing of the kind, and had to manufacture its legitimacy out of travertine arches and retouched photographs and a gold-hilted sword from a Florence workshop, the whole gaudy apparatus of a belief that never took where it was ruling — which is only the surveillance-tell in another key. Forgery, like surveillance, is the tell of a belief that never took.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is drawn from public monuments, published texts, and reported speech: the base inscription of the equestrian monument to Mussolini in Tripoli (sculptor Quirino Ruggeri, inaugurated 1938), *"A Benito Mussolini pacificatore delle genti redentore della terra di Libia le popolazioni memori e fiere dove fiammeggiò la spada dell'Islam consacrano nel segno del Littorio una fedeltà che sfida il destino,"* given in the original with translation; Mussolini's reassurance at the Sword-of-Islam ceremony, *"pace, giustizia, benessere e rispetto delle leggi del Profeta"*; the title of the closing chapter of Rodolfo Graziani's *Cirenaica pacificata* (Mondadori, 1932), *"Senussia delenda,"* and his own explanation that it paraphrased Cato's *Carthago delenda est*; and Mussolini's designation of the Libyans as *"musulmani italiani della quarta sponda d'Italia."* The Arco dei Fileni's Latin inscriptions and Balbo's characterisation of the arch are given in paraphrase and brief translation from the scholarship (the *Classical Receptions Journal* study of the arch and Sallust; the literature on Fascist Latin), and the fact that the arch was inaugurated in March 1937 and presented as the renewal of the Roman Empire under the fasces is drawn from that work. The reconstruction of the Sword-of-Islam episode — the maker Picchiani e Barlacchi of Florence, the retouched photograph, the choreography, and Mussolini's claim to the Caliph's inherited authority — draws on the scholarship on the episode (Wright, "Mussolini, Libya, and the Sword of Islam"; Del Boca) and on the Italian reference accounts; the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 is a standard fact. The romanità and *mare nostrum* framing draws on the scholarship on Fascist archaeology and the cult of Rome (Arthurs, *Excavating Modernity*; Nelis; Munzi, *L'epica del ritorno*; McLaren on colonial architecture). Contested or approximate details are given with their ranges: the Sword-of-Islam ceremony is variously dated between 18 and 20 March 1937, and the escort variously numbered about 2,500 to 2,600 horsemen; the Arco dei Fileni is dated to its inauguration in mid-March 1937. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 4

THE KUTTAB AND THE BALILLA

Module 4 · Formation — the two formations in the field: the Qur'anic school and the lodge that had installed Islam so deeply, across a thousand years, that they simply held the ground when the floor cracked, and the Fascist schooling lavished on the settler's child and withheld from the conquered — because formation withheld is not formation absent, and the field was never empty

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Two formations in the field

The framework's fourth module asks how an order installs its belief in each new generation, and it assumes, reasonably, one order forming one population. A colony breaks the assumption, because a colony has two formations in the field at once. There is the formation the conquered already carry — a belief a former conquest installed and drove so deep, across so many generations, that it long ago became the furniture of reality and now reproduces itself in every child without the colonial state lifting a finger. And there is the formation the colonial order runs, which in this case, as the colonial bend predicts, was withheld almost entirely from the conquered and lavished instead on the settler's own child and on the metropole. The module has therefore to reconstruct two good subjects rather than one — the pious Muslim the *kuttab* and the lodge produced, and the little Fascist the Italian school produced — and to notice, which is the whole finding, that the good subject the colonial order actually formed was not a Libyan at all. It was an Italian. The conquered, meanwhile, were left formed by the order Italy was trying to displace, which is why the field was never empty and the twenty-year war was fought against a formation and not a mob.

The native formation: the furniture of the world

The belief that formed the Libyan was Islam, and by the twentieth century it was not a doctrine anyone experienced as having been brought — it was simply how the world was, the seventh-century Arab conquest naturalised across some twelve hundred years until the Qur'an was the ground of the law and the calendar was the shape of the year and no living person could conceive that it had once been otherwise. It reproduced itself through a dense set of institutions the colonial state neither built nor, for a long time, could touch. It began in the *kuttab,* the small Qur'anic school attached to the mosque, which caught the child young and taught him to recite the holy book and to write the Arabic script — the first formation, installing the faith and the sacred language together before the child could weigh either. Above the *kuttab* stood the mosque-institutes of the towns, where a young man could study *fiqh,* the law, and above and beside all of it stood the *zawiya,* the lodge of the Sanusi order, which was school as much as shrine — teaching, in the descriptions that survive, astronomy and the sciences and history and medicine alongside religion, and, in a detail this module will return to, the

military arts of defending the faith. At the apex of the network sat the Sanusi university at Jaghbub, second in Africa only to al-Azhar, where a young Cyrenaican named Omar al-Mukhtar spent eight years at his studies before he ever lifted a rifle. Trust in this whole edifice ran through the descent of the holy families — the *ashraf,* the lineages claiming descent from the Prophet, of whom the Sanusi house was one — so that the shaykh's blessing carried a weight the tax-collector's decree never could.

Read off the good subject this formation produced and you read the man Italy would spend twenty years failing to subdue. He submitted to God and kept the five pillars; he fasted through Ramadan and kept the two Eids and honoured the birth of the Prophet and dreamed of the pilgrimage to Mecca, so that the ritual year rehearsed the order in him again and again from childhood; he venerated the shaykh and the saint and the tomb; he held to the honour code of his tribe, which the community enforced for free through praise and shame, so that the order was self-policing and the state's arm scarcely needed. And he held, as a plain religious obligation installed by the same formation, that a Christian who came by sea to rule Muslim land was to be resisted — that *jihad* against the infidel usurper was not politics but duty. This is the cheap, self-running pole at full function: a belief so deep that the many hold the order up themselves and force can retreat to the margins, a former conquest that took so completely that it needs no force at all to maintain, because it maintains itself in the family and the mosque and the calendar. It was authentically the conquered's world, exactly as the settler's Fascism was authentically the settler's — and naming its origin as a conquest does not make it less real, but names precisely why it was so hard to break.

The good subject was a fighter

Because the native formation was a former conquest that had fully taken, and because it carried within it the obligation of holy war — because the lodge that taught the sciences also taught the arts of defending the faith — the resistance that met the Italian floor was not a breakdown of order but the native order's good subject doing exactly what his formation had installed. This is the recursion's hardest payoff and the reason the conquest was so ruinously expensive. Al-Mukhtar was not a warlord who took up religion; he was a Qur'an-teacher, a product of the Jaghbub formation, who led the resistance *as* a religious duty, his authority flowing from the lodge and the faith and his descent, not from any state. The men who followed him were following their formation.

The strongest evidence that this formation was genuine conviction and not mere performance is the legitimacy-determination the framework asks us to look for — the moment the population's own recognised authority made a ruling and the base had to show, by what it did, whether it truly believed. That moment came in 1912, when the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, the formal head of the house of Islam, ceded Libya to Italy at Ouchy and withdrew, retaining only a nominal religious sovereignty. Had the population's belief lived in the state, it would have transferred, grudgingly, with the state's surrender; a population merely performing compliance does not fight on when its own sovereign has signed the paper. Instead the Cyrenaicans did the opposite of accepting the transfer: they followed not the ceding state but the formation, rallying to the Sanusi jihad against the incoming Christian power and fighting it for another twenty years. The belief held independently of the state that fell, because it had

never lived in the state — it lived in the *kuttab* and the lodge and the family, and those did not sign at Ouchy. That divergence between what the state did and what the population did is the cleanest proof in the whole study that the native formation was real all the way down.

Formation withheld: the schools that rivalled Rome

Against this stood the colonial formation, and its defining feature toward the conquered was that it was withheld. The Italians built schools in Libya — good ones; by the late 1930s the colony had on the order of eighty to ninety Italian schools that were said to rival the schools of Rome — but these were for the settlers' children and the administrators' children, and Arabs and Bedouin were not admitted to them. The only secondary schools in the colony were built for Italian children, and closed to Libyans; a Libyan child could be schooled, in the thin colonial provision made for him, no further than the fourth grade, barred from the secondary schools above it and, on some accounts, discouraged even from formal Arabic. The result is legible in a single number that the withholding produced: across three decades of Italian rule, the whole of Libya generated on the order of sixteen native university graduates. The native formation, meanwhile, was left to run through the several hundred Qur'anic schools the colonial state had not built and did not fund — the *kuttabs,* which were the old order's own institutions, doing the old order's own work.

This is the colonial bend's withheld formation in its plainest form, and its logic is the one the bend predicts: to school the Libyan into the colonial order's belief would have been to begin admitting him to it, and admission was precisely what the settlement (Module 2) had been built to withhold. Formation is the machinery of inclusion; a population you form into your order is a population you are on the way to seating in it. So the order that reserved full citizenship for Italians reserved full formation for Italians too, and the caste line ran through the schoolhouse as cleanly as through the citizenship rolls. It is the exact mirror of the reversed robe of Module 3: as the belief was manufactured for every audience but the conquered, so the schooling was built for every child but the conquered's. The settler's child was formed lavishly — in schools that rivalled Rome's, in the regime's youth organisations, in the cult of Rome and the Duce that made him a Fascist — because the settler's belief was the belief the order needed. The Libyan child was left to the *kuttab,* because his belief was the one belief the order had decided it could rule without.

The forged replacement

There was a late and shallow exception, and it repeats, in the register of formation, exactly the move Module 3 found in the register of the robe. Having spent the reconquest destroying the native formation's own institutions — closing the Sanusi lodges, deporting the Qur'an-teachers to island prisons, razing, in the historians' summary, the Senussi religious and educational centres through the 1930s — the regime under Balbo turned, from 1937, to offering the conquered a manufactured replacement formation of its own. It chartered a Muslim Association of the Lictor, under the Fascist party, *"a curare l'elevazione morale e civile dei nativi musulmani,"* to attend to the moral and civil elevation of the Muslim natives; it opened a School of Islamic Culture in Tripoli; it built its handful of

"Muslim villages" with mosques and schools attached. But this was a forged formation offered after the real one had been razed, and it was forged for the same reasons and with the same credibility as the Sword of Islam: aimed less at genuinely forming the Libyan than at co-opting a thin collaborator stratum and at impressing the metropole and the wider Muslim world that Italy elevated its Muslims. A formation manufactured by the destroyer of the lodges, to elevate the natives *within* the compartment marked for them and never out of it, was as transparent to the Cyrenaican who had buried his dead in the camps as the gold sword from Florence — and for the same reason. You cannot raze a people's formation and then be believed as its patron.

The field was never empty

The deepest finding of the module is what the razing did not achieve. The Italians destroyed the *institutions* of the native formation — the lodges, the endowed schools, the teaching network — and yet the formation itself did not die, because a formation twelve hundred years deep does not live only in its institutions. It lives in the family that teaches the child his prayers, in the surviving mosque, in the Arabic and the Qur'an the *kuttab* carried, in the calendar that scores the year, and in the memory of the martyrs, and none of these can be closed by a decree deporting a shaykh to Ustica. So the field the razing was meant to clear did not go empty; the incumbent formation held it, driven from its razed institutions into the un-razeable carriers beneath them. Worse, from the colonizer's point of view, the razing itself became a formative event: the very destruction of the Senussi centres, as the historians note, hardened the order into the nucleus of resistance, teaching the next generation in the most vivid possible terms that the colonizer was the enemy of the faith. The attempt to erase the formation of quiescence manufactured a formation of resistance. And the proof that the formation outlived both its institutions and its men is in what came after: al-Mukhtar hanged in 1931 became not a closed chapter but a permanent one — his face on the currency of independent Libya, his name invoked by every regime that followed, his image worn to Rome by a later Libyan ruler on a state visit — and the Sanusi university razed in the reconquest was refounded in 1960. The formation was deeper than its lodges and deeper than its leader, which is exactly what a former conquest that has become the furniture of reality is: a thing you can persecute but cannot, in a generation, unmake.

Reading formation against the framework

The framework's Module 4 reconstructs one order's good subject and calendar and asks where its formation is thin. The colonial case, and this one sharply, forces three refinements, and they are the module's contribution.

First, a colony has two formations in the field, and the colonial one forms the settler, not the conquered. The module must reconstruct both good subjects — the pious Muslim the *kuttab* and the lodge produced, and the little Fascist the settler's school produced — and register that the colonial order's actual formation-project was aimed at its own child and at the metropole, never at the ruled. A study that reconstructs only "the order's formation of its subjects" will look for the colonizer forming

the colonized and find a strange near-absence; the absence is the finding, and its complement is the lavish formation of the settler. The colonial good subject was not the colonized at all.

Second, and most important, formation withheld is not formation absent — the field does not go empty, because the incumbent formation holds it. The colonial bend says formation is withheld from the majority so the order stays brittle; this case shows *why* the brittleness is so severe. It is not the brittleness of an unformed population that might, in a vacuum, have been formed either way. It is the brittleness of a *counter-formed* population — a people actively formed, every generation, in the family and the mosque and the calendar, into the conviction that the colonizer is an infidel usurper and that resistance to him is a sacred duty. "Formation withheld" in a colony does not leave the conquered blank; it leaves them formed by the very order the colonizer is trying to displace, which is a far worse position for the colonizer than blankness, because the field is not merely unwon but held against him by an incumbent that reproduces itself for free. The resistance was a formation, not a mob, and that is the single fact that most explains why the floor here had to run on force for the whole of its life.

Third, razing the institutional seam does not erase the formation; it drives it deeper and can invert it. Destroying the lodges and deporting the teachers cleared the institutions but not the belief, which retreated into the un-razeable carriers — family, language, calendar, memory — and there kept forming each generation; and the destruction itself became a lesson that converted a formation of religious quiescence into a formation of religious resistance. The framework's rule that a razed seam refills, often more captured, holds with a twist: here the trust released by the razing flowed not to the destroyer but to the counter-formation, to the martyred Sanusi, so the vacancy refilled not as a captured seam serving the floor but as a resistance serving the faith — which is the recursion's revenge on a conqueror who tries to solve a formation he cannot admit by destroying the institutions that carry it.

The rest the case confirms. The colonial bend holds: formation withheld, and withheld along the caste line, the schoolhouse drawing the same boundary as the citizenship rolls. The recursion holds and does its heaviest work here: the native formation was durable precisely because it was a former conquest that fully took, and that durability is why, when Italy withheld its own formation, the old order simply held the field. And the cheap-versus-expensive contrast the study measures is nowhere plainer. The order Italy displaced ran on the cheapest possible fuel — the governed's own conviction, installed for free by their own institutions, self-policing through their own honour code, needing no colonial school and no colonial garrison to reproduce. The order Italy installed ran on the dearest — force, wire, camps, surveillance — precisely because it withheld formation from the conquered and so never earned the benefit column that would have let the floor withdraw. Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took; and here the belief never took because it was never even offered, the colonial order having decided that forming the Libyan was more dangerous than fighting him. It fought him for twenty years instead.

A note on sources. This module is more reconstructive than quotation-heavy, as formation modules tend to be, and the balance of its evidence is paraphrased from the scholarship rather than quoted. The

reconstruction of the native formation — the *kuttab* attached to the mosque, the town institutes teaching *fiqh,* the Sanusi *zawiya* as a teaching institution (including, in the education-history literature's summary, the military arts of defending the faith), the university at Jaghbub, and the fusion of lodge and tribe — draws on Evans-Pritchard's *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica,* on Ahmida's *The Making of Modern Libya,* and on the standard histories of Libyan education and Islam. The figures for the colonial schooling — on the order of eighty to ninety Italian schools reserved for settlers' and administrators' children, the exclusion of Libyans from the Italian and secondary schools, the capping of Libyan schooling near the fourth grade, and the resulting handful (about sixteen) of native university graduates — are drawn from the education-history literature and vary somewhat across sources (the counts of "Italian" versus "Arab" schools differ by whether the several hundred native *kuttabs,* which the colonial state did not build, are included); they are given here as a cluster rather than exact totals, and the Libyan share of the population is put across sources at roughly three-quarters to five-sixths. The one primary phrase quoted, the charge of the Muslim Association of the Lictor to attend to *"l'elevazione morale e civile dei nativi musulmani,"* is carried from the 1939 legislation examined in Module 2 and given in the original with translation. The legitimacy-determination reading — that the population followed the Sanusi jihad rather than the Caliph's cession of 1912, and that al-Mukhtar's memory outlived his execution — draws on the same scholarship and on the documented afterlife of his image. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 5

ONE DOCTOR FOR THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND

Module 5 · The Cost Column — why the ordinary Cyrenaican's ledger came out for revolt for twenty years, and what it finally took to reverse it: a cost column driven past credible threat to total custody, the exit engineered shut and the pastoral base destroyed, until the sacred benefit of resistance was overridden at the biological bone

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The ledger that came out for revolt

The framework's fifth module asks why the ordinary subject's ledger comes out against revolt — why, weighing the benefit of defiance against its cost from where he stands, the ordinary man decides to comply. In almost every order in this collection the answer is some mixture of a cost column full enough to price defection and a benefit column filled by a belief thick enough that most men comply without being made to. In Cyrenaica, for twenty years, the answer was that the ledger did *not* come out against revolt. The ordinary Cyrenaican weighed the cost of resistance — which was, from the first, death — against its benefit, and chose resistance, again and again, across two decades, because the benefit column was not empty and was not neutral: it was filled, by the thick native formation reconstructed in Module 4, with the sacred obligation of *jihad* against the infidel usurper. The belief that in a settled thick-robe order makes compliance cheap here made *resistance* cheap, because the formation ran against the colonizer, not for him. This is the fact that governs the whole module and explains the extremity it must describe. The Italian cost column in Cyrenaica had to do something no ordinary cost column has to do: not merely price the defection of an indifferent population, but override a positive, thick, self-renewing benefit-of-resistance held by a counter-formed one. And a benefit that strong is not overridden by a credible threat. It is overridden, if at all, only by driving the cost past threat into the body itself — which is what the camps were.

The two dials, and why they could not be set the ordinary way

The framework reads the cost column through two dials: how credible the force that would punish defection, and whether any exit exists. In the ordinary case both are given more or less for free — a garrison supplies credible force by its reach, and geography supplies the closed exit by penning a settled population that cannot disperse. In Cyrenaica neither dial could be set that way, and Module 1 has already shown why. The force dial could not be set by garrison-reach, because the population was mobile and the country was open: for twenty years Italian columns held the towns and the tax-roads and could not catch the bands that dissolved into a desert they knew and the Italians did not. And the exit dial could not be set by geography, because geography here offered exit rather than closing it —

the open desert at the population's back and, across it, a British Egypt where the fighters could rest and resupply and an Italian column could not follow. So the two dials that a settled conquest inherits from garrison and geography had, in Cyrenaica, to be manufactured, at a cost so great that it defines the order. The manufactured capturability of Module 1 — the camp and the wire — is, read from the individual subject's side, exactly this: the two dials of his cost column, forced to their extremes by hand because neither could be set by the ordinary means.

Force made total: the camp

The force dial, unable to be set by reach, was set instead by total physical custody. Beginning in 1929 and intensifying through 1930 and 1931, the Italian administration deported the rural population of eastern Libya — on the order of a hundred thousand people, better than half of all Cyrenaica, mainly women, children, and the old, the men being with the bands or dead — from the Jebel Akhdar down to a chain of sixteen concentration camps strung along the arid Sirtic coast: El Agheila, Soluch, Marsa al-Brega, El Magrun, Apollonia, Abyar, Agedabia, and the rest. Custody replaced reach. A population the floor could not catch in the field it now simply held in its hand, behind wire and machine guns, and the cost of defection for a man so held was no longer a probable future punishment but an immediate present one.

The conditions were what total custody of a pastoral people on ground that could not feed them had to be. The camps crowded on the order of twenty thousand people at a time, together with the animals they had been driven down with, into something like a single square kilometre; typhus and other epidemics ran through them, lice and skin disease made the days a torment, the rations were paltry and the labour forced. The medical provision is the figure that states the whole reality, and it is worth setting down bare: the camps of Soluch and Sidi Ahmed el Magrun, holding between them an estimated thirty-three thousand people, had one doctor. By the time the last camp was closed in September 1933, on the most cited reckoning something close to forty-four thousand of the interned — near forty-five per cent of them — were dead. And over the same years, as the state deported the people it also destroyed the herds that were their life, so that in Cyrenaica the sheep fell from about eight hundred and ten thousand in 1926 to ninety-eight thousand in 1933, the goats from seventy thousand to twenty-five thousand, and the camels — the animal on which the whole nomadic economy and the whole capacity for movement depended — from seventy-five thousand to two thousand.

What the metropole was told about these places is the seam of the study at its widest. The regime's propaganda proclaimed the camps hygienic and efficiently run — oases, in its telling, of modern civilisation — and Graziani's own volume printed a photograph of one captioned a step towards civilisation. One doctor for thirty-three thousand, and a step towards civilisation: the two descriptions are of the same place, and the distance between them is the distance across the Mediterranean, which the order existed to maintain. And the terrible efficacy of the custody is not in dispute even from the side of the resistance: the separation of the population from the fighters was, as al-Mukhtar himself is reported to have acknowledged, the measure that finally broke a resistance that had shown, in the

Italian command's own phrase, a notable vitality. The formation was strong enough that nothing short of seizing the entire population could defeat it. The cost column had to become total custody because anything less had been, for twenty years, overridden.

Exit made impossible: the wire and the free-fire zone

The exit dial, unable to be set by geography, was set by engineering. In the winter of 1930–1931 the army strung the frontier wire described in Module 1 — some two hundred and seventy kilometres of barbed wire in four lines from the Gulf of Sollum to the oasis of Jaghbub, watched by forts and patrolled from the air and by armoured car over a zone in which anything moving could be shot — for the single purpose of closing the door to Egypt that geography had left open. To the wire the floor added the legal closure of every other exit from compliance: the population was disarmed under pain of death, and contact of any kind with the resistance was made a capital offence, so that the ordinary Cyrenaican who fed a fighter, or failed to inform on one, or was found with a weapon, had chosen death as surely as if he had taken up arms himself. Between 1930 and 1931 some twelve thousand people were executed on suspicion of rebel sympathy, and the public hanging of captured or suspected men — including, before twenty thousand of his interned people at Soluch, al-Mukhtar himself — was used deliberately as a demonstration, the cost of defection displayed on the gallows so that no one need estimate it. Where the ordinary order leaves the subject a private exit — flight, quiet non-compliance, the hidden transcript that costs nothing to hold — this one closed even those, because the wire sealed the geographic exit, the capital-offence law sealed the exit of quiet complicity, and the camp had already seized the body that might have used either.

The cost at the biological bone

Put the camp and the wire and the killed herds together and the cost column has been driven to the place the framework calls the biological bone — the point, normally reached only in the plantation and the mine, where every door is shut and the floor sinks to the level of bare survival because the subject has no exit and no leverage left. The camels from seventy-five thousand to two thousand are the bone made numerical. A pastoral people whose herds are destroyed and whose bodies are penned has no subsistence to return to and no means of movement to return with, so that the trap closed not only on the present but on the future: even a man released from the camp in 1934 was released into a Cyrenaica whose flocks were gone, and there was, in the most literal sense, nothing to go back to. This is the cost column at its theoretical maximum — force total, exit nil, subsistence destroyed — and it is the reason this is the most lethal cost column anywhere in the corpus. It did not price defection; it removed the material possibility of survival independent of the floor, and killed near half of those it enclosed in the process of doing so.

Core and periphery: the hidden transcript and the collaborator

The ledger was not the same everywhere, and the framework's instruction to expect a different answer for core and periphery holds sharply. In the coastal towns — Tripoli, Benghazi — the cost column was closer to the ordinary kind: a policed urban population, some of it genuinely co-opted, the Jewish merchants and the pro-Italian notables and the special citizens of Module 2, and a real collaborator stratum that the floor recruited into its own apparatus, the Savari and Spahi and Meharist colonial troops, and, once the resistance was broken and the assimilation policy under way, the two colonial divisions of Libyan Arabs the army fielded by 1940. For these the ledger came out against revolt in something like the normal way, and their compliance was, in James Scott's terms, prudent performance more than conviction — the public transcript of loyalty over a hidden transcript the floor could not read. The test of which it was came when the cost apparatus was finally lifted: the Second World War tore the Italian floor off Cyrenaica, and what re-emerged was not the manufactured loyalty of the monument inscription but the resistance the camps had buried — the Sanusi under Idris returning on the British side, and Idris crowned king of an independent Libya in 1951, two decades after the rope at Soluch was meant to have ended his order. The compliance the cost column bought was never belief. It was the ledger held at the extreme, and it reversed the moment the extremity lifted, which is the surest sign that the benefit column had never been won at all.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The framework reads the cost column through two dials and the thick/thin gradient, and this case sharpens all three, in ways that are the module's contribution.

First, the required height of the cost column is a function not only of the force available but of the strength and direction of the benefit column it must override. The framework's gradient runs from thick belief, where force withdraws to the margins, to thin belief, where the cost column is held high by visible force. This case adds a third and worse position the gradient did not name: where the belief is thick but runs *against* the ruler. There the cost column is not filling an empty benefit column, as in a thin-belief order, but fighting a full one — overriding a positive, self-renewing benefit-of-resistance that the population's own formation keeps topped up every generation. And a full benefit column is not overridden by a credible threat, which is why the ordinary high cost column of a thin-belief order was, in Cyrenaica, insufficient for twenty years. To override a thick hostile formation, the cost column must be driven past credible threat into total custody — the camp — because only the seizure of the body itself can outweigh a benefit the mind holds as sacred. The camp is what the cost column looks like when it must defeat a formation and not merely discipline an indifference, and a study should read the reach for total custody as the diagnostic of a benefit column running strongly the wrong way.

Second, manufactured capturability is the subject's cost column made total. Module 1 established that where the population is mobile and the terrain offers exit, capturability must be built rather than inherited. Read from the individual's side, that built capturability simply is his two dials forced to their extremes: the camp is the force dial at its maximum, total custody in place of credible reach, and

the wire is the exit dial at its minimum, an engineered pen in place of a geographic one. So the two dials, in a mobile counter-formed colony, cannot be set by the ordinary furniture of garrison and geography and must be manufactured at extreme cost — which is precisely why this cost column is the corpus's most expensive and most lethal, and why the framework should treat garrison-reach and geographic closure not as the universal setting of the dials but as the *cheap* setting, available only against a settled or a persuaded population and replaced, against a mobile hostile one, by custody and wire at a cost that runs toward genocide.

Third, the cost column at the biological bone is self-defeating as a strategy of holding. It works — it broke the resistance — but it works by destroying the metabolic base of the population it means to hold, so that what it produces is not a held, extractable, governable people but a graveyard and a cleared plateau. The camels from seventy-five thousand to two thousand, the near half of the interned dead, the third of Cyrenaica gone: these are not the price of holding the population but the evidence that the order could not hold it and could only remove it. The cost column driven to the bone is a confession, written in the demography, that the belief was never going to be won and the population was, in the end, not ruled but subtracted — which is why this module runs straight into Module 2's finding that the settlement was the genocide's balance sheet, and into Module 11's accounting of the metabolic dead. A cost column that can hold a population only by killing half of it has not solved the problem of ruling them; it has abolished the problem by abolishing them.

The rest the case confirms without strain. The surveillance-and-force apparatus here — the camp, the wire, the free-fire zone, the disarmament, the capital-offence law, the informers, the gallows used as demonstration — is the surveillance-tell of the framework at its most extreme: a belief that never took, held down by the most total coercion in the collection. The recursion runs underneath it all: the cost had to reach the bone precisely because the thick former-conquest formation of Module 4 ran the benefit column against the colonizer, so that the expensive-pole conquest had to spend, on holding down a cheap-pole order's still-living conviction, more force than any order in this study spends anywhere. And the colonial bend holds in the seam: the raw cost column operated in the colony — one doctor for thirty-three thousand — while the metropole was shown the oasis and the step towards civilisation, the order's core task being, to the end, to keep those two descriptions of the same square kilometre from ever meeting.

A note on sources. The figures here are drawn from the standard scholarship and reference accounts of the pacification and the camps, and the load-bearing ones are given with their ranges: the population deported (on the order of 100,000–110,000, more than half of Cyrenaica); the number of camps (sixteen, principally El Agheila, Soluch, Marsa al-Brega, El Magrun, Apollonia, Abyar, and Agedabia); the crowding (on the order of 20,000 interned with their animals in about a square kilometre) and the medical provision (one doctor between the roughly 33,000 of Soluch and Sidi Ahmed el Magrun); the camp mortality (most cited near 44,000, close to 45 per cent, by the last camp's closure in September 1933, with total pacification deaths estimated between about 40,000 and 70,000); the executions of 1930–1931 (some 12,000 on suspicion of rebel sympathy); and the collapse of the herds

(sheep from about 810,000 in 1926 to 98,000 in 1933, goats from 70,000 to 25,000, camels from 75,000 to 2,000). These draw on Ahmida (*The Making of Modern Libya* and *Genocide in Libya*), Del Boca, Rochat, and Evans-Pritchard (*The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*), among others. Graziani's caption "a step towards civilisation" is a verified caption from *Cirenaica pacificata* (1932); the characterisation of the camps as hygienic, efficient "oases of modern civilisation" is the regime propaganda's framing as summarised in the historical literature rather than a verified verbatim quotation, and is used here as such. Badoglio's directive that the work continue "even if the entire population of Cyrenaica must perish" (June 1930) is carried from Module 1 in the standard English translation, to be set against its Italian original in Modules 10 and 11. Al-Mukhtar's reported acknowledgement that the separation of population from fighters was the decisive measure is given as reported in the scholarship. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 6

SPACE FOR THE GREAT PROLETARIAN

Module 6 · Extraction — the box of sand had no surplus to take, so the extraction ran the other way: the metropole's resources poured in, and what was taken from the colony was the ground itself — land for the settler, labour for the road, the herds at the bone, and, deepest of all, space for Italy's proletarian millions — an extraction with no "just enough" point, because you cannot tune the taking of a man's land

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Following a surplus that was not there

The framework's sixth module says: follow the surplus — find the mechanisms by which the order takes the produce of the ruled, quantify the take, and locate it at the edge of the revolt threshold, the "just enough" point where the extractor draws as much as he can without provoking the rising that would cost him everything. The instruction assumes there is a surplus to follow, and in almost every order in this collection there is. In Libya there was almost none, and that absence is where this module has to begin, because it bends the whole shape of the extraction and, in the end, the framework's account of it.

Libya was poor. It was, in the phrase the radical Gaetano Salvemini threw at the whole enterprise before it began, *uno scatolone di sabbia* — a big box of sand — a land the nationalist press had fantasised as rich in minerals and well-watered and which turned out to be, for the purposes of an extractor, very nearly worthless: thin coastal agriculture, a decayed caravan trade, no known mineral wealth of consequence, and the oil that would one day make it rich still undiscovered and thirty years away, surfacing only in 1959, after independence, when Italy was gone. The conquest did not pay. The war of 1911–12 alone cost on the order of a billion and a third lire, a billion more than Giolitti had promised, and the colony went on costing: the roads, the ports, the railways, the drainage and the wells, the subsidies that built the settlers' farms and the garrisons that held the ground all had to be paid for from Rome, and the colony returned, in ordinary extractive terms, almost nothing against them. Italy's own official account of its investment states the logic without embarrassment — the capital went in to serve the new colonists and to make the colony more self-sufficient — which is to say the metropole was pouring resources *into* the colony, not drawing a surplus out of it. This is the first inversion, and it is fundamental: the classic colony sends its surplus to the metropole, and this one received the metropole's surplus instead. If there was no produce to extract, then the extraction, if there was one, had to be of something else.

What was extracted: the ground, not the produce

There was an extraction, and it was massive, but its object was not the produce of the land — it was the land. What Italy took from Libya was the ground itself: the tribal grazing commons and the Sanusi endowments declared state domain and handed to settlers, reconstructed in Module 2, on the order of two hundred and twenty-five thousand hectares in the colonisation companies' hands by 1940; the labour of the conquered, mobilised to build the infrastructure of the settler economy; the herds, seized and destroyed, the camels from seventy-five thousand to two thousand of Module 5; and, beneath all of these and organising them, the physical space of the country, taken to be filled with Italians. The extraction was not of a flow but of a stock — not the annual surplus a settled peasantry yields to a tax-collector, but the standing capital of a pastoral people: their land, their animals, their labour-power, and their place. This is the second inversion, and it follows from the first: where there is no surplus to skim, an extractive conqueror would simply leave, but a *settler* conqueror stays and takes the ground, because the ground is the point. What Italy wanted from Libya was never Libyan wealth. It was Libyan room.

The road on taken ground

The clearest single object of the labour side of the extraction is the great coastal road, and it is the clearest single instance of the study's method too, because of the distance between what it was said to be and what it was. The *Via Balbia* — the Litoranea — ran one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two kilometres along the whole Mediterranean length of the colony, from the Tunisian border to the Egyptian, and Mussolini came in March 1937 to inaugurate it in the same visit that gave him the Roman arch and the Sword of Islam. It was presented, at the metropole and to the world, as a gift: a feat of Italian engineering, the opening of Libya to modernity and tourism, the redemption of a backward coast. It was built by Libyan labour — the historian Baldinetti records the works as employing something over ten thousand Libyan Arabs, mobilised by the colonial administration in the years just after the pacification that had killed or interned half of Cyrenaica, so that whatever wage was paid, the labour was the labour of a broken and landless population with little power to refuse. And its real function was military: it was the artery down which the Italian army would drive to invade Egypt in September 1940, and its strategic value was plain to every contemporary who looked past the tourist brochure. So the road that the metropole received as Italy's gift to Libya was in fact taken from Libya twice over — built on the labour of the conquered and laid across ground confiscated from them, to serve the settler economy and the army that held them down. The four hundred kilometres of new railway and four thousand of new road, the ports and the factories and the drainage works that the colonial record proudly totals, belong to the same ledger: real works, lasting works, some of them the backbone of Libya to this day — and every one of them an investment in the settler colony, built with the conquered's labour on the conquered's land, and counted at the metropole as generosity. Credit the roads; they were real. But read the direction of the giving: the gift was extracted from the people it was said to be given to.

Space for the great proletarian

Beneath the land and the labour lay the deepest object of the extraction, and it is the one that names the whole enterprise: space. The colony existed, in its founding rationale and its Fascist maturity alike, to hold Italy's surplus people. The landscape established the argument — Italy the *grande proletaria,* the great proletarian nation, its poor pouring out by the million to the Americas, its nationalists demanding a colony that could catch that outflow and settle it on Italian soil — and the demographic colonisation of the 1930s was that argument made concrete in bodies and farms: the *ventimila* of 1938, the settler population past a hundred thousand, the villages named for Italian martyrs planted on the Cyrenaican plateau. What Libya was extracted *for* was not its own yield but its capacity to relieve the metropole's overpopulation, which is to say the thing taken was room — Libyan room, cleared of Libyans, to be occupied by Italians. This is the settler inversion in its purest form. The tributary colony extracts the native's surplus and needs the native alive and working to produce it. The settler colony extracts the native's *place* and needs the native gone, because the same acre cannot be both the Bedouin's grazing and the colonist's farm. The legitimating story was ready to hand and had been since Pascoli: the great proletarian's children, exiled and despised in other men's countries, were owed land, and here across the water was land — "empty," "uncultivated," "unowned," in the fictions of Module 2 — waiting to be redeemed by Italian hands. That the land was neither empty nor unowned, that it was the grazing commons of a pastoral people who had held it for centuries, was the fact the fiction existed to bury, because to take room for the great proletarian's children the room had first to be declared vacant, and then, when the people on it proved the declaration false by refusing to leave, made vacant.

The extraction with no "just enough" point

Here the framework's central image of extraction — the stable point at the edge of the revolt threshold, the "just enough" the extractor tunes to — meets a case it does not fit, and the misfit is the module's finding. The "just enough" equilibrium is a feature of *surplus*-extraction, and it exists because a surplus is a rate: the extractor can take a third of the harvest or a half or two-thirds, tuning the take up toward the threshold and easing it back if he crosses, because the thing extracted is a flow that can be drawn at any level short of starvation. Land-extraction is not a rate. You do not take a third of a man's ground and leave him the rest to graze; the settler needs the acre entire, and the taking is all-or-nothing. And an all-or-nothing dispossession has no point below the revolt threshold, because taking a man's land does not sit at some tunable distance from the rising — it *is* the rising's cause, produced in full the moment the taking is complete. This is precisely what happened: the extraction of the ground itself crossed the threshold not because Italy pushed a rate too high but because the thing extracted was of a kind that has no low setting, and the twenty-year war was the revolt that land-extraction produces by its nature. And the response, when the revolt came, could not be the surplus-extractor's response of easing the rate, because there was no rate to ease — the land had been taken, and to end the revolt by returning it would have been to abandon the colony's whole purpose. So the response was the other thing land-extraction leaves available: not to lower the take but to remove the

taken-from. The camps of Module 5 are, read from this module's side, the completion of the extraction — the subtraction of the population from the ground so that the ground could be held vacant and filled. The two extraction dials, force and exit, did not here set a sustainable rate; they set the speed at which the dispossessed could be cleared. Land-extraction runs not toward an equilibrium but toward an elimination, and it stops only when the native has accepted landlessness or ceased to be present. The Cyrenaicans did not accept it, so they were made absent.

Reading extraction against the framework

The framework's sixth module is a model of surplus-extraction — the rate, the revolt threshold, the "just enough," the two dials that tune the take — and it is an excellent model of the tributary order it was built on. This case shows it needs a companion model for the settler order, and supplies two refinements toward it.

First, and centrally: where the extraction is of the ground itself rather than a surplus off it, the "just enough" equilibrium does not exist, and the extraction runs toward elimination rather than toward a stable rate. A surplus is a flow that can be drawn at any level, so surplus-extraction finds a stable point at the edge of the revolt threshold and sits there, needing the producer alive. Land is a stock taken whole, so land-extraction has no level below the threshold — it produces the revolt by its completion — and it has no stable end-state with the dispossessed in place, because the settler and the native cannot both hold the acre. Its only stable end-states are the native's acceptance of landlessness or the native's removal, and where the native is thickly formed to resist, as Module 4 showed the Cyrenaican was, acceptance does not come and removal is what remains. So the two dials of extraction, in a land-taking colony, do not tune a rate; they set the pace of clearance. This is the structural difference between the extractive colony, which exploits the native and needs him, and the settler colony, which displaces the native and needs him gone — what the scholarship on settler colonialism, following Patrick Wolfe, calls the logic of elimination, invasion as a structure and not an event. The framework should carry both models: extraction-as-rate, tending to equilibrium, for the tributary order; extraction-as-dispossession, tending to elimination, for the settler one. Libya is the settler case in its starkest form, and its genocide is not an excess on top of its extraction but the shape its extraction takes when the dispossessed will not go quietly.

Second, the direction of extraction can invert, and "follow the surplus" must sometimes become follow the land, the labour, and the space. In a settler colony poor in surplus, resources flow from the metropole into the colony — the investment, the subsidy, the garrison, the road — and what flows out of the colony is not produce but the standing capital of the conquered: their ground, their labour, their herds, their room. The colony is sustained as a net drain, for demographic and strategic and prestige value rather than for any extractive return, which means an analyst who looks only for the surplus flowing to the metropole will find the ledger running backward and conclude, wrongly, that there was no extraction at all. The extraction was total; it simply took stocks rather than flows, and place rather than produce. So the module's instruction, in a settler case, is to follow not the surplus but the dispossession — to count the hectares transferred, the labour coerced, the herds destroyed, and the

people removed, and to read the metropole's investment not as generosity but as the capital cost of clearing and holding the ground.

The rest the case confirms and connects. The caste-sorting the colonial bend predicts is exact: the land flowed to the settler caste, the dispossession and the coerced labour and the removal to the conquered caste, and the metropole subsidised the transfer. The seam split the study tracks runs straight through the road: the extraction of Libyan land and labour was received at the metropole as Italy's gift of modernity to Libya, and keeping those two descriptions apart — the gift and the taking — was, as ever, the order's work. The recursion runs underneath: the ground extracted was the former conquest's own tenure, the tribal commons and the Sanusi endowment, the material base of the cheap-pole order legally erased to make room. And the module locks to its neighbours: Module 2's settlement was this extraction's redistribution, the taken ground handed on as farms; Module 5's camps were this extraction's completion, the population subtracted from the ground; and Module 11's accounting will count what this extraction cost in the only currency a land-taking colony finally deals in, which is not the surplus it drew but the people it cleared.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is limited to Gaetano Salvemini's dismissal of Libya as *uno scatolone di sabbia,* a big box of sand, attributed to him in the period debate. The figures for the coastal road (the *Via Balbia,* 1,822 kilometres from the Tunisian to the Egyptian border, inaugurated by Mussolini in March 1937, and used as the invasion route into Egypt in September 1940) are drawn from the standard reference accounts; the historian Anna Baldinetti's finding that its construction employed something over ten thousand Libyan workers is credited to her, with the caveat that the degree of coercion is characterised differently across the literature — some accounts, including hers, framing it as employment, others emphasising the coercive conditions of a population just subjected to the pacification. The land and settler figures (on the order of 225,000 hectares in colonisation-company hands by 1940, the *ventimila* of 1938, an Italian population past 100,000) are carried from Module 2 and its sources (Segré on Balbo, the colonisation-agency volumes); the herd figures from Module 5. The characterisation of the colony as a net fiscal drain, sustained by metropolitan investment rather than yielding an extractive surplus, follows the standard economic histories and the colonial administration's own account of its investment. The distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, and the "logic of elimination," is drawn from the scholarship on settler colonialism, in particular Patrick Wolfe, and is credited as modern analysis rather than a period source. No reliable series of ordinary tax or tribute rates on the Libyan population is offered here, because the real extraction was of land, labour, herds, and space rather than of a taxable surplus, and figures that cannot be verified are not supplied. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 7

DAMAGING TO THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY

Module 7 · Information and Suppression — the seam split in two by distance: the native interpreter class razed rather than captured, and the metropolitan seam whose master valve was distance itself — and which, when the regime that built the crime had fallen, was re-sealed not by the regime but by the nation, in the honour of its own army

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Two seams, and which one mattered

The framework's seventh module finds the seam — the interpreter class that sits at the chokepoint between the people and the knowledge they cannot check — and watches it work two valves, feeding an authorised reading and starving a rival one. A colony has two such seams, not one, and the whole of this module turns on the colonial bend's prediction that they are split apart by distance and that the order's core task is keeping the two ends from meeting. There is the native seam, in the colony, the interpreter class that held the conquered's belief; and there is the metropolitan seam, at home, the channel through which the metropole learned what its conquest was doing. And the bend inverts the framework's usual priority between them. Because the robe is reversed — cut for the metropole, whose belief funds and mans the conquest, not for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not need — the analytically primary seam is not the conquered's but the metropole's. The conquered's interpreter class can simply be razed, cheaply and brutally, since nothing the order needs depends on what the conquered believe; the metropole's seam must be carefully managed, since everything the order needs depends on what the metropole believes. So the sophisticated information-work of this order was not the control of the Libyans' knowledge. It was the control of the Italians'. And its most remarkable feature is that it outlasted, by half a century, the regime that built it.

The native seam: razed, not captured

Toward the conquered, Italy did not manage the seam; it destroyed it. Where French Algeria had tried to *redirect* the native religious authority — to get behind the marabouts and the brotherhoods and point their earned trust at the conqueror — Italy in Cyrenaica *razed* the Sanusi interpreter class outright, as Modules 3 and 4 established: the lodges closed, the Quran-teachers deported to the island prison of Ustica, the endowments that funded the whole teaching network expropriated, the Sanusi religious and educational centres systematically destroyed through the early 1930s. This was the outflow valve at its most violent — not the banned book or the untaught alternative, but the physical elimination of the men who held the authorised reading of the conquered's own faith. Around it stood the colony's surveillance apparatus of Module 5: the total disarmament, the free-fire zone along the wire, the informers, the making of any contact with the resistance a capital offence, the whole

machinery of a floor that could hold its ground only by watching it. Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took, and the completeness of the surveillance here — a whole population interned and watched — is the measure of how completely the belief had failed to take.

But the framework's structural law held, and turned the razing against the razer. The seam cannot be emptied; destroy its occupant and the position refills. In the ordinary case it refills more captured, a demagogue standing in the seat he cleared. Here it refilled as *resistance* — the trust released by the razing flowed not to any captured replacement the Italians could install but to the martyred Sanusi themselves, to the hanged imam and the destroyed lodge, so that the destruction of the native seam produced not a controllable vacancy but the nucleus of the twenty-year revolt. This is why the native seam was, for the order's real purposes, a lost cause from the start: capture it and you cannot, because the conquered will not follow a Christian usurper's interpreter; raze it and you deepen the resistance. Toward the conquered there was no cheap information-solution, only the expensive one of force. So the order spent its cleverness elsewhere.

The metropolitan seam: distance as the master valve

The seam that the order actually worked with care was the one running back to Italy, and its two valves are legible. The inflow valve fed the metropole a lavish authorised reading. Graziani, who built the camps, also wrote the books — *Cirenaica pacificata,* Cyrenaica Pacified, in 1932; *La riconquista del Fezzan* in 1934; *Pace romana in Libia,* Roman Peace in Libya, in 1937; and, after the fall, *Libia redenta,* Redeemed Libya, in 1948 — a whole shelf in which the pacification is Roman peace and the confiscation is redemption. The Istituto Luce newsreels carried the visual reading: the Sword of Islam raised on the retouched horse, the Fourth Shore in bloom, the twenty-six new villages, the Arco dei Fileni. The camps themselves were fed to the metropole captioned, as Module 5 showed, as hygienic oases of modern civilisation, a step towards civilisation. This was the authorised picture, and it was complete and it was continuous.

The outflow valve that protected it was, at bottom, distance. This is the colonial seam's master mechanism and the module's first refinement: the metropole could not check what happened on a coast that most Italians would never visit and could not reach, and so was thrown back, in the pure form of Hardwig's epistemic dependence, on trusting the colonial state's own account of what the colonial state was doing. No banned book is needed to starve a rival reading when no reader can get near the thing the reading would be about. A historian's summary states the geography exactly: the worst of the regime's atrocities took place not in Europe but in Libya and Ethiopia — which is to say, out of sight, across a sea, where the home conscience that would have recoiled from them if it saw them plainly was structurally prevented from seeing them at all. The camps could be called oases because the man reading the caption in Milan had no way to walk the wire at Soluch. Distance did the work that censorship does at home, and did it more cheaply and more completely, because it did not have to suppress the truth — it merely had to leave the metropole unable to reach it, and supply, into that reachless space, the picture it preferred.

Where the seam was briefly forced open, the pattern the framework predicts appeared: the order moved to reseal it. The reprisal after Sciara Sciat in 1911 leaked, despite Italian efforts, and stirred real anti-Italian feeling in Britain; the order answered not by admitting the oasis massacre but by circulating photographs of its own martyred soldiers, flooding the opened seam with a counter-image. And underneath the managed picture ran the private words the picture existed to cover — Badoglio's order that the work go on even if the whole population of Cyrenaica must perish, set against the title *Cirenaica pacificata*; Graziani's chapter demanding *Senussia delenda,* the Senussi must be destroyed, set against *pace romana.* The method of this whole study is only the setting of those pairs side by side, and Module 7 is where the machine that keeps them apart is named: an authorised reading manufactured at the metropole, a rival reading starved by the sea, and a permanent labour of interpretation to keep the man in Milan from ever standing at the wire.

The seam that outlasted the regime

The most remarkable thing about the metropolitan seam is that it did not fall when the regime fell, and this is the module's central finding. When Fascism collapsed in 1943 and the war ended in 1945, the seam that had hidden the Libyan genocide was not forced open by the reckoning that opened the German one. It was re-sealed — and re-sealed not by the dead regime but by the living nation, which had acquired an interest in keeping it shut.

The man who built the camps was never tried for building them. Graziani was placed on the United Nations War Crimes Commission's list, and Ethiopia pressed for his prosecution for the massacres of 1937; but the Allied powers were indifferent to trying Italian war criminals, the British Foreign Office actively opposed Ethiopia's part in the commission because it needed the Ethiopian government's goodwill for its own designs on Eritrea, and the effort was abandoned. Italy had no Nuremberg — the historian's phrase is the missing Italian Nuremberg — and the only court that convicted Graziani, an Italian military tribunal in 1950, sentenced him to nineteen years not for the concentration camps of Cyrenaica or the gas dropped on the oases but for his collaboration with the Germans in the war's last act, at Salò. Of that sentence he served a matter of months before his lawyers won his release on the argument that he had followed orders; he became honorary president of a neo-fascist party in 1953, and died in his bed in 1955. In 2012, with public money, the town of Affile raised a monument over his tomb inscribed with two words: *Patria* and *Onore* — Fatherland and Honour. The builder of the camps was never answered for the camps, and seventy years on was given a memorial in the name of the nation's honour.

The seal over the whole was a myth the postwar Republic needed: *Italiani, brava gente* — Italians, good people — the founding conviction that Italians had been decent even under Fascism, victims of the evil German rather than agents of their own empire, a myth the historian Angelo Del Boca titled, in the interrogative, a myth hard to die. Its function was precise: to reckon honestly with the Libyan genocide would have indicted not merely a fallen regime but the nation and its army, the same army the new Republic was built on, so the nation preferred not to reckon, and the files that would have forced it were literally shut away — the *armadio della vergogna,* the cupboard of shame, the cabinet of

war-crimes dossiers turned to face the wall and rediscovered only in the 1990s. And the outflow valve went on working in a democracy, against no censor's law but the nation's preference. Moustapha Akkad's film of the resistance and the camps, *Lion of the Desert,* made in 1981 with Anthony Quinn as al-Mukhtar, was refused a distribution licence in Italy — the prime minister Giulio Andreotti reportedly finding it "damaging to the honour of the army" — and was not shown there until 2009, twenty-eight years on, timed to a state visit by Gaddafi; a British documentary on the Fascist colonial crimes, made in 1989, has still never aired on Italian television. The seam that hid the camps was worked, in other words, by the democratic Italian nation for the better part of a century after the camps closed, in the name of the honour of its army — which is the same coin, exactly, in which the Tripoli monument of 1938 had consecrated the pacifier of the peoples and redeemer of the land of Libya.

Reading information and suppression against the framework

The framework's seventh module identifies one seam and its two valves and holds that the seam is structural and cannot be emptied. This case confirms the structural law and refines the module in three ways.

First, a colonial order has two seams, and the analytically primary one is the metropole's. The module's instruction to identify the seam must be carried out twice — once in the colony, once at home — and the colonial bend fixes their priority: the conquered's seam can be razed, because the order does not need the conquered's belief, while the metropole's must be managed, because the order needs the metropole's. The sophisticated information-work of a colonial order is therefore aimed not at the ruled but at the home audience, and a study that looks only for the interpreter class controlling the colonized will find it destroyed and miss the real apparatus, which points the other way across the sea.

Second, the metropolitan seam's master outflow valve is distance itself. The framework's outflow valves are the banned book, the silenced heretic, the untaught alternative. In a colony the cheapest and most powerful valve is geographic: the metropole cannot reach the thing, and so is thrown onto the colonial state's own account of it, in the purest instance of the epistemic dependence from which the whole framework begins. Distance does not have to suppress the truth; it need only leave the metropole unable to verify it and supply the preferred picture into the gap. The camps captioned as oases are the proof — a lie that survived not because it was defended but because it could not be checked. A colonial-seam analysis should therefore treat distance as the primary suppression mechanism and read the censor's ordinary tools as secondary, reached for only where distance failed and a rival reading got home.

Third, and most important, the metropolitan seam can be re-sealed after the regime falls, and outlast it by generations, because the interest that seals it is the nation's and not the regime's. The framework holds that a razed seam refills, often more captured; here the colonial seam refilled, after the regime that dug it was gone, with something more durable than any interpreter class — the metropole's own motivated ignorance, its need to keep believing itself good. The German seam was forced open at

Nuremberg because the victors willed it and the German interest in not-knowing was overridden; the Italian seam stayed shut because the Allies were indifferent and the Italian interest in not-knowing was left sovereign, free to reseal itself as *brava gente,* to shut the files in the cupboard, to ban the film, to raise the monument. The finding is that the seam hiding a colonial crime is re-sealed, after the regime, by the metropole's need to keep believing itself innocent — and that this seal is more durable than the regime's own, because it serves not one elite's power but a whole nation's self-image, and a nation defends its self-image longer than a regime defends its rule. This is why the collapse of Module 10, when it comes, changes almost nothing here: the floor was torn off Libya by a foreign army, but the seam over the metropole's conscience held for another sixty years, worked by the very democracy that had replaced the men who built the crime.

The rest the case confirms. The colonial bend holds in its sharpest form — the seam split by distance, the order's core task the keeping of the two ends apart, and that task outliving the order itself. The recursion runs beneath: the razed native seam refilled as resistance because the former-conquest formation it had carried was real, and flowed to its martyrs rather than to the razer. And the cheap-versus-expensive contrast completes itself here in an unexpected register: the native order held its people's belief cheaply, through a seam they trusted for free; the colonial order held nothing of its conquered's belief and had to run on force — but it held its *metropole's* belief cheaply and long, through the cheapest valve of all, the sea between the reader and the wire, and then through the nation's own preference not to look. The floor was expensive. The story told about it, at home, was cheap — and it lasted.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is limited to the verifiable: the titles of Rodolfo Graziani's own volumes — *Cirenaica pacificata* (Mondadori, 1932), *La riconquista del Fezzan* (1934), *Pace romana in Libia* (1937), and *Libia redenta* (1948); the two words *Patria* and *Onore* inscribed on the monument raised at Affile in 2012; and Giulio Andreotti's reported characterisation of *Lion of the Desert* as "damaging to the honour of the army," given here in the reported English rendering rather than an asserted Italian original. Graziani's post-war conviction (an Italian military tribunal in 1950, nineteen years for collaboration with the Germans rather than for the colonial camps, of which he served a period variously reported from a few months to about two years before release) and the non-prosecution of his colonial crimes are drawn from the standard accounts; the dates of the tribunal are given by some sources as 1948 and by others as 1950 and are noted as such. The distribution history of *Lion of the Desert* (made 1981, licensed for Italian exhibition only in 2009) and the non-broadcast of the 1989 British documentary are drawn from the film and reception literature. The analysis of post-war memory rests on paraphrased modern scholarship, credited: Angelo Del Boca, *Italiani, brava gente?*; Michele Battini, *The Missing Italian Nuremberg: Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics*; Mimmo Franzinelli on the *armadio della vergogna*; and Ali Abdullatif Ahmida on the colonial and post-colonial silence. The razing of the native Sanusi seam — the closed lodges, the deported teachers, the seized endowments — is carried from Modules 3 and 4 and their sources (Evans-

Pritchard; Ahmida). Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 8

BENITO IN BALBOLAND

Module 8 · The Open Problem — coordinating the elite of a charismatic parvenu who ruled beneath a king he could not abolish: the colony as the export valve for the surplus population and, more tellingly, for the one lieutenant too popular to keep near the throne — and the fracture the parvenu could not close, because a charisma that runs on delivery has no heir and no fallback but the crown that would dismiss it

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The open problem, and the parvenu's version of it

The framework's eighth module turns from the ruled to the rulers and asks the question that decides whether an order lasts once it has solved the problem of holding the many: what stops the powerful few from fighting each other? The default, always, is the war of all against all among those who hold coercive weight — warlordism — and every durable order is a specific answer to holding it off, an answer the Menu of Part 5 sorts into families. This case wears a distinctive version of the problem, and the whole module turns on it. The apex here is not a king. Mussolini held no dynastic title, descended from no anointed line, and ruled — this is the fact that governs everything — beneath a Savoy monarch he had not displaced and could not abolish. His authority was of Weber's third kind, the charismatic: the personal gift or mission that must be continually demonstrated by what it delivers, because a charisma that stops delivering stops being believed. A parvenu of that kind faces the open problem in a form the dynastic apex does not, and the way he answered it — and the way it finally answered him — is what this module reconstructs.

One feature of the colonial case sharpens the frame before we begin, by contrast with Algeria. There, the elite-coordination module was in large part about the *native* elite — Napoleon III's dream of a *royaume arabe,* the attempt to co-opt the Arab aristocracy into the imperial order as an intermediary class. Here there is no such story, because the native elite was not co-opted but razed: the Sanusi leadership deported, hanged, or driven into exile, their lodges closed, their endowments seized, as Modules 3 and 7 established. Italy destroyed the interpreter class rather than seating it. So in Libya the open problem is not doubled between a native and a colonial elite; it is purely the metropolitan Fascist one — and the colony's role in it is not as a site where a native elite is co-opted but as a destination to which the *metropole's own* surplus elite is sent. The colony inverts, from Algeria's co-optation site to Libya's export valve, and that inversion is the module's spine.

The players and the default

The powerful whom Mussolini had to coordinate fell into two sets, and the difference between them is the fracture the module ends on. The first set he had largely made: the *gerarchi,* the Fascist hierarchs

— Balbo, Dino Grandi, Galeazzo Ciano, Roberto Farinacci, Giuseppe Bottai, Achille Starace — and beneath them the *ras,* the provincial party bosses who had risen as leaders of the squadrist violence, and the party itself and its militia. The second set he had not made and could not unmake: the King, Victor Emmanuel III, who remained head of state and to whom the army swore its oath; the army command, whose loyalty ran to the crown and not to the party; the Church, bound to the regime by the Lateran accord of 1929 but not owned by it; and the industrial and landed interests. Mussolini sat atop the first set by charisma and atop the second by a negotiated coexistence, and the whole architecture is what the Italians came to call the *diarchy* — the two-headed state, Duce and King, in which the parvenu ruled by permission of a legitimacy older than his own.

The default this held off was not hypothetical, because Fascism had itself come out of very near it. The movement's origin was the squadrismo of 1919–22, the blackshirt gangs of the provincial *ras* — Balbo's own gang in Ferrara among the most violent — warlord bands in all but name, each with its local fief and its private violence, imperfectly commanded from the centre. Mussolini's first internal achievement, the so-called normalisation of the mid-1920s, was precisely the taming of those bands, the subordination of the *ras* to the party and the party to himself. But the taming was never total; the *gerarchi* remained semi-autonomous powers, each with a following, and the coordination that held them was not an institution with a rule but the personal ascendancy of one man. That is the parvenu's exposure: where a dynastic order coordinates its elite partly through the impersonal certainty of a succession everyone can predict, the charismatic order coordinates its elite through the person of the leader alone, and has, beneath him, no agreed rule for what comes after — only a scramble waiting to happen.

Divide, balance, and ration the fame

Mussolini's working method for holding the *gerarchi* was the Menu's family of divide and balance, run with real skill. He rotated them through offices before any could root, set them against one another, kept their jurisdictions deliberately overlapping and their futures deliberately uncertain, and let them compete for his favour rather than combine against him. And toward the most dangerous of them he added a technique that belongs as much to Module 7 as to this one: he managed their fame. The clearest instance concerns the man this module is named for. So wary did Mussolini become of Italo Balbo's popularity that he is reported to have ordered the Italian press not to mention Balbo's name more than once a month — the rationing of a rival's renown, an outflow valve turned not on the conquered's knowledge but on a lieutenant's celebrity. Divide the powerful, balance them against each other, and starve the brightest of the oxygen of fame: this was the coordination device, and it worked for two decades. Its weakness was intrinsic to it. A coordination that runs on the apex's personal management of every rivalry demands that the apex keep delivering the triumphs that make his management credible, and provides no machinery that would survive him — which is why, when the deliveries stopped, there was nothing underneath.

The export valve: Balbo to Balboland

The sharpest single instance of the parvenu's method, and the one that ties the whole open problem to the colony, is what Mussolini did with Balbo. Italo Balbo was the most dangerous kind of subordinate a charismatic apex can have: not a plotter but a *rival attraction*. He had been one of the four *quadrumvirs* of the March on Rome, a founder of the Fascist Grand Council, the builder of the Italian air force, and — through the mass transatlantic flights of the early 1930s, the armada of twenty-four seaplanes he led from Rome to Chicago in 1933 — a genuine international celebrity, the best-known Fascist in the world after Mussolini himself, spoken of, at home and abroad, as the possible successor, the heir apparent. He was independent-minded, he had traveled the democracies and admired them, and — the detail that most alarmed Mussolini — he was close to the Crown Prince Umberto, which made him a living bridge between the Fascist elite and the rival legitimacy of the throne. A dynastic apex has tools for such a man: marry him into a cadet branch, name him to a succession and thereby bind his ambition to the survival of the house. The parvenu has no such tools, because he has no house and no succession to offer. What he has instead is the frontier. On the first day of 1934, with Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan freshly merged into a single colony of Libya, Mussolini appointed Balbo its Governor-General and sent him there — a posting of real responsibility that was understood by everyone, including Balbo, as an exile, a gilded removal from the political stage of Rome where his fame had become a threat. *Time* magazine caught the rivalry in 1937 in an article it titled, with the frontier's own logic, "Benito in Balboland."

This is the Menu's Export family applied not to a surplus class but to a single over-mighty man, and it is, I will argue, the characteristic move of the charismatic apex. It is also the classic Export move in a colonial register, because Libya was already the export valve for Italy's *other* surplus — the landless poor of Module 6, shipped across the sea to relieve the metropole's demographic and class pressure. The colony absorbed both surpluses at once: the ambitious poor who might have made trouble at home, and the ambitious lieutenant who certainly would. And it displayed, in Balbo's case, the Export family's characteristic risk with textbook clarity. The exported man built, at the frontier, a base of his own. "Balboland" was not an idle jibe: Balbo made the Fourth Shore his personal achievement and his personal power — the roads, the twenty thousand settlers, the villages, the whole developed colony bearing, in the end, his name on its great highway — and he used the distance to remain exactly the independent power Mussolini had sent him away to neutralise, opposing the racial laws of 1938 alone among the leadership, opposing the German alliance, telling his colleagues to their faces, in the reported phrase, that they would all wind up shining the Germans' shoes. The export removed him from Rome but did not tame him; it gave him a province to be independent in. And it was ended not by Mussolini's design but by chance, or by something the record cannot fully close: on 28 June 1940, days into Italy's war, Balbo's aircraft was shot down over Tobruk by Italian anti-aircraft gunners who took it for British — friendly fire, on the most credited account, though the rumour that the Duce had welcomed or arranged the death of his heir apparent attached itself to the event at once and has never entirely died, for the reason such rumours never do, which is that everyone knew the motive was there even where the deed was not. Whatever killed him, his death removed the one *gerarch* with a

base, a following, and a bridge to the throne — and cleared, four years early, the succession the parvenu could not otherwise resolve.

The fracture the parvenu could not close

Behind the management of Balbo lay the fracture the parvenu could never close, and it is the diarchy. Mussolini's charisma had, from the start, borrowed the crown's dynastic legitimacy to stabilise itself: it was the King who had made him prime minister in 1922 rather than face him down, the King in whose name the state and the army continued to act, the King whose ancient legitimacy underwrote the parvenu's new one. That borrowing was the source of Mussolini's stability and the guarantee of his fall, because a borrowed legitimacy is a creditor, and the crown retained, unused for twenty years, the power to call the debt. This is why Balbo's closeness to the Crown Prince frightened Mussolini more than any policy disagreement: it threatened to fuse the two things the diarchy kept apart, a popular Fascist alternative and the royal legitimacy that could authorise one. And it is exactly the fusion that destroyed him in the end, though by other hands. When the deliveries finally failed — when the war Mussolini had entered for a seat at Hitler's peace table turned into catastrophe, the empire lost, Sicily invaded, the cities bombed — the charisma that had coordinated the elite evaporated, because it had never rested on anything but delivery, and the elite defected to the residual legitimacy that remained. On the night of 24–25 July 1943, the Grand Council of Fascism — the body Balbo had helped found — voted against its own Duce, and the next day the King, exercising the power the diarchy had reserved to him for twenty-one years, dismissed Mussolini and had him arrested. The parvenu was undone by precisely the legitimacy he had borrowed to prop himself: the crown that had raised him deposed him, and the elite followed the crown because the crown was what remained when the charisma was gone. What followed — the puppet republic at Salò, the civil war, the *gerarchi* shot by their own side or hanged by the partisans — was the default itself, the war of all against all, returning to the ground the coordination had held it off for twenty years.

Reading the open problem against the framework

The Menu classifies this order as a blend the framework already anticipates — divide and balance among the *gerarchi,* export for the surplus poor and the surplus lieutenant — and it shows the drift the framework tells us to track, the export valve closing (Balbo dead in 1940, the empire lost by 1943) at the very moment the order collapsed, exactly the Export family's documented failure mode, the outlet running behind the pressure it was meant to relieve. But the case sharpens the framework in three ways that are its contribution, and they cluster on the figure of the parvenu.

First, the charismatic apex has a distinctive elite problem the Menu's five families were built for dynastic and institutional apexes, not for him — and his characteristic move is Export applied to the individual. A dynastic order can afford a brilliant lieutenant, even groom him, because the succession is fixed and his ambition can be bound to the house's survival. A charismatic order cannot, because it has no succession to offer and no house to bind him to, so its most capable subordinate — the natural heir any healthy order would cultivate — becomes instead its gravest threat, a rival attraction the apex

must neutralise. Lacking the dynastic tools of marriage-alliance and designated succession, the parvenu reaches for the one tool left, distance: he exports the dangerous man to a frontier. So Export, in the framework, is not only a solution to a surplus *class* but the charismatic apex's characteristic answer to a surplus *individual* — and it carries the Export family's signature risk intact, that the exiled man builds at the frontier the very base the exile was meant to deny him, as Balbo built Balboland.

Second, a parvenu who borrows dynastic legitimacy to stabilise his charisma installs, in that borrowed legitimacy, his own successor-in-waiting. The diarchy was Mussolini's prop and Mussolini's executioner, and the two were the same thing seen at two moments. Borrowed legitimacy stabilises the charismatic order while the charisma delivers, and destroys it the instant the charisma fails, because the elite, needing somewhere to stand when the leader falls, defects to whatever older legitimacy the leader himself had kept alive by borrowing from it. The framework's account of coordination-failure should therefore add that a charismatic order's coordination holds only as long as its deliveries hold, and collapses not into a vacuum but *toward whatever residual legitimacy the apex propped himself on* — so that the parvenu's fate is legible in advance in the identity of his creditor. Mussolini's creditor was a king, and a king is what deposed him.

Third, the colony is an elite-management device, and in a razed-elite colony its role inverts. A frontier absorbs not only the surplus ambitious class of the classic Export but the individual over-mighty lieutenant the apex cannot keep near the throne; the colony is, among its other functions, a place to put people the centre cannot digest. And where — as here, and unlike Algeria — the native elite has been destroyed rather than co-opted, the colony carries none of the burden of intermediary native rule and serves the metropole's elite problem purely as a destination: not the site where a native aristocracy is seated, but the estate to which a metropolitan rival is sent. A study of a colonial order's open problem should therefore ask, of the colony itself, not only "what native elite was co-opted here" but "what metropolitan elite was exported here" — and read the governor's palace as, sometimes, a gilded cell.

The rest the case confirms. The colonial bend holds in its prediction of the collapse's direction: the order fell not because the ruled beat the floor — the Libyans had been crushed a decade before — but because the metropole's own coordination failed, its elite and its king turning on its Duce, exactly the metropole-driven collapse the bend anticipates and Module 10 will trace in full. The recursion is, for once, marginal here, because the native elite that a recursion would have run through was razed rather than inherited — which is itself the finding that the elite problem in this colony was wholly the conqueror's own. And the cheap-versus-expensive contrast appears in a new place: the parvenu's coordination, like his floor, was expensive and brittle, running on the continual delivery of triumphs the way the floor ran on the continual application of force, and failing the moment the delivery stopped — a charismatic order being, in the end, only an order that has substituted one man's performance for the furniture of reality, and must keep performing or fall.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is limited to the verifiable: the title of the *Time* magazine article "Benito in Balboland" (22 March 1937). Italo Balbo's reported remarks — that

his colleagues would end by shining the Germans' shoes, that Libya sat between the British and the French like a slice of ham in a sandwich, and his reported warning to the Grand Council that there would not be lampposts enough in the Piazza Venezia to hang them all — are given as reported in the biographical and journalistic literature rather than as verified transcripts, and are flagged as such. The characterisation of Balbo's 1934 posting as a gilded exile follows the Italian biographical accounts; the report that Mussolini limited press mention of Balbo is drawn from the same literature and given as reported. The reconstruction of Balbo's career, popularity, closeness to Crown Prince Umberto, opposition to the racial laws and the German alliance, and death by friendly fire over Tobruk on 28 June 1940 (with the persistent but scholarly-discounted rumour of Mussolini's involvement) draws on the standard biographies (Giorgio Rochat, *Italo Balbo*; Giordano Bruno Guerri; and the general histories of the regime by De Felice and Bosworth). The events of 24–25 July 1943 — the Grand Council's vote and the King's dismissal and arrest of Mussolini — are standard facts. Weber's typology of authority, and the reading of Mussolini's rule as charismatic, are used as analytical frame and credited as modern. Dates are given as established: Balbo to Libya on 1 January 1934, dead 28 June 1940, Mussolini deposed 25 July 1943. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 9

THE REPUBLIC AND THE RECONQUISTA

Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — the plural opening a weak Italy could not help but grant: the first republic in the Arab world, elective parliaments, a recognised native emir — and the Fascist foreclosure that crushed all three the moment Italy grew willing to pay the price of domination; the colony where the foreclosed order was rehearsed before it came home

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The liberty variable in a colony

The framework's ninth module asks the question that separates orders that merely rule from orders that can be lived under with some freedom: does the arrangement permit plural power — rival institutions, representation, a civil society, a native authority the centre must bargain with rather than simply command — or does it foreclose them, concentrating all power in one hand and leaving the ruled nothing to stand on? And the framework's answer to *why* an order lands on one side or the other is the liberty variable's core claim: plurality is almost never granted from benevolence. It is forced from below, by a balance of power — by the fact that some group the centre would rather dominate is strong enough that dominating it outright is not worth the cost, so the centre settles instead for rules that bind it too. Where that balance holds, there is plurality; where it breaks, there is foreclosure.

This case is an unusually clean test of that claim, because the same colony passed through both states in fifteen years, and the hinge between them is precisely datable. Between 1918 and 1922, Libya saw a genuine plural opening — the first republic in the Arab world, elective provincial parliaments, press and association freedom, a recognised native emir governing the interior by treaty. Between 1922 and 1939, Fascism foreclosed every piece of it. The opening was not granted because anyone in Rome loved liberty; it was extracted by a native power the post-war Italian state was too weak to crush. The foreclosure came not because the natives grew weaker but because a new regime in Rome grew willing to pay the price of crushing them. Liberty here was the dividend of a balance of force, and its abolition was the dividend of a decision to break that balance whatever it cost — which is the liberty variable's mechanism laid almost bare. And the case adds one thing to the framework the metropolitan cases cannot show: the colony did not merely follow the metropole into foreclosure but ran ahead of it, becoming the laboratory in which the foreclosed order was rehearsed before it was brought home.

The opening: a republic, a parliament, an emir

When the Ottomans ceded Libya at the end of the First World War, Italy was in no condition to take up what they had ceded. Wrecked economically and convulsed politically in the *biennio rosso,* its army sick of war, the Italian state could not spare the force to reconquer a country whose interior it had

never held, and into that weakness the Libyans moved with real political creativity. On 16 November 1918, at ʻAziziya in Tripolitania, local leaders proclaimed the *al-Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulsiyya,* the Tripolitanian Republic — described by historians as the first formally republican government in the Arab world. It was a plural construction in its own right: a collective leadership rather than a single ruler, a governing council of four — Ramadan al-Suwayhli of Misrata, the Berber leader Sulayman al-Baruni, Ahmad al-Murayyid of Tarhuna, Abd al-Nabi Bilkhayr of Warfalla — sitting above a consultative council of some two dozen chiefs drawn from across Tripolitania, blending Arab and Berber elements under an Islamic frame, and it carried its claim to self-determination to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where one of its advisers was the Egyptian Abd al-Rahman Azzam, later the first secretary-general of the Arab League. It was fragile — it would soon fracture in the tribal rivalries that killed al-Suwayhli in 1920 — but it was a genuine native attempt at a plural, representative state, and it existed because Italy could not yet stop it.

Unable to crush the republic, Italy negotiated with it, and the negotiation produced the most liberal colonial settlement in the whole of this study. The statutes of 1919 — the *Legge Fondamentale,* issued to Tripolitania in June and Cyrenaica in October — made the Libyans, in the words of the settlement, no longer subjects of Italy but holders of a distinct Italian citizenship of their province; and around that citizenship it built real plural institutions. Each province was to have its own elected parliament with the power to levy tribute; the inhabitants were granted liberty of the press and of association; the Arabic language was to be promoted; and compulsory military service in the Italian army was abolished. The right to petition the parliament in Rome was extended to a colonised population. In Cyrenaica the settlement was completed the next year by treaty with the native power centre itself: by the Accord of al-Rajma of October 1920, Idris al-Sanusi was recognised as Emir of Cyrenaica, permitted to administer autonomously the great interior oases — Kufra, Jalu, Jaghbub, Awjila, Ajdabiya — and paid a monthly stipend by an Italian government that agreed to leave the policing of Sanusi country to the Sanusi. The Senussi were, in the sources' phrase, largely content, and Idris travelled to Rome for the celebrations, received there by the King. By 1922 the logic of the opening was running toward its natural end: the Tripolitanian leaders, seeking the stability their own civil strife had cost them, asked Idris to extend his emirate over Tripolitania as well, offering him, in a formal document of July 1922, the headship of a unified Libya — a native proto-state, plural in its origins and Islamic in its frame, taking shape across the whole colony. Idris accepted in November 1922.

Why the opening happened: plurality as the dividend of weakness

It is essential to read the opening for what it was, because the temptation is to read it as generosity and the liberty variable exists to refuse exactly that reading. Nothing in the 1919 statutes flowed from Italian benevolence. They flowed from Italian weakness, and the sources say so without hedging: Italy, facing serious economic, social, and political problems at home, was not prepared to relaunch its war in Libya, and the Arabs of Tripolitania capitalised on that weakness to declare their republic and force their terms. The elective parliaments, the recognised emir, the abolished conscription, the promoted language were the price Italy paid for a peace it could not otherwise buy, in a country whose interior it

could not otherwise hold, at a moment when the cost of domination was more than the exhausted post-war state could bear. This is the liberty variable in its purest colonial form: the plural institutions were the dividend of the native power centre's uncrushed strength set against the metropole's temporary inability to pay for domination — liberty forced from below by a balance of force, not handed down from above by a change of heart. The proof is in what happened to it when the balance changed.

The foreclosure: the reconquista

The balance changed in Rome, and the timing is almost too exact to be believed. In the very month Idris accepted the crown of a unified Libya — November 1922 — Mussolini took power in Italy, and with him arrived a regime for which the calculation that had produced the opening no longer held. Fascism was willing to pay the cost of domination that Liberal Italy had flinched from, and once a metropole is willing to pay that cost the balance that bought the plurality is gone. Everything the opening had built was foreclosed, piece by piece, across the following decade. The accords with the Senussi were denounced and the reconquest launched from 1923; the emirate of al-Rajma was dead, Idris driven into Egyptian exile, and the twenty-year war of Modules 1 and 5 — the camps, the wire, the hanging of al-Mukhtar — was the physical form the foreclosure took in Cyrenaica. In 1927 the representative machinery of the 1919 statutes was abolished outright, in the words the jurist Ambrosini used to record it: *"È soppresso il sistema rappresentativo elezionista ed autonomista degli statuti del 1919, ed è restaurato in pieno il principio della sovranità dello Stato"* — the elective and autonomist representative system of the 1919 statutes is suppressed, and the principle of the sovereignty of the State is fully restored. The elected provincial parliaments were gone; the press and association freedoms were gone; and in 1939, as Module 2 showed, the distinct citizenship that had once carried the right to petition Rome was hollowed into the "special" citizenship whose very grant abolished the path to the full one. The republic, the parliament, and the emir were all three erased, and what replaced them was not a narrower plurality but none — the sovereignty of the Fascist state, restored in full, over a population that had briefly held elections and now held nothing.

The mechanism is exact and worth stating flatly, because it is the module's core contribution. The plurality of 1919 was the price of a domination Liberal Italy could not afford; the foreclosure of the 1920s was what happened when a regime arrived that would afford it. Fascism did not out-argue the plural opening or out-vote it. It out-*spent* it — it was willing to lay out the force, the camps, the tens of thousands of dead that breaking the native power centre required, and once it had broken that centre there was no counterweight left to bargain for parliaments or emirates, and so there were none. Liberty, in the colony, was exactly as durable as the balance of force that had compelled it, and not one day more.

Foreclosed for everyone: the colony as laboratory

Two further features complete the picture and carry the finding past the single case. The first is that Fascism foreclosed the colony for *everyone,* not only the natives. In French Algeria the metropole was

a republic, and the colony it produced was a *herrenvolk* democracy — plural for the settlers, who had deputies and elections and a press, and foreclosed for the natives, who had almost nothing. Fascist Italy was not a republic; it had foreclosed its own plural institutions at home, abolishing free elections and opposition parties and the independent press, and so the colony it produced had no plural institutions for anyone, settler or native. The Italian colonists of the Fourth Shore got no elected colonial assembly of their own; they got the party, the *podestà,* and, in 1939, incorporation into a metropolitan Italy that was itself a one-party state. The colony's internal structure of liberty, in other words, tracked the metropole's regime type: a plural metropole yields a *herrenvolk*-plural colony, a foreclosed metropole yields a doubly-foreclosed one.

The second feature is sharper and darker. The colony did not merely follow the metropole into foreclosure; it ran ahead of it. Fascism perfected in Libya, in the 1920s and early 1930s, techniques of total domination — the concentration camp, the mass deportation, the abolition of every representative body, the rule of a population entirely by force — that it applied at home later, more cautiously, and never so completely. The camps of Cyrenaica predate by years the worst of what the regime did to Italians; the total foreclosure of Libyan political life was accomplished while the forms of the Italian parliament still limped on at home. The colony was the laboratory of the foreclosed order — the place where the methods of total domination were first developed at full strength, on a conquered people whose suffering the metropole was structurally prevented from seeing, before any part of them was turned, in diluted form, on the metropole's own citizens. This is the pattern later critics of empire named the boomerang — Hannah Arendt's argument that the methods of colonial rule return to Europe, Aimé Césaire's that fascism was colonialism applied to Europeans — and Libya is one of its clearest instances. The foreclosed order was not brought from Rome to Tripoli; important parts of it were developed in Tripoli and carried toward Rome.

Reading plurality and foreclosure against the framework

The framework holds that plurality is forced from below by a balance of power and forecloses when that balance breaks. This case confirms the mechanism with unusual clarity and refines it in two ways that are the module's contribution.

First, plurality in a colony is the dividend of the native power centre's ability to hold the field against a metropole not yet willing to pay the full cost of domination — and it forecloses the instant the metropole becomes willing to pay that cost. The 1919 statutes, the al-Rajma emirate, the tolerated republic were not steps on a road toward colonial liberty; they were the momentary price of a domination post-war Italy could not afford, and they lasted exactly as long as that inability lasted. When Fascism arrived willing to spend the force — the reconquest, the camps, the dead — the balance broke and the plurality vanished, not because it was defeated in argument but because the power that had compelled it was crushed. A study of a colony's liberty variable should therefore read every grant of plural institutions first as a reading of the balance of force at the moment of the grant, and should expect the grant to be revoked whenever the metropole's willingness to pay for

domination rises to meet the cost — because colonial plurality is a truce, not a settlement, and a truce holds only while both sides prefer it to the fight.

Second, the colony's plurality tracks the metropole's regime type, but the colony forecloses harder and earlier — it is the laboratory of the foreclosed order, not its echo. The liberty variable, run only on metropolitan cases, would predict that a foreclosed metropole yields a foreclosed colony, and so it does. But the colonial case adds a direction the metropolitan cases cannot: the foreclosure is pioneered in the colony and travels home, not the reverse. The concentration camp, the total abolition of representation, the rule of a whole population by force alone were achieved in Cyrenaica years before and more completely than anything the regime attempted in Italy, on a population whose destruction the distance of Module 7 kept invisible at home. So the framework should hold that the colony is not downstream of the metropole's foreclosure but often upstream of it — the testing ground where domination is developed at a strength the metropole will not yet tolerate for its own citizens, and from which, as Arendt and Césaire argued, it returns. The order practised on the conquered is the order the citizen may meet next.

The rest the case confirms. The seam of the study runs through the whole arc: the plural opening was displayed at the metropole as generosity — Idris received by the King in Rome, the statutes promulgated to fanfare — and the foreclosure was dressed as the restoration of the sovereignty of the State and the pacification of a rebellious province, so that the metropole saw a firm hand where the colony lived the erasure of its republic. The recursion runs beneath the plurality itself: the native plural institutions were not invented from nothing but drew on the former-conquest formation of Module 4 — the Sanusi order supplying the emir, the tribal and Islamic councils supplying the republic's collective form — so that the foreclosure was, at bottom, the crushing of the political expression of the cheap-pole order Italy had come to displace. And the colonial bend holds in the direction of decision: the fate of Libyan liberty was settled in Rome, by the change of regime and the willingness to pay, and not in Tripoli by anything the Libyans did or failed to do — the plurality granted by one metropolitan calculation and revoked by another, the colony's freedom a variable the colony did not control.

A note on sources. The exact primary wording quoted here is Gaspare Ambrosini's characterisation of the 1927 suppression of the 1919 elective system — *"È soppresso il sistema rappresentativo elezionista ed autonomista degli statuti del 1919, ed è restaurato in pieno il principio della sovranità dello Stato"* — carried from Module 2 and given in the original with translation. The provisions of the *Legge Fondamentale* of 1919 (the distinct Italian citizenship of the province, the elective provincial parliaments with power to levy tribute, the freedoms of press and association, the promotion of Arabic, the abolition of compulsory Italian military service, and the right to petition the parliament in Rome) are drawn from the reference and scholarly accounts of the statutes and given in paraphrase. The Tripolitanian Republic (proclaimed 16 November 1918 at ʿAziziya; its governing council of al-Suwayhli, al-Baruni, al-Murayyid, and Bilkhayr; its consultative council of roughly two dozen chiefs; its appearance at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference; Azzam as adviser) and the widely stated

characterisation of it as the first formally republican government in the Arab world are drawn from the scholarship and reference literature; the "first Arab republic" description is common in that literature and is given as such rather than asserted as settled. The Accord of al-Rajma of October 1920 (Idris recognised as Emir of Cyrenaica, autonomous administration of the interior oases of Kufra, Jalu, Jaghbub, Awjila, and Ajdabiya, and an Italian stipend) and the 1922 offer of a unified emirate are drawn from the same sources. The analysis of the colony as the laboratory of the foreclosed order, and the boomerang thesis, are credited as modern interpretation, following Hannah Arendt (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*) and Aimé Césaire (*Discourse on Colonialism*), and drawing on the Libyan scholarship of Ahmida, Del Boca, Anna Baldinetti (*The Origins of the Libyan Nation*), and Lisa Anderson. Contested or approximate points — the exact franchise and powers of the 1919 parliaments, which varied between the two provinces and are reported unevenly; the "first Arab republic" claim; and the dates, given here as the Republic on 16 November 1918, the statutes in June and October 1919, the Accord of al-Rajma in October 1920, and the suppression of the representative system in 1927 — are noted as such. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 10

THE SEA HE CLAIMED

Module 10 · Change and Collapse — an order that ran on delivery had to keep delivering, so the parvenu staked the empire he held on the sea he coveted and lost both; the floor torn off not by the conquered, long since crushed, but by a foreign army and by the metropole's own king — and the cheap-pole order Italy had tried to destroy simply rose from where it had waited and took the crown

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collapse that came from everywhere but the conquered

The framework's tenth module asks how the order changed or ended — the proximate trigger, the structural cause, the direction from which the collapse came. In most orders the interesting question is whether the ruled finally overturned the floor, or the elite fractured, or the whole thing simply drifted into a new configuration. Here the answer is stark and is exactly what the colonial bend predicts: the order did not fall because the conquered beat the floor. The Libyans had been crushed by 1932 — the camps, the wire, the hanging of al-Mukhtar — and for a decade Cyrenaica was quiet, the settlers arriving, the Fourth Shore in bloom, the floor holding without serious challenge from below. When the Italian order in Libya ended, in the winter and spring of 1943, it ended from three directions, and not one of them was the conquered. It ended because the parvenu's charisma, which ran on delivery, drove him to stake the empire he held on a war for more, and lost; because a foreign army tore the floor off the colony; and because the metropole's own king, at the same hour, deposed the Duce the crown had raised. The collapse came from the metropole and from outside it — never from the ruled. And in the space the collapse opened, the cheap-pole order Italy had spent twenty years trying to destroy rose from where it had been waiting and took the crown. This module traces those four movements: the engine that could not stop, the shore that was lost, the king who turned, and the order that returned.

The delivery-engine that could not stop

The collapse begins in the nature of the apex's authority, established in Modules 3 and 8: Mussolini ruled by charisma, and charisma runs on delivery. A dynastic king is legitimate because he is the king; a charismatic parvenu is legitimate only so long as he keeps producing the triumphs that prove the personal mission — and each triumph, once banked, becomes the baseline the next must exceed. The reconquest of Libya in 1932 fed the charisma; the conquest of Ethiopia and the proclamation of the Empire in 1936 fed it again, higher; and each raised the bar. The structural problem of such an apex is that he cannot stop. To halt the deliveries is to let the charisma cool, and a charisma that cools is a charisma that dies, so the parvenu is condemned to escalate — to seek the next empire, and the next, because standing still is, for him, a kind of falling. This is why Mussolini took Italy into the Second

World War in June 1940, against the advice of his own marshals and the wishes of his own people: not because Italy was ready, but because a war for the Mediterranean — for Egypt, the Suez, the *mare nostrum* of the Roman robe — was the next delivery the engine demanded, and he calculated the war already won by Germany and wanted only, in the phrase attributed to him, a few thousand dead to claim a seat at the victors' table. The over-reach was not a blunder that befell the regime from outside. It was the terminus of the regime's own logic, the point the delivery-engine was always going to reach, because an order that must keep delivering will eventually stake more than it can win.

The sea he claimed, and the shore he lost

The war for more empire lost the empire he had, and it lost it first and fastest in Libya — so that the colony which had launched the charisma became the ground on which it died. The campaign opened on the very apparatus of Module 5: on 14 June 1940, days into the war, British armour crossed the Egyptian frontier and took Fort Capuzzo, one of the strongpoints that had anchored the border wire the Italians built to seal the Bedouin out — the trap made to hold the conquered now the first thing lost to a stronger conqueror coming in. An Italian thrust into Egypt stalled; the British counter-stroke, Operation Compass, launched that December, destroyed the Italian Tenth Army within two months and swept through Cyrenaica, Benghazi falling in February 1941. The Fourth Shore, declared an integral part of metropolitan Italy barely two years before, could not be held by Italy at all: Mussolini had to beg Hitler for rescue, and the German Afrika Korps under Rommel was sent in February 1941 to prevent the outright loss of the colony. There followed two years of the see-saw desert war — Tobruk besieged, lost, and retaken, the line surging east into Egypt and back — until the Second Battle of El Alamein in October and November 1942, where Montgomery's Eighth Army broke the German-Italian army decisively and drove its remnants west across the whole length of Libya. Benghazi fell on 20 November 1942; Tripoli was entered on 23 January 1943; and by February 1943 the retreating Axis forces had abandoned Libya altogether, pushed out of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and ending Italian jurisdiction over the colony, the Fezzan passing to the Free French. Thirty years of Italian rule, and four years of the Fourth Shore, ended in a fighting retreat down a coast road much of which Balbo had built — and Balbo himself, the exiled heir apparent of Module 8, had been the campaign's first great casualty, shot from the sky over Tobruk by his own gunners in its opening days, the first man consumed by the engine's self-consumption. The sea Mussolini had claimed as Rome's swallowed the shore Rome had actually held.

The king turns

The military collapse in Africa detonated the political fracture the diarchy had carried unused for twenty-one years, exactly as Module 8 anticipated. A charisma cannot survive the failure of its deliveries, and when the deliveries turned to catastrophe — the empire lost, Sicily invaded, the cities under bombs — the coordination that had held the Fascist elite around Mussolini simply dissolved, because it had never rested on anything but the deliveries. On the night of 24–25 July 1943 the Grand Council of Fascism, the body Balbo had helped found, voted against its own Duce; and the next day

the King, Victor Emmanuel III, exercising the power the two-headed state had reserved to the crown since 1922, dismissed Mussolini and had him arrested on the palace steps. The parvenu was undone by precisely the older legitimacy he had borrowed to raise himself — the crown that had made him prime minister unmade him, and the elite followed the crown because the crown was what remained when the charisma was gone. What followed was the default itself returning to the ground the coordination had held it off: the German rescue of Mussolini, the puppet republic at Salò, the civil war up the length of Italy, the *gerarchi* shot by their own side or strung up by the partisans, and the Duce himself killed and hung by his heels in a Milan square in April 1945. The order that had run on one man's performance ended when the performance failed, and it left nothing standing behind it, because it had built nothing behind it — an order that substitutes a man's charisma for the furniture of reality has, when the man falls, no furniture at all.

The order rises from where it waited

And here the study's deepest measurement comes due, because when the Italian floor was torn off Libya, the ground beneath it was not empty. The cheap-pole order Italy had spent twenty years and a genocide trying to destroy had not been erased — Module 4 showed why, that a formation twelve hundred years deep lives in the family and the calendar and the memory of its martyrs, below the reach of any decree — and it rose. Idris al-Sanusi, driven into Egyptian exile by the reconquest, the head of the very order Graziani's book had marked for destruction with the words *Senussia delenda,* the Senussi must be destroyed, had spent the war working with the British: in 1940 he raised the Libyan Arab Force, a small army-in-exile under British command but carrying the Sanusi flag, and the Cyrenaican fighters served the Allied advance. When the Italians were gone, the British military administration that governed Cyrenaica from 1943 turned to Idris as the natural authority, the stabilising presence the country's own formation already recognised; and on 24 December 1951, when Libya became independent as a federal kingdom, its first king was Idris — the head of the Senussi order, crowned sovereign of the nation. The order that a Fascist general had declared must be destroyed, in Cato's Latin, became the royal house of the country it had been declared over, and the new kingdom's flag set the black field and white crescent of the Sanusi at its heart. This is the recursion's final payoff and the study's central contrast made complete: the expensive-pole colonial order, whose belief had never taken with the conquered and which ran on force to the last, vanished the instant a stronger force removed its floor, because it had nothing beneath the floor to hold it up; the cheap-pole native order, whose belief had taken so deeply it survived even the destruction of its lodges and the exile of its emir, waited out the whole colonial episode below the surface and then simply resumed. The Italian order lasted some thirty years and disappeared with its garrison. The order it had come to displace had lasted twelve hundred years, and rose again to rule.

It rose, though, over ruin, and the module must hold that too without softening it, because the recursion's vindication is not the conquered's reward. The Libya that became independent in 1951 was, on the reckonings of the day, among the poorest countries on earth — a per-capita income around thirty-five dollars a year, an illiteracy rate near ninety per cent, a handful of university graduates, its

principal exports esparto grass and the scrap metal of the battlefields, and, as one account puts it, no Libyan even involved in the drafting of the state the great powers assembled for it. This is the settlement's true bequest and the direct legacy of the formation Italy withheld in Module 4: three decades of an order that took the land and refused the school left a people materially wrecked and barely lettered, inheriting sovereignty over a wasteland. And the last irony belongs to Module 6: the oil that would have made the box of sand worth having was struck in 1959, eight years after independence and sixteen after the Italians left — the wealth was there all along, and the conqueror who had spent a fortune and a genocide on the ground never found it, and it fell instead to the kingdom of the order he had tried to destroy.

Reading change and collapse against the framework

The framework asks, of any collapse, where it came from and whether the order had moved toward the self-running pole or stayed at the expensive one. This case answers both and refines the framework in three ways.

First, the charismatic-parvenu order has an endogenous terminus: it must escalate its deliveries until it over-reaches, because it cannot stop delivering without dying, so the collapse is built into the delivery-logic rather than merely triggered from outside. A dynastic order can rest; a charismatic one cannot, because rest is decay. So the parvenu is driven to seek the next empire past the point of prudence, and the over-reach that destroys him is not an accident that befalls his order but the destination its own engine was always travelling toward. The external shock — the lost war — was one his logic drove him to go looking for. A study of a charismatic order should therefore read its collapse not as bad luck or bad generalship but as the maturation of its founding bargain: the empire that feeds the charisma is the empire the charisma will eventually gamble and lose, because an engine that must keep accelerating eventually leaves the road.

Second, and centrally, the expensive-pole order vanishes when its force is removed, while the cheap-pole order it displaced survives the removal of its floor and resumes — which is the study's whole measurement cashed out at the moment of collapse. An order whose belief never took has nothing beneath its floor; it is a floor and only a floor, and when a stronger force lifts it, there is nothing to hold and the order simply ends, as the Italian order ended in 1943 with its garrison. An order whose belief took has a floor laid over a conviction; lift the floor and the conviction remains, and can carry the order across the interregnum until a new floor can be raised on it — as the Sanusi conviction carried the native order across the Italian decades and returned it to power in 1951. This is why the framework's gradient is not merely a description of how cheaply an order runs while it stands but a prediction of what survives when it falls: the cheap-pole order is the durable one precisely because the belief that made it cheap is the thing that outlasts any particular floor. The colonizer's thirty years and the native order's twelve hundred are not two facts about longevity; they are one fact about where the belief lived.

Third, the collapse confirms the colonial bend's direction and sharpens its verb. The bend predicts a collapse driven by the metropole's will emptying rather than by the ruled beating the floor, and so it was — the ruled had been crushed a decade before, and the fatal blows came from the metropole's engine, the metropole's king, and a foreign army. But "emptying" is too passive a word for what happened. The metropole's will did not drain away; it was consumed — burned up by the parvenu's compulsion to escalate, spent into a war that lost the colony it was meant to crown. The colony was both the fuel that fed the charisma and the fire that destroyed it, and the metropole's exhaustion was self-inflicted, the predictable end of an order that had to keep conquering to keep believing in itself. The bend should read, in the charismatic case: collapse driven not by the metropole's will emptying but by its will consuming itself.

A note on sources. The military events are given from the standard histories of the North African campaign and are dated as established: Italy's entry into the war on 10 June 1940; the British capture of Fort Capuzzo on 14 June 1940; Operation Compass and the destruction of the Italian Tenth Army over December 1940 to February 1941; the arrival of the Afrika Korps in February 1941; the Second Battle of El Alamein in October–November 1942; the fall of Benghazi on 20 November 1942 and of Tripoli on 23 January 1943; and the Axis abandonment of Libya by February 1943. The political collapse — the Grand Council's vote of 24–25 July 1943, the King's dismissal and arrest of Mussolini on 25 July, and the subsequent Salò republic and civil war — is standard fact, carried in part from Module 8. Balbo's death over Tobruk on 28 June 1940 is carried from Module 8. The post-war course — Idris al-Sanusi's wartime cooperation with the British and the Libyan Arab Force, the British and French military administrations of 1943–51, Libya's independence as a kingdom under Idris on 24 December 1951, and the Sanusi flag of the new state — is drawn from the reference and scholarly accounts (and Idris's return is set against Graziani's *Senussia delenda,* carried from Module 3). The figures for Libya's poverty at independence — a per-capita income on the order of thirty-five dollars, illiteracy near ninety per cent, and a mere handful of university graduates — are given as reported in the historical literature and treated as indicative rather than precise. The discovery of Libyan oil in 1959 is standard fact. The reading of Mussolini's rule as charismatic and its collapse as endogenous follows the analysis credited in Modules 3 and 8 (Weber as frame; De Felice and Bosworth on the regime). Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed*.

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 11

THE LAND THE DEAD BOUGHT

Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — the genocide weighed against the roads, and why in a settler colony the scales do not balance, because they are not one scale but two: the dead and the land they were cleared from are the same act, and the achievements that accrued to the caste that replaced the dead cannot be netted against the caste that died

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The accounting the study has been deferring

The framework's eleventh module is the one the whole method has been building toward and putting off: the grim accounting, the sober weighing of what an order did to human beings against what it built. Its instrument is the metabolic-death test — did the order cause net excess death, death above what the ground would have carried without it, and how does that weigh against whatever roads and cities and institutions the order left behind? Every module before this one has pointed at a mass of death without stopping to count it: the oasis massacre of Module 1, the camps of Module 5, the herds and the cleared plateau of Module 6. This module counts it. And in the counting it discovers that the accounting cannot be done the way the framework's question assumes it can — that in a settler colony the scales do not balance not because the weights are hard to find but because there are two scales and no beam between them, the atrocity and the achievement being, as Modules 2 and 6 already showed from their own sides, the same act seen from the two castes it fell upon.

The dead: the metabolic bone, counted

The death must be counted first, in the ranges the destroyed archives and the suppressed record permit, and it must be counted with the gravity it is owed rather than the clinical ease that would be its own kind of insult. The heart of it is the genocide of Cyrenaica between 1929 and 1934. At the start of the pacification the population of Cyrenaica was reckoned at around 225,000; by its end at around 142,000 — a decline of roughly eighty-three thousand people, close to a third of the whole. Something over a hundred thousand — on Ahmida's count some 110,000, the entire rural population of eastern Libya — were driven from the Jebel Akhdar and interned in sixteen concentration camps on the arid coast, and by 1934 only about forty thousand of them were left alive, the rest, between sixty and seventy thousand mostly rural people — men, women, the elderly, children — dead of starvation and disease behind the wire, together with some six hundred thousand of their animals, the metabolic base of their whole existence, starved with them. Another twelve thousand were executed on suspicion of rebel sympathy in 1930 and 1931 alone. This was not the death of battle — the Italian military dead across the whole thirty years of the Libyan wars numbered on the order of nine thousand — but the death of a

penned pastoral people deliberately deprived of the herds and the land that kept them alive: metabolic death, the biological bone of Module 5, reached not by accident but by policy.

Beyond Cyrenaica and across the whole colonial period the figures widen into ranges that the suppression of the record (Module 7) makes it impossible to close, and honesty requires giving them as ranges rather than choosing one. The United Nations, administering Libya before independence, estimated that between 250,000 and 300,000 Libyans died from all non-natural causes — combat, execution, disease, famine, thirst — under Italian rule between 1912 and 1942. The historian Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, whose work recovered this genocide from the oral testimony of its survivors after eighty years of silence, argues the true figure is higher, toward half a million. Ilan Pappé has estimated that the pacification killed half the Bedouin population of Cyrenaica; the Italian historian Emilio Gentile puts the suppression's dead lower, near fifty thousand; Gaddafi later claimed three-quarters of a million, half the country, a figure for which there is no evidence and which is noted here only to be set aside. Against a Libyan population variously put at between eight hundred thousand and a million and a half in 1911, and reckoned at around eight hundred thousand by 1943, the scale is not seriously in doubt whatever the precise number: a substantial fraction of a people died, and the scholarly consensus that has formed around the case, resisting both the inflation of the propagandist and the minimisation of the apologist, is that what happened in Cyrenaica was a genocide — and, specifically, a settler-colonial one.

The roads: the achievement, credited

The other column must be credited honestly, because the discipline of this module is to name the cost without denying the achievement, and the achievement was real. Italy built, in Libya, infrastructure of a kind and quality the country had never had and would long depend on: the Via Balbia running the whole 1,822 kilometres of the coast, some four thousand kilometres of new roads and four hundred of new railway, ports and drainage works and wells, the settler agriculture that made the Jebel bloom for a decade, and the archaeological recovery of the Roman cities — Leptis Magna, Sabratha, Cyrene — dug from the sand and preserved. Some of this outlasted everything else the Italians did and remains, in the roads especially, part of the fabric of Libya to this day. To deny it would be to swap one distortion for another, and the method forbids that as firmly as it forbids swallowing the self-justification.

But crediting the achievement is not the same as entering it in a shared ledger, and here the honest accounting must part company with the apologist's. The roads and the railways and the reclaimed farms were built for the settlers and the army — the whole point of the development, in Ahmida's reconstruction and the regime's own planning alike, was to prepare the ground for the settlement of between half a million and a million Italian peasants, mainly on the fertile eastern plateau, the Green Mountain that the camps had emptied. The archaeology served the propaganda of Module 3, the proof that Libya was Roman ground returning to Roman hands. And the natives, for whom almost none of it was built, were left by the same order materially wrecked and barely lettered, inheriting at independence, as Module 10 counted, a country near ninety per cent illiterate with a handful of

graduates and an income of dollars a year. Most tellingly, the central achievement — the settlement itself, the farms and the villages — did not even outlast the order: the settlers were repatriated after 1943, most gone by 1970, and the demographic colony they were the point of simply evaporated. The roads remained; the reason they were built departed. What Italy built in Libya it built for a caste that then left, on land it had cleared of the caste that stayed.

Why the scales do not balance: the same act

This is where the metabolic-death test meets the limit the settler colony imposes on it, and the limit is the module's central finding. The test, as the framework frames it, weighs excess death against what was built, and the framing quietly assumes that the people who died and the people who inherited the building are the same people — that a single population bore the cost and received the benefit, so that the two can be entered in one ledger and a net struck, however uneasily. In an extractive colony that assumption more or less holds: the order worked the natives, taxed them, sometimes worked them to death, and built roads and railways that the same native population used and in some measure inherited, so that one can at least attempt the terrible sum of whether the building was worth the dying, even while insisting the natives were never asked. In a settler colony the assumption fails completely, because the population that died and the population that inherited the building are not one population but two castes, and the death and the building are not two things but one.

The genocide that cleared the Green Mountain and the settlement that filled it were, as Modules 2 and 6 established from the wealth side, a single operation — the camps emptied the plateau of its pastoralists so that the villages could be planted on it, the deportation order and the survey stake two moments of one act. Which means the dead did not die to *pay for* the roads; the dead died to *become* the land the roads were built on. Their removal was not the cost of the achievement in the way an extractive order's death toll is the cost of its extraction; their removal *was* the achievement, from the settler's side — the vacant fertile ground was the thing produced, and the killing was the producing of it. And the achievement accrued entirely to the other caste: the roads and farms were built for the settlers who replaced the dead, on the land the dead were cleared from, and then departed with the settlers. So there is no single scale on which to weigh them. The dead are on one caste's ledger, entered as the whole of that caste's experience of the order — the camp, the wire, the starved herd, the grave at Soluch — and the roads are on the other caste's ledger, entered as a benefit that caste enjoyed and took away. To net the roads against the dead is to pretend the two castes were one, which is precisely the pretence the whole settler enterprise depended on and the whole method exists to refuse. The question "did the roads outweigh the dead?" is not hard to answer; it is malformed, because it asks whether one caste's benefit can discharge another caste's death, and no accounting recognises a currency in which it could.

The counter-position, stated and answered

The counter-position deserves its fullest form, because answering a strawman proves nothing. It runs so: Italy's was a short colonisation, barely three decades; it built roads and ports and a modern

administration where there had been a decayed Ottoman backwater and tribal disorder; it recovered and preserved a Roman heritage the world would otherwise have lost; the highest death figures are propaganda, Gaddafi's half-a-million-plus unevidenced, and some accounts even show the Libyan population rising across the period; the camps, however brutal, were a counter-insurgency measure against a real twenty-year armed resistance, not a programme of extermination; and the roads, whatever else is said, are still there, carrying Libyans, a lasting good no rhetoric can wish away. Every clause of this contains something true, and the method requires conceding what is true in it: the colonisation was short, the roads were real and remain, the resistance was real, the highest figures are unreliable, and the archaeology did preserve.

And then it must be answered without flinching. The roads were real and were built for the settlers and the soldiers; the modern administration ruled a population it had cleared by a third and schooled not at all. The recovered Roman heritage was recovered as a weapon, the archaeological proof that the land was Italy's by inheritance and the Sanusi's by nothing. The population did not rise for the people who lived there: the claim of increase counts the incoming settlers and averages away the collapse of Cyrenaica, where a third of the people vanished, and it is refuted by the United Nations' own quarter-to-third-of-a-million and by the survivors whose testimony Ahmida recovered. And the camps were not merely counter-insurgency, or rather the counter-insurgency and the clearing were the same policy: the population was interned not only to sever it from the fighters, as Module 5 showed, but to remove it from the fertile land the settlers were coming to take, as this module and Module 6 show, and the two motives are one motive because in a settler colony pacifying the natives and clearing them for settlement are the same act. One can credit every real thing the counter-position names and the sum does not move, because the achievements it names all belong to the ledger of the caste that lived, and the death it minimises belongs to the ledger of the caste that died, and the honest accounting is not permitted to pay the second debt with the first credit.

Reading the grim accounting against the framework

The framework's grim accounting weighs net excess death against what an order built, and this case sharpens the instrument in a way that should be carried into every future settler case.

The grim accounting cannot be run as a single cost-benefit ledger in a settler colony, because the atrocity and the achievement are the same act seen from the two castes it divided. The metabolic-death test tacitly assumes one population that both suffers the death and inherits the building, and for a tributary or extractive order that assumption roughly holds, so the terrible sum can at least be attempted. A settler order breaks the assumption at its root: the death clears the land and the building fills it, so the killing and the constructing are one operation, and the caste that died and the caste that built and inherited are two. The test must therefore be run twice, once for each caste, and its columns cannot be netted across them — the settlers' roads cannot be entered against the natives' dead, because the roads were the settlers' benefit and the dead were the natives' whole experience, and there is no exchange rate between one caste's road and another caste's grave. The framework should hold, for settler cases, that the grim accounting is caste-relative: not one ledger with a difficult net, but two

ledgers with no beam between them, and any attempt to strike a single balance is not a hard piece of moral arithmetic but a category error that reproduces the settler pretence that the two castes were one people.

This carries a second, connected refinement about the death itself. The metabolic-death test was built to catch the death an extractive order produces as a by-product of its extraction — the worked-out miner, the famished tax-payer, death as the cost of taking a surplus. The settler order's death is of a different kind and must be read differently: it is not the by-product of extraction but the substance of it, the clearing that *is* the wealth, so that the death toll is not a regrettable side-effect to be weighed against the enterprise's gains but the enterprise's principal product, the vacant land itself measured in the bodies removed to make it vacant. Ahmida's insistence on reading the Libyan genocide as settler-colonial violence rather than as counter-insurgency excess is exactly this point in the historiography, and the framework should absorb it: where the extraction is of land, the death is not the cost of the order but the order's output, and the grim accounting counts not what the order spent but what it made.

The rest the case seals. The seam of the study closes here, forced shut: the metropole's ledger — the roads, the redemption, the Fourth Shore in bloom — and the colony's ledger — the third of a province dead, the six hundred thousand starved animals, the cleared plateau — which Module 7 was built to keep apart, are here at last set on the same page, and the page will not net them, which is the truest thing the accounting can show. The recursion delivers its last irony: the genocide was undertaken to clear the ground of the native order and settle it permanently with Italians, and it failed even at that, for the settlers left within a generation and the order the camps were meant to erase — the Sanusi, the cheap-pole formation of Module 4 — survived to take the crown, so that the killing bought neither a lasting settlement nor the erasure of the thing it killed for, only the dying itself. And "legibility is not pardon" reaches its sharpest application: to understand why the death was so vast — because clearing a mobile people from fertile land they will not leave requires killing or removing them, and the same-act structure of settler colonialism makes the atrocity and the achievement one — is in no way to lessen it, but to name precisely what kind of thing it was. The land the dead bought was bought for others, and the dead are not repaid by the roads laid over them.

A note on sources. This module weighs figures rather than quoting texts, and its figures are drawn from the standard scholarship and reference accounts and given as ranges, with the contestation named. The Cyrenaican decline (from about 225,000 to about 142,000, a loss near 83,000, about one third); the internment (on the order of 110,000 in sixteen camps, with roughly 40,000 alive by 1934 and some 60,000–70,000 dead of starvation and disease, together with about 600,000 animals); and the executions of 1930–31 (some 12,000) are drawn from Ali Abdullatif Ahmida (*Genocide in Libya: Shar, a Hidden Colonial History,* 2020) and the reference literature that follows him. The whole-period estimates are given as the range the sources support: the United Nations' 250,000–300,000 for 1912–1942; Ahmida's higher figure toward 500,000; Ilan Pappé's estimate of half the Cyrenaican Bedouin; Emilio Gentile's lower figure near 50,000 for the suppression; and Gaddafi's unevidenced 750,000,

noted only to be set aside. The 1911 population (variously 800,000 to 1.5 million) and the 1943 figure (around 800,000) are given as the reference ranges, with the caveat that the destroyed colonial archives and suppressed record (Module 7) make all these figures uncertain. The Italian military dead (on the order of 9,000 across 1911–1943) and the infrastructure figures (the *Via Balbia* of 1,822 km, some 4,000 km of roads and 400 of railway) are carried from Modules 2 and 6 and their sources. The reading of the genocide as settler-colonial violence, and of the death as the clearing that constituted the settlement rather than a counter-insurgency by-product, follows Ahmida and the settler-colonialism scholarship credited in Module 6 (Wolfe). No period primary source is quoted here, because the accounting is a modern weighing of a suppressed record rather than a reading of the order's own words; where the order's words are wanted — *Cirenaica pacificata,* "a step towards civilisation," *Senussia delenda* — they stand in Modules 3, 5, and 7. Every load-bearing figure here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · ITALIAN LIBYA — MODULE 12

THE DOOR THE HEIR CLOSED

Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — the case set among its siblings: the caste-instrument two colonial powers reached without conspiring, the seam Italy razed where France redirected, and the door Rome had opened — full citizenship to a Libyan-born dynasty's whole empire — closed by the heir who claimed Rome's name and inverted Rome's method

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The case in the comparative frame

The framework's final module lifts the case out of its own detail and sets it among the others, to ask what it shares with them and where it departs — because a pattern is only a pattern if it recurs, and a single well-told story proves nothing until it is laid beside its siblings and the recurrences and the divergences are named. Italian Libya has a natural frame for this, and it runs through the whole study: the recursion of Rome. Italy did not merely conquer Libya; it claimed to *return* to it, as the heir of the Rome that had ruled the coast before Islam, digging the Roman cities from the sand to prove the inheritance and calling the sea *mare nostrum* after the Rome that had called it so. And the frame is exact and merciless, because Rome's defining political act on that very coast was the opposite of everything Fascist Italy did there. The Rome whose heir Italy claimed to be had, in the person of a dynasty born in Libya, opened the widest door to inclusion the ancient world ever cut; and the Italy that claimed to inherit that Rome closed it. The convergences that place Libya among the colonial cases, the divergences that make it its own, and the counter-position that must be answered to end the study, all organise around that single closing door.

Convergence: the same short menu

Begin with what recurs, because the recurrences are the framework's vindication. The whole of the colonial bend, predicted at the outset and tested module by module, held. The robe was reversed, cut for the metropole and the wider world and never for the conquered, whose belief the floor did not need. Formation was withheld from the majority, because to form them would have been to begin admitting them. The seam was split in two by distance, and the order's core labour was keeping the metropole from seeing what the colony lived. The extraction was sorted by caste, the land to the settler and the clearing to the native. And the collapse came from the metropole and from outside it, never from the ruled. None of this was assumed; all of it was found, against the sources, exactly where the bend said to look.

The sharpest convergence is with the sister case, French Algeria, and it is sharp enough to be almost eerie, because the two colonial powers reached the identical caste-instrument without conspiring. France's *sénatus-consulte* of 1865 declared the Algerian Muslim French — *"l'indigène musulman est*

français" — and then withheld the citizenship in the same breath with its *néanmoins,* its "nevertheless," anchoring the exclusion in the retention of Quranic personal law. Italy's decree of 1939 granted the Libyan Muslim a *cittadinanza italiana speciale,* a special citizenship, anchored in the same retained Muslim personal and successoral law, and abolished in the same act the path to the full citizenship — the inclusion-as-foreclosure of Module 2. Two empires, a Mediterranean and three-quarters of a century apart, uncoordinated, drew from the same short menu the same answer to the same problem — a Muslim majority they would not admit and could not expel — and reached, independently, the identical device: religion-as-personal-law, functioning at once as the robe's respect for the conquered's faith and as the marker of their exclusion. And the Italian jurists *saw* it: Gaspare Ambrosini wrote a treatise expressly on *"lo statuto dei nativi dell'Algeria e della Libia,"* the statute of the natives of Algeria and of Libya, reading the two as one kind of thing. This is the filter at its most legible — position logic run separately by two apexes, in ignorance of one another, converging on the same solution because the materials and the problem were the same. Uncoordinated convergence is the strongest confirmation a structural claim can have, and the two native-statutes are as clean a specimen of it as the collection holds.

Beyond the caste-instrument, Libya converges with the wider corpus on the machinery the framework runs everywhere: the two dials of force and exit, turned here to their extremes; the seam and its valves; the Menu families, Export and Divide-and-balance, blended as the framework says they always blend; and the filter, selecting without a selector, which retained the cheap-pole native order for twelve hundred years and discarded the expensive-pole colonial one in thirty. The framework held across the whole distance from the ancient and dynastic cases to a twentieth-century fascist one, which is the only test of a framework that matters.

Divergence: what Libya contributes

Now the divergences, which are the study's contribution back to the framework, and they cluster into a handful of refinements the earlier modules stated and this one gathers.

The deepest divergence from Algeria, and the one that drove everything downstream, is that Italy *razed* the native seam where France *redirected* it. France tried to get behind the marabouts and the brotherhoods and point their earned trust at the conqueror; Italy destroyed the Sanusi outright — the lodges closed, the teachers deported, the endowments seized, the order marked in Cato's Latin for destruction. From that single choice the whole distinctive shape of the Libyan order followed: the forge of Module 3, because a razed seam cannot be redirected and an Islamic robe toward the wider Muslim world had then to be manufactured from a Florence workshop; the formation that held the field in Module 4, because the razing drove the belief into the un-razeable carriers and the trust flowed to the martyrs rather than to any captured replacement; the twenty-year resistance and the genocide it provoked; and the final return of the Sanusi as the crown in Module 10. Raze the seam and you get a resistance and a forgery; redirect it and you get a co-opted intermediary — the framework predicts the divergent order from the single variable, which is what a framework is for.

Around that central divergence stand four more, each a refinement the study drove back into the method. Libya's apex was a *parvenu* — a charismatic ruler with no dynastic legitimacy, propped beneath a king, whose authority ran on delivery and whose delivery-engine consumed itself, giving the framework its account of the charismatic order's endogenous terminus. Libya was a *settler* colony in the purest form, its extraction not of a surplus but of the land itself, which has no stable equilibrium and runs to elimination — the fork now written into the Field Manual's Module 6 — and whose grim accounting is therefore caste-relative, two ledgers with no beam between them. Libya's metropole was *foreclosed,* a one-party state, so the colony was doubly foreclosed and became the laboratory in which total domination was rehearsed before it came home. And Libya's conqueror was itself a nation barely made, a fifty-year-old fiction, so its reversed robe did double duty as a nation-making engine pointed inward, the conquest sold at home as the thing that would finally make Italians. Gather these and the study's contributions stand in a row: manufactured capturability where geography offered exit; inclusion as the mechanism of foreclosure; the robe with a hole where the conquered should be, and the forge forced by the razing of the seam; formation withheld leaving not a blank but a counter-formed population that held the field; the cost column's third position, thick belief running against the ruler; land-extraction's missing equilibrium; the two seams and the metropolitan one outlasting the regime; the parvenu's export of the individual and the borrowed legitimacy that becomes his executioner; colonial plurality as a truce and the colony as the foreclosure's laboratory; the delivery-engine's self-consumption and the expensive order's disappearance against the cheap order's return; and the caste-relative accounting in which the roads cannot pay for the dead. No one of these unmakes the framework; each sharpens it, and together they are what this case was for.

The door the heir closed

Return now to the frame, because it carries the study's deepest single measurement. In the year 212, the emperor Caracalla — Marcus Aurelius Severus Antoninus, the son of Septimius Severus, the emperor born at Leptis Magna on the Libyan coast — issued the *Constitutio Antoniniana,* extending full Roman citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire, millions of people across three continents, in what the record calls the first unitary citizenship in the history of the world. And he did it, the sources are explicit, without stripping the new citizens of their own law: existing local legal traditions were explicitly guaranteed even as the citizenship was universalised. A dynasty from Libya gave the whole Roman world citizenship and let it keep its local law. Set that beside the decree of 1939, and the recursion delivers the study's sharpest irony. Fascist Italy, claiming to be the heir of exactly this Rome, "returning" to exactly this Libya, took the very same device — the retention of the conquered's local law — and inverted its function completely: where Rome had extended full citizenship *and* preserved local law, together, as inclusion, Italy preserved the Libyan's Muslim law precisely in order to *deny* him the full citizenship, and abolished the path to it. The same instrument, retained personal law, used by the Rome of a Libyan emperor to include the world, and by the Italy that called itself Rome's heir to exclude the Libyans. The door the Severans opened for the whole empire, the false heirs of Rome closed against the very people the Severans had come from.

This is not only irony; it is the study's central mechanism stated at its root. The framework's deepest claim, the one *The Architect and the Inheritor* rests on, is that an order becomes real — reaches the self-running pole, becomes the furniture of reality that needs no force because the governed hold it up themselves — by *taking in,* by forming and including the governed until the order is simply their world. Rome took because it included: it made a provincial from Leptis Magna its emperor and then made his subjects its citizens, and so became, across the Mediterranean and the centuries, the furniture of reality, naturalised so deeply that its own later conquests could invoke it as legitimacy. Fascist Italy did not take, with the conquered, for a single day, because it refused the one thing that makes an order real: it withheld the formation, reversed the robe, drew the caste-line through the schoolhouse and the citizenship rolls, and closed the door. An order that refuses inclusion cannot become the furniture of reality; its belief never takes; it is condemned to the expensive pole, to run on force and surveillance and the forged sword, and to vanish the moment a stronger force removes its floor — which is precisely the fate Module 10 recorded. The whole difference between the Rome that lasted centuries and became the ground of Western legitimacy, and the Italy that lasted thirty years and left only roads and graves, is the door: the inclusion Rome opened and its heir closed. The heir who closed the door did not merely commit a cruelty; he guaranteed that his order would never be real, and so guaranteed its end.

The counter-position: *brava gente,* stated and answered

The study must end on the strongest case against its own reading, stated in its full force and answered without flinching. That case is the myth of the *italiani brava gente* — the Italians, good people — and it runs so. Italian colonialism, it says, was the mildest of the European empires: brief, barely three decades against France's hundred and thirty; the work of a poor latecomer who could never afford the systematic machinery of the British or the French; less racist, less bureaucratic, less thorough. The Italians built roads that still carry Libyans, drained marshes, recovered a Roman heritage the world would else have lost; they were, individually, decent people, and some of their leaders — Balbo, who alone among the hierarchs opposed the racial laws — were more decent than the regime. The genocide, the case concludes, was a Fascist aberration bolted onto a fundamentally humane national character, not the true face of Italian colonialism, which at its best offered citizenship and villages and elevation to its "Muslims of the Fourth Shore."

Every true thing in this must be conceded, because answering a strawman proves nothing. The colonisation *was* short. Italy *was* a poor latecomer. There *was* a genuine liberal opening in 1919, the first Arab republic and its elective parliaments. Individual Italians *were* decent, and Balbo *did* oppose the racial laws. Concede all of it.

And then answer it, because the myth is not merely mistaken; it is the very mechanism of forgetting the study exists to break. The *brava gente* myth is the metropolitan seam of Module 7 in its most durable form — the seal the nation placed over its own crimes when the regime fell, the reason there was no Italian Nuremberg, the reason the colonial archives stayed shut, the reason a film about the resistance was banned in democratic Italy until 2009 as "damaging to the honour of the army," the

myth the historian Del Boca titled *a myth hard to die*. It is not evidence that Italian colonialism was mild; it is the *product* of the concealment that hid how severe it was. And the severity is not in doubt: a genocide that killed a quarter to a third of Cyrenaica and, on the United Nations' own reckoning, a quarter to half a million Libyans across the colonial period; concentration camps at a scale and lethality Africa had not seen; poison gas dropped on the tribes; the deliberate starving of a penned pastoral people and their six hundred thousand animals; and the racial laws and the caste-citizenship that make the "less racist" claim untenable. It was shorter than the French, and denser — the death rate compressed into three decades what other empires spread across a century. Nor was the genocide a mere Fascist aberration: the reprisal massacre and the island deportation camps appeared in 1911, under Liberal Italy, in the conquest's first month, because the lethality was the logic of a *settler* colony that needed the land cleared, and settler colonies clear the land whoever runs them.

Here is the deepest answer the study can give, and it turns the counter-position inside out: the very features that make Italian colonialism *seem* mild are the mechanisms by which its severity was hidden. It seems mild because the robe was reversed and the crimes were done to a people the metropole was structurally prevented from seeing; because the atrocities happened, as the historian put it, not in Europe but in Libya, across a sea the home conscience could not cross; because the nation resealed its own seam with a myth it needed. The mildness is not a fact about the colonialism; it is a fact about the concealment, and the counter-position mistakes the success of the one for the truth of the other. When the seam was at last forced partly open — when, in 2008, an Italian prime minister signed a treaty with Libya and stated that Italy apologised for its killing, destruction, and repression of the Libyan people during the colonial period — the acknowledgment came sixty-five years after the colony was lost, entangled with a deal over oil and migration, and lasted only until the next upheaval. The apology was real, and it was late, and it was interested, and its very belatedness is the measure of how long and how well the seam had held.

So credit the roads, and name the dead, and refuse to let the one pay for the other, as Module 11 required. And then say the thing the whole study has been arithmetic toward: the heir of Rome built roads and closed the door, and the door mattered more than the roads. Rome opened it and became the furniture of a civilisation; its heir closed it and became a thirty-year occupation that left, when its garrison sailed, a wire fence in the desert, a shelf of books that called a genocide a peace, and a people who buried a quarter of a province and then, from under the order that had tried to erase them, rose and took back their own ground.

Reading convergence and divergence against the framework

The capstone's contribution to the framework is the frame itself made into a claim. The convergence — two colonial powers reaching the identical caste-instrument uncoordinated — is the filter confirmed at the strongest available level, position logic converging without contact, and it should stand in the framework as a worked instance of why the Menu's families recur: not because anyone copied, but because the same problem drawn from the same short menu yields the same answer. The divergence — razed seam against redirected, parvenu against dynasty, settler against mixed, foreclosed

metropole against plural — is the framework's variables shown doing predictive work, the downstream order legible from the upstream choice. And the deepest contribution is the door: an order becomes real only by inclusion, and an order that refuses to include the governed cannot reach the self-running pole however long it holds the floor — so the colonial order, defined by the reversed robe and the withheld formation and the caste-lock, is the structural opposite of a naturalising conquest and is condemned by its own refusal to the expensive pole and the early grave. The recursion supplies the proof by contrast: the same coast, conquered by a Rome that included and by an Italy that would not, kept the first as the furniture of reality for a millennium and shed the second in a generation. That is the whole gradient of *The Machine That Runs Itself* — from the order held by force to the order held by conviction — written across nineteen centuries of one shore, and its lesson is the one the colonial bend has implied at every step and the door makes explicit: the belief takes only where the order takes the people in, and an order built to keep them out was never going to become real, only to hold, expensively, until it couldn't.

The colonial bend held in every prediction. The recursion held to the last, the cheap-pole former conquest outlasting the expensive-pole new one and resuming when it fell. And the study's central measurement came out where the frame said it would: the conqueror who claimed Rome's name refused Rome's method, closed the door Rome had opened, and paid the price the framework sets for refusing to become real — thirty years, and then the desert took the wire back.

A note on sources. The exact primary and near-primary wording quoted here is drawn from the verifiable: France's *sénatus-consulte* of 1865, *"l'indigène musulman est français,"* cited from the Algeria study for the comparison; Italy's *cittadinanza italiana speciale* of 1939 and Gaspare Ambrosini's treatise title *"lo statuto dei nativi dell'Algeria e della Libia,"* carried from Module 2 with translation; Giulio Andreotti's reported ban of *Lion of the Desert* as "damaging to the honour of the army," carried from Module 7; and the Italian prime minister's 2008 statement, at the signing of the Italy–Libya treaty of Benghazi, that Italy apologised for its killing, destruction, and repression of the Libyan people during the colonial period, given in the reported English rendering. The Roman material is standard fact: Septimius Severus, born at Leptis Magna, emperor 193–211; his son Caracalla's *Constitutio Antoniniana* of 212, extending Roman citizenship to all or nearly all free inhabitants of the empire while, as the scholarship and the UNESCO record of the Giessen papyrus note, explicitly preserving existing local legal traditions. The death figures are carried from Module 11 as ranges (the United Nations' 250,000–300,000 for 1912–1942; Ahmida's higher figure; the third of Cyrenaica lost). The analysis of the *italiani brava gente* myth follows the modern scholarship credited throughout, in particular Angelo Del Boca (*Italiani, brava gente?*) and Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, and the framework claims about inclusion and the self-running pole follow *The Machine That Runs Itself* and *The Architect and the Inheritor*. Every load-bearing fact here is to be re-verified against a primary or standard source before it is built upon. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*